Spring 2011 Full Issue by Naval War College, The U.S.
Naval War College Review 
Volume 64 
Number 2 Spring Article 1 
2011 
Spring 2011 Full Issue 
The U.S. Naval War College 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review 
Recommended Citation 
Naval War College, The U.S. (2011) "Spring 2011 Full Issue," Naval War College Review: Vol. 64 : No. 2 , 
Article 1. 
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss2/1 
This Full Issue is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital 
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval 






















NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
Spring 2011
Volume 64, Number 2
1
Naval War College: Spring 2011 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
Cover
The littoral combat ship USS Indepen-
dence (LCS 2) alongside in Newport, 
Rhode Island, during a visit in October 
2010. Numerous students, faculty, and 
staff of the College toured the vessel, 
which was in port to serve as a school 
ship for the Surface Warfare Offi cers 
School. The U.S. Navy’s sixth warship to 
bear the name and the name-ship of its 
class, Independence was delivered in late 
2009 and commissioned on 16 January 
2010. The ship and its modular weapons 
suite are designed for multipurpose 
operations in the highly dangerous littoral 
zones—enclosed waters close to hostile 
shores, where warships face a challenging 
combination of shallow depths, complex 
hydrological conditions, and a variety of 
sophisticated sea- and land-based sensors 
and forces. 
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FROM THE EDITORS
The term “antiaccess/area denial” (A2/AD) is by now so familiar to military offi-
cers and analysts that it is virtually taken for granted as a fair description of the
People’s Republic of China’s strategic concept for a potential clash with the U.S.
Navy in the western Pacific. It is therefore somewhat odd that the Chinese them-
selves have no equivalent term in their military doctrine. In fact, as Vitaliy
Pradun argues at length in the lead article of this issue, “From Bottle Rockets to
Lightning Bolts: China’s Missile Revolution and PLA Strategy against U.S. Mili-
tary Intervention,” the term is highly misleading if it is taken to suggest that the
Chinese would only seek to deter, harass, or delay arriving American naval forces
in the event of a conflict rather than to defeat them comprehensively. Pradun
makes a compelling case that the latter is precisely what they intend and what ex-
plains in particular the rapid proliferation of Chinese antiship and other mis-
siles of all types in recent years. This article nicely complements a series of pieces
that have appeared in recent issues of the Review on related matters: Marshall
Hoyler, “China’s ‘Antiaccess’ Ballistic Missiles and U.S. Active Defense” (Au-
tumn 2010); Toshi Yoshihara, “Chinese Missile Strategy and the U.S. Naval
Presence in Japan,” and Thomas J. Culora, “The Strategic Implications of Ob-
scurants: History and the Future” (both Summer 2010); and Andrew S. Erickson
and David D. Yang, “Using the Land to Control the Sea? Chinese Analysts Con-
sider the Antiship Ballistic Missile,” and Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin,
“China’s Antiship Ballistic Missile: Developments and Missing Links” (both Au-
tumn 2009).
In “Toward an African Maritime Economy: Empowering the African Union
to Revolutionize the African Maritime Sector,” Commander Michael L. Baker,
USN, proposes an ambitious, holistic program for improving the maritime
economy and infrastructure of the African littoral in response to challenges like
illegal fishing, piracy, drug smuggling, theft of oil, and other consequences of the
virtual lack of effective governance there. He argues that it is very much in the
interests of the international community, working with and through the African
Union, to provide support and financial aid to such an effort.
In “The Development of the Angled-Deck Aircraft Carrier: Innovation and
Adaptation,” Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman, and Mark D. Mandeles ex-
amine the watershed period in the history of naval aviation immediately follow-
ing World War II. Then, several major technological breakthroughs—notably
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the jet engine and nuclear weapons—raised large questions about the future and
led to an array of innovations in the design and operational utilization of air-
craft carriers. Central to this story is the collaboration between the aviation
communities of the navies of the United States and Great Britain during these
years. Strikingly, the most important of these innovations—notably the angled
flight deck, optical landing aid, and steam catapult—originated with the British,
not the Americans. This little-known story may hold interesting lessons for the
U.S. Navy today with respect to its commitment to maritime security coopera-
tion as well as technological innovation in the carrier force. A longer version of
this paper will be published later this year as Newport Paper 37, under the title
Innovation in Carrier Aviation.
Two articles revisit, if from very different angles, the Cold War at sea. Robert
G. Angevine, in “Hiding in Plain Sight: The U.S. Navy and Dispersed Operations
under EMCON, 1956–72,” tells another little-known story—this one very ger-
mane to the challenges the Navy faces today from the emerging Chinese missile
threat as discussed in our lead article. In “Alliance Naval Strategies and Norway
in the Final Years of the Cold War,” Commodore Jacob Børresen, Royal Norwe-
gian Navy (Ret.), reminds us that Norway was once one of the key fronts of the
Cold War and an important focus of U.S. and allied maritime strategy. A histo-
rian of the Royal Norwegian Navy as well as a participant in many of the events
he describes, Børresen offers us highly relevant lessons in the difficulties of
alliance management and the requirements of effective maritime security
cooperation.
Finally, in “The Quiet Warrior Back in Newport: Admiral Spruance, the Re-
turn to the Naval War College, and the Lessons of the Pacific War, 1946–1947,”
Hal M. Friedman revisits a key period in the postwar history of the Navy and of
the Naval War College in particular. This article is based on parts of several chap-
ters in Professor Friedman’s recent book Digesting History: The U.S. Naval War
College, the Lessons of World War Two, and Future Naval Warfare, 1945–1947
(Naval War College Press, 2010).
SURFACE NAVY ASSOCIATION LITERARY PRIZE
Every year the Surface Navy Association, with headquarters in Alexandria, Vir-
ginia, confers the Surface Navy Literary Award upon the author of the best pro-
fessional article in any publication addressing surface Navy or surface warfare
issues. We’re delighted to report that two articles appearing in the Review have
won honorable mention this year: “The Zumwalt-Class Destroyer: A Technol-
ogy ‘Bridge’ Shaping the Navy after Next,” by George Galdorisi and Scott Truver
(Summer 2010), and “The Most Daring Act of the Age: Principles for Naval
Irregular Warfare,” by Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Armstrong, USN (Au-
tumn 2010).
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FROM BOTTLE ROCKETS TO LIGHTNING BOLTS
China’s Missile Revolution and PLA Strategy against
U.S. Military Intervention
Vitaliy O. Pradun
In March 1996, China conducted military exercises and live missile firings in theTaiwan Strait as a response to the increasingly pro-independence stance of Tai-
wan’s president, Lee Teng-hui. The United States responded in turn by maneu-
vering two aircraft carrier groups into the island’s vicinity. China and the United
States did not come to a standoff, and the issue ended peacefully, although not
without ominous messages being received by all parties. China had signaled its
willingness to use military force to check Taiwan’s incipient independence am-
bitions, and the United States had conveyed its resolve to defend Taiwan against
aggression from the mainland.1
The incident, which made the possibility of armed conflict between the
United States and China palpable for the first time in decades, precipitated a cri-
sis in China’s security planning. The Chinese leadership understood that if it
were dragged into a military conflict with the Americans to reverse a Taiwanese
declaration of independence or a like provocation, it would have no chance of
prevailing in what it believes to be both a domestic issue and its most important
(and increasingly volatile) security concern. The subsequent and still ongoing
surge in China’s military modernization, force-posture restructuring, and doc-
trinal overhaul has thus been energetically focused on constructing the capabil-
ity to fight and win a regional war over Taiwan with the world’s strongest and
most technologically advanced military. This does not mean that China is hos-
tile to the United States or that it expects to fight a war with the United States in
the near future. However, it does mean that it sees armed conflict with the
United States over conflicting regional interests as a possible and very serious
contingency and that it is determined to be ready to meet it.
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Nevertheless, although American analyses of China’s likely performance
against Taiwan abound, to date there has been no attempt to define, map, and as-
sess comprehensively China’s likely operational strategy and its potential for
success against U.S. forces. The main reason is that the literature on Chinese se-
curity policy has been generally skeptical of China’s battlefield capabilities, lead-
ing many independent analysts to dismiss the military threat the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA)* poses to the American forces.2 Furthermore, American
analysts have attributed this view to the PLA itself and therefore, rather unduly,
posited its unwillingness to engage the United States in combat. Instead, the
dominant view in American policy circles is that China is pursuing what has been
called an “access-denial strategy,” aimed not at directly confronting U.S. forces but
at circumscribing, slowing down, and imperiling their access to the theater of op-
eration so as ultimately to delay their intervention or render it ineffective.3
According to consecutive versions of the U.S. Defense Department’s (DoD’s)
annual Military Power of the PRC report, “China’s approach to dealing with [U.S.
military intervention] centers on what DoD’s 2006 Quadrennial Defense Re-
view report refers to as disruptive capabilities: forces and operational concepts
aimed at preventing an adversary from deploying military forces to forward op-
erating locations, and/or rapidly destabilizing critical military balances.”4 Simi-
larly, the Congressional Research Service argues that “consistent with the goal of
a short-duration conflict and a fait accompli, observers believe, China is con-
structing a force that can deter U.S. intervention, or failing that, delay the arrival
or reduce the effectiveness of U.S. intervention forces.”5 A scholar at the Security
Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology concludes that
“China’s military preparations for potential conflict over Taiwan have focused
on delaying or slowing the deployment of U.S. forces to the theater and poten-
tially frustrating U.S. military operations around the island if a conflict erupts.”6
According to such views, China seeks to “deter,” “slow down,” “disrupt,” and
“complicate” the deployment of American assets to the theater of operation
rather than to engage them in combat. China’s investment in such systems as na-
val mines, electronic-warfare capabilities, and antisatellite weapons are given as
the evidence. Notably, some works go farther, claiming China’s investment in
conventional assets like submarines, aircraft, and missiles as evidence for a com-
mitment to access denial. For example, according to a widely published retired
U.S. Navy admiral, “The critical aspects of a new navy and the highly significant
8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
* “PLA,” or the People’s Liberation Army, refers in this article to China’s military in general, rather
than its army branch alone. The army service is designated here the “PLA Army,” the navy the “Peo-
ple’s Liberation Army Navy,”or PLAN, and the air force the “People’s Liberation Army Air Force,”or
PLAAF. The Second Artillery is a quasi service responsible for land-based nuclear and conventional
ballistic and cruise missiles.
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synergies that may develop between it and the missile and air forces warrant full
attention, because they are directed specifically at deterring, delaying, or com-
plicating timely and effective U.S. access and intervention.”7
The access-denial approach thus sees China’s strategy as indirect, defensive,
limited in scope and effect, and—owing to its putative reliance on disruptive
technologies and conventional assets deliberately reconfigured for disruptive
missions—inherently suboptimal compared to a conventional military cam-
paign, which, this view assumes, will remain beyond China’s means for some
time. Most pointedly, a recent and highly influential RAND report on China’s
strategy concludes that “the possibility that the Chinese People’s Liberation
Army (PLA) might employ antiaccess measures in a conflict with the United
States is the product of the PLA’s view of the nature of modern war, its awareness
of China’s military weaknesses, and its recognition of U.S. military superiority.”8
Nevertheless, evidence suggests that China’s emerging strategy is actually much
more ambitious, direct, and therefore dangerous for the United States. The access-
denial assumption largely overlooks what I believe to be the most salient, but
revolutionary, developments in the Chinese military—the wide proliferation of
long-range ballistic and cruise-missile technologies and the convergence of Chi-
nese military power around a missile-centric, rather than the conventional
platform-centric, model of mass-firepower combat.
In analyzing these developments further, with particular attention to evi-
dence of the missiles’ technical capabilities and China’s emerging C4ISR* archi-
tecture, it becomes clear that China’s successes in missile technology have much
more significant implications than previously thought. Rather than simply
compiling a loose portfolio of individual disruptive capabilities, China is pursu-
ing an ambitious program of military innovation in air and naval warfare geared
toward not harassment but paralysis and destruction of the adversary’s forces
through a concerted campaign.
My thesis is not only that China’s strategy is thus increasingly methodical but
that, with its organizing missile-centric focus, it promises to transform how
China’s forces engage in combat in general, to supply them with previously un-
available military options against the United States, and to render irrelevant
American superiority in a number of key areas. Since their first use in the 1996
Taiwan crisis, Chinese conventional missiles thus have gone from being mili-
tarily irrelevant spook weapons to highly accurate, flexible, and lethal modes of
precise and concentrated firepower around which China’s military strategy is in-
creasingly converging. I argue that the impact of this change is significant
P R A D U N 9
* Command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
C2 and ISR are partial variations.
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enough that, absent a major effort to offset China’s gains, the United States
would no longer be able to win a regional air-naval war with China over Taiwan’s
status were it to occur.
This, of course, does not mean that China itches for a war or that in a cross-
strait conflict it would prefer engaging the U.S. forces in a full-on military cam-
paign rather than deterring them from intervening in the first place. In fact, the
opposite is most likely true. However, even if China in fact prefers to deter the
United States from intervening or to coerce withdrawal early on by imposing lim-
ited attrition, this does not lead us back to access denial. In reality, whether the
United States intervened or not would be up to the United States, not China.
China is realistic enough to understand that it would not be able to assure deter-
rence against the world’s strongest power, with a security commitment to Taiwan,
broad regional interests, and a reputation at stake. However, whereas the access-
denial literature is strangely silent about what China plans to do if deterrence fails
or once the delayed U.S. forces finally do arrive at its doorstep, evidence in China’s
weapon procurement and force structure suggests that its hopes of deterring
American intervention in a Taiwan conflict altogether are underpinned by a capa-
bility not to delay and harass U.S. forces but to defeat and destroy them in a re-
gional war. The purpose of my article is to assess this capability.
The remainder of the article is organized in the following fashion. The first
section describes in some depth China’s investment in a variety of missile technolo-
gies and the convergence of its conception of firepower combat around a missile-
centric model. The second section discusses targeting and asset-coordination capa-
bilities. The third and fourth sections strive to conceptualize China’s operational
performance on the battlefield and evaluate its potential for success against U.S.
forces in a limited regional war. These sections address the novel combat options
that missiles allow China, the mechanics of missile combat, and the level of
threat it poses to the U.S. platform-centric forces. Specifically, the third section
discusses operations against land-based and docked targets, the fourth—against
moving targets at sea. The fifth section also assesses American missile defenses,
from the perspective of Chinese missile capabilities and likely countermeasures
against defenses. The concluding section offers policy considerations for the
U.S. government and military.
CHINA’S FORCE STRUCTURE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
Despite the prominent position U.S. government publications give to access de-
nial, little in PLA doctrinal writings suggests that China is committed to a delay-
ing or even a defensive strategy. As (paradoxically) admitted even by the cited
RAND report, no term equivalent to “access denial” appears anywhere in Chi-
nese military writings.9 Quite to the contrary, Chinese doctrine emphasizes not
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delaying or harassing tactics but a rapid and methodical offensive campaign
aimed at first paralyzing and then annihilating the enemy as quickly as possible.
It is true that the PLA doctrine discusses information and special-operations
warfare and the like, but it never loses its offensive spirit, in that it clearly stipu-
lates that contrary to what the access-denial approach argues, such operations
would be a means rather than a goal and would be carried out “to produce the
strategic and campaign superiority, creating conditions for winning the decisive
battle” or “create favorable conditions for the main force.”10 The methodical na-
ture of China’s military doctrine is particularly striking in that it focuses not on
delivering spread-out delaying attacks but on concentrating firepower against
vital military targets. The bulk of Chinese military writings, including the 2008
China defense white paper, The Science of Military Campaigns (the primary doc-
trinal source for the PLA), and, unsurprisingly, The Science of Second Artillery
Campaigns, focus on applying firepower efficiently and innovatively to achieve
victory over the enemy’s force as in a conventional military campaign, even if a
limited one.11 It is here that China’s extensive investment in theater missile tech-
nologies takes root, and its staggering scope not only reinforces China’s commit-
ment to a missile-centric strategy but gives us important insights into the true
ambitiousness of China’s strategic and operational goals in a potential conflict
with the United States.
Missiles are cheap, fast, expendable, risk no friendly casualties and, most im-
portantly, are difficult to preempt. Moreover, they do not require air superiority to
operate and offer a high, often even uninhibited, rate of defense penetration.
China can thus use missiles not only to achieve strategic surprise but to dismem-
ber U.S. assets on the ground or at sea without putting its own hardware or per-
sonnel in harm’s way. For this reason, missiles have permeated the PLA’s doctrine
for every important kind of operation, from denial to blockade, and the PLA offi-
cer corps views them more and more as the way to level the playing field against a
superior adversary.
Hence, every type of theater missile China operates has seen substantial
growth in numbers and improvement in lethality in the recent years, and these
trends alone afford remarkable insight into China’s apparent goals and priori-
ties.12 The Second Artillery’s older DF-21 medium-range ballistic missile
(MRBM) has an estimated maximum range of 2,150 km and a circular error
probable (CEP) of seven hundred meters.13 China has also begun the procure-
ment of the much more potent DF-21A and, most recently, DF-21B. These mis-
siles have an extended range of 2,500 km and are reported to use in-flight Global
Positioning System (GPS) updates and a radar-correlation terminal-guidance
system, which allows the DF-21A to achieve a CEP of fifty meters and the more
accurate DF-21B one of a remarkable ten meters.14 The DF-21/21A/21B missiles
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are carried by transporter-erector-launchers (TELs) and are capable of carrying
unitary high-explosive (HE), submunition, chemical, nuclear, and electromagnetic-
pulse (EMP) warheads.15 The sheer number of these missiles has grown as well. The
annual American report on China’s military power put the number of
DF-21/21As (CSS-5 Mod 1/2) at nineteen to twenty-three in 2005, forty to fifty
in 2007, and eighty to ninety in 2010.16 This means that since procurement
started, the number of Chinese
MRBMs has been increasing by
ten or eleven missiles per year,
with procurement still ongoing.
The Second Artillery has also
built an inventory of hundreds of
accurate, long-range land-attack
cruise missiles (LACMs). China’s HN-1/2/3 cruise missiles, launched from a vari-
ety of platforms, have ranges between six hundred and three thousand kilometers,
and due to inertial and terminal TV guidance boast accuracies between fifteen to
twenty meters for the HN-1 and a stunning five meters for the HN-2/3.17
The scope of operations now performed by the Second Artillery—which
fields but one type of weapon, missiles—and its integration into the rest of the
PLA are also remarkable. Although originally created as a nuclear command, the
Second Artillery has been reorganized primarily for conventional strike, as most
of the missiles it now operates are conventional ballistic missiles. Furthermore,
using these missiles, it is now tasked with conducting many of the operations
hitherto conducted only by aircraft and vessels in other services—including at-
tacks against C4ISR targets, airfields, ports, logistics networks, and, soon, mov-
ing ships.18
To a similar extent, China’s strategy for engaging U.S. aircraft carrier groups
relies on missiles, as opposed to platforms. The original Congressional Research
Service report cited above identifies, consistent with other analyses, the follow-
ing as China’s sea-denial threats to the United States: ballistic missiles (including
those capable of attacking moving ships), advanced cruise missiles, land-based
maritime attack aircraft, submarines, surface combatants, and naval mines.19
Tellingly, every single one of these threats, save the last, relies on long-range
antiship cruise missiles (ASCMs) to engage U.S. surface assets. To that end, over
the past decade the PLAN has procured a large number of ASCMs, Russian-
made and indigenous, specifically designed to attack U.S. carrier groups. De-
ployed to various platforms, these missiles are equipped with inertial guid-
ance, in-flight GPS updates, and terminal radar guidance; they deliver HE
warheads weighing from 165 to 513 kg. The most advanced missiles—the
SS-N-22 Sunburn, on the Sovremenny-class destroyer, and the SS-N-27 Sizzler,
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on the Kilo-class submarine—travel at supersonic speed and drop to just ten
meters above the surface in the attack stage, making 10g maneuvers to evade de-
fenses and attack at unexpected angles. Most critically, the vast majority of Chi-
nese ASCMs are capable of ranges between 160 and 400 km, outranging the
principal ASCM used by the United States and its allies, the RGM-84 Harpoon,
by factors as large as 3.25.20
The most remarkable fact, though, is the extent to which ASCMs have per-
vaded the Chinese navy and naval aviation. The PLAN has fitted advanced
ASCMs on four out of its five destroyer classes, two out of three frigate classes,
five out of seven attack submarine classes, and just about every aircraft in its in-
ventory, including the obsolete fighters and heavy bombers of 1960s vintage.21
The PLAN is also heavily investing in fast attack craft (FACs), whose role appears
to be exclusively that of dedicated missile platforms. The PLAN has fitted
thirty-seven of its 190 older FACs with advanced ASCMs.22 In 2004 it has intro-
duced the Houbei/Type 022 class of ASCM-armed catamaran; as of the end of
2009, over sixty units were in service, with as many as a hundred expected by the
end of the production run.23
In addition to standard LACMs and ASCMs, China has procured at least two
types of advanced antiradiation missiles (ARMs). The first was an Israeli missile/
drone, the IAI Harpy. Launched from a truck, the Harpy boasts a two-hundred-
kilometer range and can loiter unnoticed for hours before identifying and striking
a target either on land or at sea.24 The second was the Russian Kh-31P, delivered
by aircraft and boasting supersonic speed, a complex flight profile, a 110–200
km range, an eight-meter CEP, and the ability to attack targets on land, at sea, or
in the air.25
Finally, China is on the cusp of deploying an additional capability for engaging
moving U.S. carrier groups, again using missiles—the vaunted DF-21C
ground-based antiship ballistic missile (ASBM), equipped with a maneuverable
reentry vehicle (MaRV). The DF-21C, sometimes referred to as the DF-21D,
DF-21E, or DF-25 depending on the source, has an estimated maximum range of
1,500 km. When fired at the target, the missile would deliver its reentry vehicle to
the general vicinity of the carrier group, at which point a terminal-guidance
suite—believed to be active-radar, infrared (IR), or laser—would seek the target
and maneuver the reentry vehicle onto it at high hypersonic speed. Its maneuvers,
carried out in a complex trajectory, are designed to guarantee penetration of
antimissile defenses and then a hit.26 The warhead type or types are unknown at
this time but believed to be HE, armor-penetrator, submunition, or EMP. It ap-
pears that the missile went into production in 2010 and could be fielded as early as
2011. Extrapolating from the DF-21 yearly production cycles, we can expect to see
ten or so new DF-21Cs deployed each year.27 (See the table.)
{LINE-SPACE}
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It is illogical to consider that China, rigorously building up such fundamental
advantages over the U.S. Navy as it is, is seeking merely to harass and slow down
U.S. ships approaching Taiwan. Instead, China appears to be committed to se-
curing the capability to win a regional-scale campaign against the U.S. Navy, and
it appears to see transcending the platform-centric concept of naval warfare as
the key to this goal.
In the end, China’s overwhelming emphasis on missile technologies under-
mines the argument that it is merely pursuing access denial for two reasons. First,
missiles are fundamentally destructive, rather than disruptive, weapons. Their
wide proliferation within the PLA suggests a commitment to crippling the adver-
sary’s campaign effort and imposing maximum casualties on its forces, rather
than merely impeding their deployment. In fact, it is likely that China would actu-
ally allow an adversary to mass its assets within striking distance, specifically to
maximize the effectiveness of missile attacks. In either case, there is no reason to
see the wiping out by missile strikes of a squadron of fighters at a forward operating
base in Japan or Korea as merely disruptive and delaying rather than a conventional-
battle goal of inflicting attrition on the adversary’s assets, reducing its operational
capability, and degrading its campaign effort while furthering one’s own.
Second, China’s missiles can target only forces that have already entered the
theater. Only a few MRBMs and LACMs could strike land targets as far away as
Guam, and none could target U.S. forces beyond the “second island chain.”28
Chinese ASCMs can attack targets at most four hundred kilometers from their
launch platforms. As China’s ability to operate those platforms—surface com-
batants, submarines, and aircraft—far from its shores remains limited and
would be risky in any case, it would not be able to engage U.S. carrier groups un-
til they were within hundreds of kilometers from Taiwan. Overall, China has
procured close to a hundred MRBMs and hundreds of ARMs and LACMs, and it
has armed nearly every boat, ship, submarine, and aircraft in its navy with super-
sonic ASCMs. Moreover, all these types of missiles above are highly effective
against targets within the theater but are incapable of striking targets attempting
to access it. In the end, then, it does not follow that China’s primary strategy is
access-denial or that its missiles somehow represent an extension of that strat-
egy. Rather, its force structure and its weapon-procurement trends indicate
strongly that China has instead maintained a commitment to the conventional
aerospace/naval campaign, but revolutionized it by couching it in a missile-
centric rather than platform-centric model of firepower combat. Moreover, as
the destructive properties and the theaterwide (but clearly not transocean)
ranges of China’s missiles suggest, their advent points to a Chinese commitment
to an energetic strategy of engaging and defeating an adversary directly in the
theater, not merely delaying and disrupting its access, with uncertain options
thereafter.
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However remarkable in itself the ongoing convergence of China’s strategy
around missile-centric concepts is, even more disturbing is the fact that theater
missiles are showing real potential to expose the heretofore well-shielded weak-
nesses of U.S. expeditionary forces, including long forward-deployment times,
the exposed state of equipment at forward operating bases, and the obsolescence
of ASCMs carried by surface combatants. Furthermore, China’s missiles, sup-
ported by recent strides in C4ISR, promise to provide the country with trans-
formative options, long coveted but previously unavailable, that would offset or
even render irrelevant American superiority in several key areas, including air
defense and integrated naval warfare.
The fact that stationary targets are vulnerable to surprise air strikes has been
apparent since even before Pearl Harbor. Nevertheless, in the recent decades it
would have been nearly impossible for a regional adversary to carry out a suc-
cessful air raid against a U.S. force assembling on the adversary’s borders, due to
constant American satellite surveillance of enemy forces, considerable flight dis-
tances involved, nonexistent or insufficient tanker support, formidable allied air
defenses, and the marked superiority of U.S. fighters.
But China’s conventional MRBM, LACM, and ARM technology allows it to
attack U.S. forces not only with great precision and flexibility but with expend-
able airframes fired from safe distances, thereby overcoming the once-decisive
limitations of Chinese aircraft. First, unlike aircraft, ballistic missiles are
launched from mobile, widely dispersed, inconspicuous, and easily hidden or
disguised TELs, which are nearly impossible to identify and track;29 therefore,
they do not betray their user’s intent as they take their firing positions. In addi-
tion, because ballistic-missile flight times are no longer than several minutes,
their launch would not provide sufficient warning for the aircraft to clear the
tarmac. Second, again unlike aircraft, ballistic missiles do not need air superior-
ity to operate and would be unaffected by screens of American or allied defen-
sive fighters below them. Third, because MRBMs reenter the atmosphere at
hypersonic speeds, there are currently no viable defenses against them and, as I
argue below, there will not be in the near future. This ultimately means that if
they are as accurate as analysts believe, their ability to destroy any stationary tar-
get identified by Chinese ISR assets, no matter how valuable to the United States,
is all but assured.
The Chinese ability to threaten moving ships is equally remarkable. The vul-
nerability of U.S. surface assets to ASCMs has been evident for some time. Today,
China’s maritime strategy—acquiring missile technologies for which the U.S.
surface assets simply have no effective defenses, integrating them into every
combat arm of its navy, and developing the capabilities for C2 and ISR necessary
to sustain concentrated missile raids against U.S. carrier groups—is doing for
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the ASCM what blitzkrieg did for the tank. Rather than simply integrating a
powerful weapon into existing doctrine and force structure, China has refined
its doctrine and constructed a force structure in support of a weapon in order to
fundamentally redefine that weapon’s potential.
The unprecedented adaptation of ballistic missiles for antiship operations is
equally transformative. Given its 1,500 km range and a flight time measured in
minutes, China’s revolutionary DF-21C ASBM not only offers its launcher vir-
tual impunity from counterattack but represents potentially the most robust
strike option currently possible. The speed, flexibility, range, and launcher sur-
vivability of the ASBM cannot be matched by any other weapon, and as will be
seen, antiair warfare (AAW) and missile defenses and preemption would be of
little use against it.
FINDING AND TARGETING U.S. FORCES
The most important question for many in considering the PLA’s missile threat is
whether China has the C4ISR architecture necessary to find and target U.S.
forces. I argue that in just the past five years China has achieved a sufficient pro-
ficiency in this domain to manage a successful missile campaign.
China has deployed sky-wave and surface-wave over-the-horizon (OTH) ra-
dars in recent years, offering constant coverage as far out as three thousand kilo-
meters within a field of view of sixty degrees. If, as is likely, China has built more
than one site, it could have uninterrupted radar coverage of all the surrounding
seas. These assets would be instrumental in locating and tracking U.S. surface
forces within the theater. Although the radars are large systems, their locations
might be unknown to the approaching force.
China’s space-based ISR capabilities have grown exponentially in the past
several years. As of November 2010, China has thirty optical, synthetic aperture
radar (SAR), IR, and multispectral intelligence satellites in orbit. The PLA also
operates three JianBing 3 and twelve YaoGan surveillance satellites, and several
additional YaoGan platforms are expected in orbit each year. The JianBing 3
platforms offer optical and IR imagery with a resolution under two meters. In
the more advanced YaoGan program, seven satellites are believed to be electro-
optical, offering resolution of 0.6 to one meter;30 five are believed to be SAR sat-
ellites, capable of all-weather imaging with five-meter resolution.31
China also operates a considerable number of less capable observation satel-
lites producing optical, SAR, IR, multispectral, and hyperspectral imagery that is
likely used for military intelligence as well as its primary civilian purposes.32 These
platforms include two CBERS/ZiYuan earth-observation satellites, two HuanJing
and three ShiYan environment-observation satellites, three HaiYang maritime-
surveillance satellites, three FengYun and one Chuangxin meteorological
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satellites, the Beijing-1 resources-observation satellite, and finally TianHui, a
high-resolution (approximately five meters) mapping satellite.33 To facilitate the
relay of intelligence, China launched in 2008 a TianLian 1-01 data-relay satellite,
offering near-real-time communication and coverage of 50 percent of the globe.
The successor program, TianLian 2, envisions two satellites and 85 percent
global coverage in this decade.34
According to an analysis by Eric Hagt and Matthew Durnin published in
these pages in 2009, assuming a then-accurate total of twenty-two satellites with
an off-nadir (i.e., side-to-side) field of view of sixty degrees, China could ensure
that each area was revisited by a satellite every forty-five minutes, on average.35
This would be sufficient to monitor stationary concentrations of aircraft and
ships at regional bases. Also, the space-based ISR architecture may already be
able to locate and track moving carrier groups, especially when combined with
other ISR assets. Hagt and Durnin deemed the forty-five-minute revisit rate in-
sufficient for tracking carriers continuously with space-based assets.36 However,
extrapolating from their study, having thirty satellites in orbit would reduce that
interval to thirty or thirty-five minutes. Furthermore, the Hagt-Durnin model
somewhat plays down the importance of other facets of China’s ISR assets and
their ability to overlay and complement each other. Significantly, a carrier group,
once its general location has been detected by a certain ISR asset, does not need
to be tracked by the same asset. General coordinates from the OTH radar or a
satellite could be passed to a nearby submarine or to aircraft that would close in
on the carrier to engage it or continue tracking it.
In addition to ocean-bottom sonar beds, China operates fifty-five subma-
rines, all of which could assist with carrier detection and tracking. The boats of
the relatively old and noisy Romeo and Ming classes would likely lie in wait with
their engines stopped, serving as listening posts. Newer, quieter submarines
would likely be able to track U.S. surface assets while shadowing them unde-
tected. Many observers have pointed out the likelihood that China would fit a
number of inconspicuous civilian vessels, such as fishing boats, with equipment
to detect U.S. carrier groups and relay their locations. Finally, China would call
on its surface combatants and maritime reconnaissance aircraft to assist in lo-
cating and tracking U.S. surface assets. In fact, China’s Gaoxin Project is devel-
oping seven specialized variants of the indigenous Y-8 cargo aircraft, with
versions specializing in electronic and signal intelligence collection, communi-
cation and data relay, and electronic warfare, all useful against American air and
naval assets in the theater.37
China is also proficient in remote-communication technologies, which
would be essential for coordinating assets in a high-intensity campaign. It
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operates four dedicated military communications satellites: three FengHuo ve-
hicles and the DongFangHong-4, launched in 2010.38 Also, it has access to a
number of commercial communication satellites, like Sinosat. China has also
bolstered its AWACS* capability and is continuing to push for greater airborne
C2 capability. The PLAAF has added four Y-8 early-warning planes and at least
four A-50 Mainstay AWACS aircraft to its force in the recent years.39 It is work-
ing on the KJ-200 and KJ-2000 projects, based on the Y-8 and A-50 platforms,
respectively.40
Even more strikingly, China appears to be pursuing naval asset integration
through Aegis-like technology. The first two ships of the PLAN’s latest destroyer
class, Luyang II, are designed as China’s first ships capable of integrated air de-
fense. The ships are equipped
with the Tombstone phased-array
radar with 360-degree coverage, a
C2 suite, and state-of-the-art
SA-N-20 AAW missiles, which
more than double the range of the current PLAN air defenses and represent a
leap toward correcting the PLAN’s perennial weakness in this area of warfare.41
Experts expect the new naval assets to make use of Russia’s advanced AT2M
data-link technology (analogous to NATO’s Link 16), which should contribute
to the integration of Chinese naval task forces.42 The advent of the Luyang II class
and PLAN integration not only increases the air-defense capabilities of Chinese
surface combatants but allows them to be organized into battle groups. Self-
sufficient, integrated battle groups operating phased-array radars could not only
help track U.S. assets more efficiently but coordinate and concentrate their missile
firepower, in support of one of the major tenets of China’s missile strategy.
Finally, China is now capable of supplying navigation, positioning, and cru-
cially, missile guidance systems through indigenous technology. China com-
pleted its first BeiDou 1 navigation constellation between 2000 and 2007,
covering China and the immediate region; of the original four satellites, three
are still active.43 BeiDou 1’s successor, BeiDou 2, or Compass, is China’s own
global positioning system; it has both civil and military applications, compara-
ble to GPS, GLONASS, and Galileo. It has already launched the first five Com-
pass satellites, offering coverage of most of the region.44 China plans to extend
the constellation to a total of ten satellites by 2012, achieving coverage of all of
Asia, and to a complete network of thirty-five satellites, for global coverage, by
2020.45 Many of China’s extremely long-range ASCMs currently rely on GPS
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updates for guidance; should the United States jeopardize China’s access to GPS
during hostilities, China is already able to exercise the same capabilities with its
current Compass structure.
This wealth of development in the recent years—the deployment of thirty
military and dual-use intelligence satellites, a strong all-weather capability,
OTH radars, sonar beds, and a large number of ISR-capable ships, submarines,
and aircraft—has greatly illuminated China’s “strategic view” and allows it to lo-
cate, track, and target U.S. assets on land and at sea much more easily. The PLA’s
impressive leap in integrated air defense reveals that technologically and opera-
tionally, the PLA is already capable of targeting U.S. assets in the theater. Hagt
and Durnin suggest that by 2014 China would be able to locate and track U.S.
carrier groups with its space-based ISR alone.46 As additional technology comes
on line—with a new satellite launch every several months—China’s already suf-
ficient ability to conduct coordinated air-naval operations and missile strikes is
becoming stronger, which, together with the lethality of its ordnance, presents
the loss-averse American assets with a powerful challenge.
ATTACKING LAND-BASED TARGETS
Consistent with its doctrine, China is likely to give priority to attacks on C4ISR
assets, in order to paralyze American operations. This would include striking ra-
dars (with MRBMs, LACMs, or ARMs) and C2 centers (with MRBMs armed
with earth-penetrating warheads). Importantly, this target set would also in-
clude AWACS and ISR aircraft on the ground; these aircraft are large and con-
spicuous enough to be easily visible and vulnerable to most elements of China’s
missile architecture.
Most attacks, however, would undoubtedly be concentrated against groups of
unsheltered fighters on the ground. In Operations DESERT STORM, ALLIED
SHIELD (the Kosovo campaign), and IRAQI FREEDOM, U.S.-led coalitions used
2,400, 1,055, and 1,801 aircraft, respectively, nearly all of them deployed directly
to the theaters of operation.47 During DESERT STORM, for example, coalition
forces deployed 2,400 aircraft, of which seven hundred were land-based fight-
ers.48 The land-based fighters were deployed mostly to Saudi Arabia, at an aver-
age deployment rate of fifteen fighters per day and with an average concentra-
tion density of thirty-four aircraft per airfield.49 In the two months between the
start of deployment to the theater and the commencement of combat opera-
tions, these aircraft remained parked in open areas, their personnel housed in
sprawling tent cities nearby.
A prominent 1999 RAND study of the vulnerabilities to missile strikes of as-
sets and personnel so deployed found that given typical hardstand spacing, a
ballistic missile with a five-hundred-kilogram unitary warhead could in a direct
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hit destroy six fighters the size of F-15s.50 More disturbingly, the study also re-
ported that if the unitary warhead were replaced by a submunition dispenser
containing 825 steel balls, the lethal area of the same missile would increase
eightfold. A single missile covering such an area, according to the RAND au-
thors, would thus be able to destroy eighty-two F-15-sized aircraft, or more than
an entire air wing.51
Ten years later, in 2009, another RAND study, modeling attacks by short-
range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) on all parking ramps of all ten of Taiwan’s air
bases, concluded that assuming warheads with eight hundred submunitions
each and to a large extent regardless of CEP, a mere two missiles would be re-
quired to achieve a 90 percent chance of destroying all aircraft on a given ramp,
or only one missile for a 70–80 percent chance. Given the overlap between
hardstands, this would translate to needing from twenty-four to thirty-six mis-
siles to clear all parking ramps on all ten bases.52
In the last decade, China has in fact adopted a submunition warhead for
SRBM and MRBM delivery, unquestionably with this very mission in mind. Al-
though its parameters are not known, it is most probable that the warhead uses a
large number (in the hundreds) of steel balls or shards. If this is so, China very
likely possesses an MRBM operational capability with ordnance lethal area and
accuracy on a par with, or better than, that hypothesized in the studies above.53
This means that if the United States were to deploy 340 fighters, with associated
support aircraft, to ten forward operating bases, China could potentially destroy
them all with as few as twenty DF-21/DF-21As, or only two missiles for each
base.54
Missile attacks against individual aircraft shelters, in bases that possessed them,
would be prohibitively costly. However, such bases would remain China’s strategic
priority, as the United States is likely to deploy its most capable fighters, including
the F-22, to them. For these targets China would likely use MRBMs to cut run-
ways, trapping the fighters; continue the attack with LACMs and ARMs against
radars, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and other critical infrastructure; and then
follow up with aircraft strikes targeting individual shelters by using much cheaper
precision-guided munitions. The 2009 RAND model suggests that two missiles
with CEPs of eighty-two feet (about twenty-five meters) carrying warheads with
eighty-two earth-penetrator submunitions each would render a single runway in-
operable with a 70 percent probability.55 Notably, China could strike bases just
outside the usual reach of its SRBMs—including those on Okinawa and Kyushu
and in South Korea—by using lighter warheads on its numerous DF-15A SRBMs,
thereby extending their range. An even easier solution would be to send SRBMs
on boost-glide, or depressed, trajectories, which would increase their range by as
much as 31.2 percent.56
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Chinese missiles would also pose a significant threat to U.S. ships entering
ports around the region. The United States maintains a carrier group on contin-
ual patrol in the western Pacific, homeporting the USS George Washington strike
group in Yokosuka, Japan, as part of that rotation.57 The George Washington
group remains in port about six months out of the year and is on patrol for the
other six.58 Even on patrol, it must periodically enter port for replenishment,
maintenance, and other purposes. These requirements, in addition to poten-
tially having to enter port to repair battle damage, would also apply to any addi-
tional carrier groups that the United States would maintain in the theater for a
prolonged period of time, giving China’s missiles a periodic set of lucrative, sta-
tionary targets that could be attacked with not only ASBMs and ASCMs but, ev-
ery time the ships enter into dock, standard MRBMs and LACMs as well.
Finally, China could use missile strikes against vulnerable U.S. logistics net-
works. Each forward-deployed combat aircraft, such as an F-15C, requires about
133 tons, or three C-17 loads, of ammunition, force protection equipment, vehi-
cles, personnel, and the like. According to one Chinese analyst, each F-15C con-
sumes almost seventeen tons of fuel per day.59 If supporting C2 and ISR aircraft
are deployed with the fighters, the requirement for fuel rises substantially. As
U.S. aircraft initially deploy with supplies for only two to five days, they rely
thereafter on continuous airlift and sealift.60 The dependence of American car-
rier groups on replenishment, particularly in fuel, is even more extensive. A sin-
gle strike group requires sixty thousand tons of fuel and thirty thousand of
aviation fuel every five days.61 Although transport aircraft on the ground and
supply ships in port could themselves be targeted, China might instead go for
more lucrative repositories. Since most fuel, ammunition, and other equipment
have to be stored in depots too large to be hardened, LACM attacks using stan-
dard HE warheads would imperil U.S. operations even if military platforms and
transport vessels remained intact.
ATTACKING SEA-BASED TARGETS
The consensus in the American maritime-security literature and apparently the
U.S. Navy itself is that its surface assets have no reliable defenses against Chinese-
or Russian-made state-of-the-art ASCMs.62 Because of the missiles’ low flight
profiles, brief flight times (twenty-five to thirty-five seconds), and resilience to
electronic-warfare attack, they are difficult to track and either intercept or jam in
flight.63 Specifically, because they drop to only several meters above the water in
the final stage of flight, they would effectively slip below not only the U.S. carrier
radars but the minimum vertical range of AAW missiles. What is more, these mis-
siles close in for the attack at supersonic speeds, and, as noted above, often make
10g turns to evade defenses and attack from unexpected angles.64 This makes them
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virtually impossible to intercept with AAW missiles. The only other shipborne
system that the U.S. surface combatants could employ against them is the Vulcan
Phalanx close-in radar-guided gun; however, its radar guidance is starkly insuf-
ficient for tracking and engaging objects performing evasive maneuvers at su-
personic speeds.65 Finally, although ASCMs like the Sunburn were once too
short legged to engage U.S. ships, significant increases in their ranges over the
past several years have effaced this reassurance. Furthermore, as already argued,
range disparity allows the PLAN to target American assets from well outside the
range of U.S. carrier groups’ own ASCMs.
Observers believe China is developing the capacity to capitalize on this acute
vulnerability by means of saturation missile raids launched simultaneously
from a variety of platforms on, below, and above the sea surface, with intervals
between launches on the order of only seconds to minutes.66 Granted, it is un-
likely that China would be able to synchronize simultaneous attacks by forces
hundreds of kilometers apart for some time to come. However, given its profi-
ciency in C2, satellite communications, and data relay, as well as theaterwide
coverage provided by its OTH radars, sonar beds, and possibly disguised mer-
chant vessels, China very likely is now capable of massing volleys from individ-
ual fighting squads, such as aircraft or surface-combatant strike groups, all of
whose platforms can be cued to the target’s location by the same C2 center. The
PLAN believes—and, it appears, quite correctly—that if it can mount such at-
tacks with adequate proficiency, the sheer number of missiles attacking from di-
verse azimuths in massed, sustained waves, even if not synchronized, would
inevitably saturate American defenses and take a heavy toll on the exposed ships,
which, reeling under the onslaught, would be unable to retaliate in kind. China’s
commitment to such a strategy is evident in its development of a force structure
—including aircraft, submarines, surface combatants, and FACs—able to de-
liver ASCMs from multiple axes. The total number of missile carriers in the
PLAN, multiplied by the number of missiles each carries, is truly formidable
and, with the introduction of new vessels each year, is shifting the naval balance
decidedly in China’s favor.
The PLAN operates over seven hundred maritime strike aircraft, most al-
ready fitted with between two and four ASCMs or Kh-31P ARMs.67 PLA doc-
trine describes aircraft as having advantages in ASCM delivery, in that they are
fast, versatile, and highly mobile.68 Furthermore, aircraft are safe from U.S. sub-
marines and antiship weapons and, unlike other assets, they can be detected
only by radar, and with no guarantee of that at low altitudes.69 Finally, the ranges
of air-launched ASCMs tend to be longer than those of their ship-, submarine-,
and ground-launched counterparts. All this makes aircraft an effective and
dangerous launching platform.
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Due to their inherent ability to go undetected anywhere in the theater, sub-
marines are another leg of China’s antisurface force structure. The PLAN oper-
ates twenty-nine submarines equipped with advanced ASCMs, each usually
carrying eight missiles, with new units added each year.70 Although more diffi-
cult to coordinate than surface combatant or aircraft strike groups, significantly
slower than other assets, and, by virtue of operating alone, offering much smaller
concentrations of missiles, submarines are currently China’s stealthiest platform
for antisurface warfare.71 The deterioration of U.S. antisubmarine warfare capa-
bilities since the end of the Cold War, China’s marked numerical advantage in
the theater, and the western Pacific’s maritime topography’s adverseness for sub-
marine detection would make ASCM attacks by PLAN submarines a threat
throughout a campaign even with extensive American antisubmarine warfare
assets present.72
The PLAN also operates thirteen destroyers and twenty-two frigates
equipped with ASCMs.73 Although they lack the speed of aircraft and the stealth
of submarines, they carry the most missiles, eight to sixteen per destroyer and
four to eight per frigate.74 Furthermore, China would likely organize its surface
combatants into battle groups, each coordinated by a Luyang II–class destroyer,
allowing concentration of firepower and AAW capabilities. Although coordina-
tion of synchronous missile volleys from widely separated assets may remain be-
yond China’s means for some time, the integration capabilities of the Luyang II
ships would already allow China to launch synchronized mass volleys from all
surface combatants within each battle group led by a Luyang II.
Last but not least is the PLAN’s rapidly growing FAC fleet. These vessels are
small, stealthy, fast, and maneuverable, making them difficult targets. What’s
more, each craft carries four to eight ASCMs—the same armament as many of
the PLAN’s fleet ships. Perhaps their most important characteristic, though, is
that given their low cost relative to that of surface combatants and submarines,
they can be deployed in much larger numbers—it appears that as many as a hun-
dred are planned by early next decade.75 These factors not only make this modern-
day “mosquito fleet” particularly well suited for executing mass ASCM strikes,
but lessen the impact of the loss of any one craft, rendering any exchange of ca-
sualties with U.S. surface combatants inherently favorable to the PLAN. Al-
though FACs themselves are limited to coastal areas, the long range of their
ASCMs enables them to engage surface combatants five to six hundred kilome-
ters to sea, putting U.S. ships within striking distance of China’s territory at very
significant risk.
Another weapon that warrants discussion is, of course, the DF-21C ASBM,
which should see deployment beginning in 2011. Although due to ASBM cost
and limited inventory, it is unlikely that China would use them in barrages, they
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have remarkable capability nonetheless. The missiles are launched from incon-
spicuous TELs on land, cover their entire 1,500 km range in seventeen minutes,
accurately maneuver onto their target within a wide radius, and—even with
forced reduction of reentry speed, but provided accurate targeting—strike their
targets at high hypersonic speed. The reentry vehicle entering at such velocity
would be immune to shipborne AAW and close-in gun defenses. Moreover, as
the next section discusses, because of standard countermeasures in the
midcourse phase and complex reentry maneuvers, ASBMs also could not be in-
tercepted by U.S. missile defenses. Maneuvering to get out of the missile’s seeker
would also likely prove ineffective. According to a 2010 analysis in this quarterly,
it would take approximately thirty-five minutes from the detection of the target
for the PLA to communicate its location to a relevant C2 center, issue an engage-
ment order (with no delay assumed) to the launcher, and fire the ASBM, and for
the missile to travel its full range. During these thirty-five minutes the carrier
group could travel thirty-one kilometers, making a circle with a radius of
thirty-one kilometers the missile’s area of uncertainty and therefore the re-
quired seeker footprint for a single missile to find the target.76 Although no au-
thoritative data on the DF-21C’s seeker footprint exist in the open literature,
Chinese sources suggest twenty-, forty-, and hundred-kilometer footprints.77
Given the missiles’ high cost, it is unlikely that China would opt for an overly
narrow footprint, making a hundred, or perhaps forty, kilometers more credible
than twenty. Hence, chances are that each individual ASBM would be able to
find its target and, once it does, achieve a virtually assured hit.
The U.S. Navy, as noted, has been aware of the difficulty of defending against
ASCMs for some time. To this concern have been added those about ASBMs in
recent years. For this reason, the American operational concept against antiship
missiles has, since the late Cold War, stressed “killing the archer rather than his
arrows.”78 The U.S. fleet’s ability to kill arrows will remain dismal for some time
to come. However, the most fundamental asymmetry represented by China’s
ASCMs and ASBMs is an ability to keep the archer himself well out of reach.
The SM-2 and Sea Sparrow AAW missiles have ranges of less than 170 km,
and the subsonic Harpoon ASCM has a range of only 130 km.79 On the other
hand, to use just a few examples, the Sunburn has a range of 250 km, allowing
the Sovremenny-class destroyer to attack American assets 120 km before it
would come into range of surface-launched Harpoon missiles.80 Similarly, the
range of the air-launched YJ-91 is four hundred kilometers, which allows its vec-
tor, the Su-30MK2 fighter, to release the missile and safely turn back some 230
km before it could come into the range of ship-launched American AAW mis-
siles.81 The DF-21C has a range of 1,500 km, keeping its launcher beyond U.S.
carrier groups’ radar coverage.
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The U.S. Navy’s ability to kill the archer usually has traditionally resided in its
ability to engage firing platforms with carrier-borne aircraft. However, when
flight decks are damaged by missile strikes, launching and recovering aircraft be-
comes impossible. Here, too, China’s launcher architecture allows it a number of
robust options.
Chinese aircraft generally lack the range to engage the enemy or protect the
PLAN’s surface combatants beyond a thousand kilometers or so from China’s
coast. It is therefore unlikely that China would use its aircraft at longer ranges,
where they would be vulnerable to
American carrier-borne fighters.
Past perhaps a thousand kilome-
ters from its coast, China would
most likely rely on submarine-
launched ASCMs and submarine-
and land-based ASBMs to paralyze
carrier air before the carrier groups could be engaged safely by other assets. Not
only would the Chinese submarines consistently be able to get within firing range
of the U.S. carriers due to the factors outlined above, but they would typically re-
main too far away to be countertargeted before they escaped.
Closer than a thousand kilometers from the coast, countertargeting would
become even more difficult. The submarine and ASBM threats would remain
equally persistent. Also, Chinese surface combatants and maritime strike air-
craft now threatening the carriers not only would have their own antiair capabil-
ity, but would be covered by several thousand land-based PLAN and PLAAF
fighters, several hundred of them comparable or superior to U.S. carrier-borne
fighters. Apart from the threat they would pose to the carriers themselves, their
persistence would make attacking Chinese surface combatants and maritime
strike aircraft with carrier-borne fighters all the more difficult. Within five hun-
dred or so kilometers of China’s coast, the U.S. forces would also be within the
range of FAC-launched missiles. Finally, within two hundred kilometers carriers
would be vulnerable to all of the above plus land-based S-300 SAM batteries.
In addition to all this, the U.S. naval and air forces would be unable to
countertarget ballistic-missile launchers, including ASBM launchers, on land.
The United States would be unable to rely extensively on airborne ISR platforms,
as they are highly vulnerable to Chinese SAMs. This would force the Americans
to depend largely on space-based reconnaissance. Optical satellites, however,
have trouble penetrating cloud cover, which is perennial in southwest China. As
China extensively employs sophisticated camouflage, concealment, and decoy
techniques, many of its assets would be indistinguishable to radar, or even opti-
cal satellites or airborne ISR.82 Lastly, and most importantly, Chinese TELs
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would operate in densely populated areas, where, even if not hidden inside
buildings or under bridges, they would need to be identified among vast num-
bers of civilian vehicles. For these reasons a dedicated RAND study that exten-
sively models attacks against Chinese TELs with the most advanced existing and
developmental American technology concludes that they would be nearly im-
possible to target, especially at long ranges.83
In the end, it would be remarkably difficult for U.S. carrier groups to count on
destroying Chinese missile launchers with airpower, or by any other means, be-
fore their own flight decks were disabled. The United States would be forced to
try to shoot down Chinese ASCMs after all—and no effective technology exists
to do so effectively and consistently.
OVERCOMING THEATER MISSILE DEFENSES
To cope with the rising missile challenge in the past several decades, the United
States has invested heavily in active missile defenses.84 Unfortunately, the cur-
rent and projected American strategies are unlikely to provide any reasonable
measure of effectiveness against China’s missiles. For its part, China has invested
in a number of countermeasures specifically meant to foil U.S. missile defenses.
Currently the U.S. theater missile defense (TMD) architecture is designed to
engage ballistic missiles in their midcourse and reentry phases. The chief system
to strike down missiles in the midcourse stage is the sea-based SM-3 missile.85
The principal systems to engage ballistic missiles in the reentry phase are the Ter-
minal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), for the “upper tier” of the atmo-
sphere, and the PAC-3 SAMs and Navy’s SM-2 Block IV SAM, for the lower tier.86
However, even this multilayered defense network has serious, and probably insur-
mountable, limitations in terms of simultaneous-engagement volume, available
interceptor inventories, and interceptor performance.
The first limitation is on the number of targets that it can realistically engage
within a single time window. As no interceptor would have better than an 80
percent chance of success even under ideal conditions, it is almost certain that
two interceptors would have to be fired per target. However, one “target” does
not mean one missile. It is common for modern ballistic missiles to release chaff
or from five to ten decoys, indistinguishable from the warhead to TMD sensors,
during the midcourse phase.87 The PLA also discusses firing previously decom-
missioned obsolete missiles, less accurate or capable armed weapons (some re-
leasing their own decoys), and even cheaper SRBMs as “bait” for interceptors.
Thus a volley of ten missiles could produce from fifty to a hundred targets, aside
from chaff. The TMD system would be forced either to select targets randomly
or to attempt to engage them all. Since the vast majority of the targets would be
decoys, the former would offer an impracticably low probability of picking out
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the true warheads; the latter would exhaust the interceptor launch capacity at
once. Either way, the TMD system would allow unengaged targets, many of them
presumably warheads, to penetrate to their targets. Notably, whereas decoys
would burn up during reentry, decommissioned or otherwise low-capability
missiles would survive and continue acting as decoys against reentry-phase de-
fenses. For these reasons, the PLA feels confident of its ability to saturate the
defense in this way in each launch window.88
The second major limitation of the TMD is in interceptor inventory. For ex-
ample, the United States is currently planning to procure 329 SM-3 missiles,
tasked with midcourse stage interception, for its entire navy.89 Because two in-
terceptors would most likely be fired per target, that entire inventory might in-
tercept at most 160 or so targets. However, it is fallacious to assume an exchange
based merely on respective ballistic-missile and interceptor inventories. Factor-
ing in decoys released in the midcourse stage, 160 targets could correspond to as
few as sixteen to thirty-two actual missiles. If decommissioned missiles and the
like are added, the number of high-value airframes the Chinese would need to
deplete the entire SM-3 inventory falls even lower. Other interceptor systems are
similarly limited in their inventories. This means that a number of concerted
volleys of low-value missiles containing just several capable missiles, especially
if equipped with decoys, would inevitably deplete the entire TMD inventory, let
alone the fraction of it deployed to the theater.
The third limitation of the TMD lies in the doubtfulness of its interceptor ca-
pabilities. Few realistic data exist. For example, the SM-3 missile-based architec-
ture has demonstrated sixteen successful intercepts in twenty attempts.90
However, a prominent analysis suggests test conditions (which provide the basis
for developers’ claims) tend to be far from what the missiles would deal with in a
real combat scenario.91 What is more, the deployed systems are strictly limited in
the kinds of targets they can intercept at all. Notably, the PAC-3 and SM-2 Block
IV are designed for SRBM interception but would be ineffective against longer-
range ballistic missiles, due to the targets’ higher reentry speeds. The speed of a
PAC-3 interceptor, the faster of the two, is only 2.5 kilometers per second, allow-
ing it to intercept only missiles with ranges no longer than 1,500 km.92 Indeed,
U.S. forces deployed to the theater would be within 1,500 km of China’s launch
points. But the Chinese could respond by simply sending MRBMs on lofted tra-
jectories, traveling the same horizontal distance but descending at much higher
velocities and so easily outrunning lower-tier defenses. Also, although THAAD,
PAC-3, and SM-2 Block IV missiles can engage objects descending on set trajec-
tories, they cannot chase down MaRVs descending in unpredictable trajectories
at high hypersonic speeds.93 Finally, all lower-tier defenses have IR seekers;
simply enclosing reentry vehicles in cooled shrouds would throw them off.
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Hence, none of the missile defense systems in development by the United
States could provide effective protection from Chinese missiles. Moreover, be-
cause fielding additional missiles and developing additional countermeasures
are always substantially easier and cheaper than expanding or enhancing missile
defenses, this is not an imbalance that the United States could realistically hope
to redress. This prospect ultimately gives China three options for dealing with
American theater missile defense. First, it could attack campaign-relevant tar-
gets regardless of TMD. Using decoys, high reentry speeds, and penetration aids,
China would likely be able to strike its preferred targets with MRBMs and
ASBMs, accepting the risk of potentially losing a few missiles to interceptors.
Second, in the unlikely event that U.S. defenses proved particularly effective in
intercepting individual missiles, sustained high-volume missile volleys, possibly
including decommissioned missiles, could consistently saturate them, allowing
the majority of the missiles in each wave to leak through. Third, China might
attempt to target the TMD architecture itself early in the campaign. Attacking
PAC-3 batteries with MRBMs, THAAD TELs with ARMs, and TMD-capable
ships with either ASBMs or ASCMs would significantly degrade the TMD ar-
chitecture and greatly facilitate subsequent missile strikes against campaign-
relevant targets.
SKIPPING A GENERATION: POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
What China is poised to achieve is truly remarkable and unprecedented in mod-
ern warfare. Within just a few years, China would acquire the capability to attack
—accurately, rapidly, and with nearly complete assurance—U.S. forces on the
ground anywhere in the East Asian theater, regardless of the air and missile de-
fenses the United States could bring forward. Chinese forces would be able to
conduct wide-scale naval operations against battle groups as far as 1,500 kilo-
meters from the mainland while remaining safely out of range themselves.
Hence, although China is still a long way from matching the United States in
conventional military prowess or combat proficiency across the board, its goal
of defeating American forces in a limited theater war may well be within reach.
The consequences for American war planning of failure to give due consider-
ation to the tremendous threat posed by the Chinese missiles and the stark inad-
equacy of current and anticipated U.S. defenses against them may prove
disastrous in a combat scenario. If the United States wishes to maintain its abil-
ity to intervene in a militarized Taiwan scenario, it is imperative that it take the
measures necessary to offset China’s missile threat.
To begin with, it is quite clear that TMD defenses lack the speed, accuracy, fir-
ing rates, and total interceptor inventories to cope with large numbers of sophis-
ticated missiles equipped with countermeasures and, soon, maneuverable
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reentry vehicles. Additional investment into TMD would therefore be counter-
productive; the funds devoted to it should be shifted to more promising capabil-
ities. For instance, much effort must be put into improving the active and
passive defenses against supersonic projectiles. It is crucial that theoretical and
practical research on real-life supersonic ASCM flight and attack profiles and on
effective defenses against them be conducted. Future American AAW missile de-
velopments should focus on trading horizontal range for speed, maneuverabil-
ity, and the low interception altitudes required against sea-skimming ASCMs
maneuvering at supersonic speed. Also, much greater attention should be given
to a wide range of passive defenses, including radio-frequency emission con-
trols, deception emitters, obscurants, decoys, and jamming.94
The U.S. Navy needs to reinforce its efforts to develop much stronger offen-
sive capabilities at much longer ranges. Although it has high hopes for the
long-range electromagnetic rail gun, even its projected range of 370 km may not
be sufficient for future needs, leaving the new generation of ASCMs just as rele-
vant as ever.95 Some currently fielded ASCMs already reach 550 km. If there is
any offensive technology in which the United States needs to skip a generation, it
is precisely in projectiles with very long range and high closing speed sustained
by onboard propulsion—namely, advanced antiship cruise missiles.96
The U.S. Navy should also develop a much stronger antiship capability for its
submarines. Although its carrier groups would remain outranged by the Chi-
nese naval ASCMs and vulnerable to land-based ASBMs, American submarines
would be immune to these threats and just as difficult for the Chinese to detect
as Chinese submarines are for the United States to detect. Hence, by trading
some of the Tomahawk LACMs carried by Virginia-class submarines for ASBMs,
the U.S. Navy would enable its submarines to attack PLAN surface forces effec-
tively and in relative safety, despite its ASCM range deficiency. Furthermore, the
U.S. Navy should strongly consider increasing the number of submarines that it
operates in the Pacific theater.
Similarly, the U.S. Air Force should consider developing a more flexible forward-
deployment plan for a Taiwan contingency. Although it would not be able to
cancel out the threat from Chinese ballistic missiles, it could mitigate the threat
through greater dispersal, camouflage, concealment, and use of decoys. Scattering
small groups of aircraft among many airfields, increasing the spacing between
parked aircraft, disguising large C4ISR aircraft, and deploying decoys would
greatly reduce American losses to individual missile hits. It would also be essential
to maintain as many aircraft in the air or on strip alert as possible.
Finally, a much greater role should be given to intercontinental bomber
strikes. Although China’s SAM network would make the cost of sending non-
stealth B-52s and B-1s into Chinese airspace prohibitive, the nineteen available
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B-2s could replace many forward-deployed ground-attack aircraft. One of the
major developments that makes placing greater emphasis on a bomber force
particularly appealing is the advent of 250-pound small-diameter bombs
(SDBs), GBU-39, and from 2013, GBU-53.97 The fielding of SDBs allows U.S.
bombers to more than double their bomb loads without reducing the effective-
ness of each individual bomb. Hence, whereas in the past the B-2 could carry at
most eighty five-hundred-pound bombs, it can now carry at least 216 SDBs.98
Capitalizing on its ability to carry dozens of highly specific advanced munitions
or over two hundred SDBs, the B-2 bomber would be able to take out exponen-
tially more enemy targets, with substantially fewer sorties, than was possible in
any of the previous U.S. air campaigns. Moreover, unlike forward-deployed
strike aircraft, it would be completely invulnerable to Chinese MRBMs and
LACMs, as well as, in all likelihood, Chinese air defenses.
Nevertheless, giving intercontinental bomber strikes a greater role would not
make forward-deployed aircraft any safer. Hence, the final consideration for war
planning is developing an intercontinental strike capability that would prevent
the need to base aircraft within the range of Chinese missiles at all. In the end, al-
though ambitious, this concept would have many advantages and might be the
only option for truly defeating China’s missile-centric strategy. To construct this
capability, the United States should maintain its commitment to developing and
procuring in sufficient numbers a new stealth bomber currently slated for intro-
duction in 2018.99 Assuming that the 2018 bomber would, like the B-2, be able to
carry 216 SDBs, a total stealth-bomber fleet of fifty (i.e., thirty-one 2018 air-
frames and the nineteen existing B-2s) could deliver 10,800 precision-guided
bombs in a single mission.100 Given the maximum fighter air-to-ground loadout
of between six and nine precision-guided bombs, this would be equal to the
maximum payload carried by between four and six hundred fighters flying three
sorties each from forward operating bases.101 However, unlike the forward-
based fighters, the long-range bomber force would not require air superiority,
fighter cover, in-theater operational or logistical support, or any forward infra-
structure vulnerable to theater missiles at all. The bombers would take off from
Hawaii, Alaska, or the continental United States, refuel over the western Pacific,
deliver their ordnance, and return home, refueling over the Pacific once more,
all within from twenty-four to thirty-six hours. This operations concept would
simplify the air campaign; offer tremendous savings in time, material, and logis-
tical support; render irrelevant China’s tactical missile threat to U.S. aircraft op-
erating in the theater; and allow for offensive action in as little as forty-eight
hours after a warning order. Equipped with currently available and upcoming
munitions for attacks against stationary and moving targets, the bomber fleet
would be able to target not only China’s C4ISR, airfields, and parked aircraft but
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moving PLAN surface combatants and landing craft, in conjunction with sub-
marines and carrier groups.102 Such a concerted air-surface campaign against
Chinese efforts in the Taiwan Strait would largely deny China the use of its mis-
siles to either deter or defeat the American intervention force.
Nevertheless, developing effective technology and operational concepts to
offset the threat posed by Chinese missiles will take resources and considerable
time. Meanwhile, by 2015, nearly all aspects of China’s formidable missile-
centric strategy, including ASBMs, will have matured. For some time into the fu-
ture, then, the United States and Taiwan might be left staring at a wide-open
window of vulnerability. However, the scope of this vulnerability should prompt
Washington not to avoid or deny the problem or to attempt to address it with
current technology ill suited to the task but to come up with innovative solu-
tions. To put the risk in poignant context, as of the last day of 2010 the seven-
year-old Iraq war had claimed the lives of 4,748 American personnel, taking a
deep psychological toll of the military and society alike.103 It is frightful to think
that in an armed conflict with China a single saturation missile strike against a
U.S. aircraft carrier, if it sank the ship, would claim nearly five thousand lives
within hours. Whatever the American geopolitical interests or stakes for East
Asian stability, until this possibility is effaced or at least greatly reduced, China’s
missile developments should remain of high interest to American security
analysts, military officers, and policy makers alike.
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TOWARD AN AFRICAN MARITIME ECONOMY
Empowering the African Union to Revolutionize the African
Maritime Sector
Commander Michael L. Baker, U.S. Navy
A key source of American leadership throughout our history has been
enlightened self-interest. We want a better future for our children and
grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if other peo-
ples’ children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity.
The belief that our own interests are bound to the interests of those be-
yond our borders will continue to guide our engagement with nations
and peoples.
NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES, MAY 2010
The high profile of Somali piracy has brought the issue of African maritimesecurity to the attention of world leaders and citizens. This crisis, however,
is not the only challenge facing Africa “in the maritime”; rather, it is a symptom
of a much deeper problem—that Africa suffers from weak maritime governance
and the lack of a harmonizing vision for an African
maritime economy. Every year in Africa billions of
dollars’ worth of fish is illegally captured, billions of
dollars’ worth of drugs and arms are shipped overseas,
pirates capture and hold for ransom hundreds of mar-
iners operating commercial and private vessels, ban-
dits steal maritime oil worth billions of dollars, and
thousands of liters of waste are illegally dumped.
Some of these crimes flow into Africa from abroad
(including much of the illegal fishing and narcotics
trafficking), while others (such as piracy) go from the
inside out. These nefarious activities are global in
their reach and require global action if we hope to
eliminate their impact.
Africa’s maritime realm has deep significance for
African and international actors. The oceans, ports,
Commander Baker is a U.S. Navy Foreign Area Officer
specializing in African maritime security assistance. He
is currently an international affairs fellow in residence
at the Washington, D.C., office of the Council on For-
eign Relations. He holds a bachelor of science degree
(with honors) in history from the U.S. Naval Academy
and a master’s in international relations from Istanbul
Bilgi University, as an Olmsted Scholar. He has served
as the Southeast Asia political-military action officer for
the Chief of Naval Operations and as the U.S. liaison
officer to the Turkish Special Forces in Silopi, Turkey,
and throughout northern Iraq. Commander Baker was
a founding member of U.S. Africa Command, serving
as desk officer for Nigeria, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau,
Cape Verde, and Mali as well as, most recently, Re-
gional Director for West Africa Engagement. In July
2011 he will assume duties as the defense and naval
attaché to Madagascar, the Comoros, Mauritius, and
the Seychelles.
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and inland waterways of the African continent are more than mere sources of
food and energy; they are how Africa trades with the rest of the world. Accord-
ingly, the African maritime sector holds the key to wealth and prosperity for the
continent as a whole. If Africans hope to realize a prosperous future as stake-
holders in an emerging market or even as global market leaders, they will need
first to master the maritime domain. But for too long governments and institu-
tions have turned blind eyes toward the African seas and allowed security prob-
lems, corruption, bureaucracy, and weak infrastructure to rob Africans and
their honest partners of food, energy, wealth, and prosperity. Given the impor-
tance of the maritime in the global market, and hence in Africa, the United
States and other international partners should consider ways to support mari-
time sector development in Africa, to help actualize plans, strategies, and part-
nerships that improve security, governance, infrastructure, and commercial
investment. As the U.S. national security strategy clearly states, it is in the Amer-
ican interest to do just that. To highlight this reality, the National Security Coun-
cil encouraged the Department of State and the U.S. Africa Command to hold an
international conference to discuss the issues and solutions surrounding the Af-
rican maritime domain in October 2010.
But more than simple collaboration on maritime security, the international
community needs an African strategy for maritime development, a plan to tie to-
gether existing and future actions, to help establish an African maritime econ-
omy that creates wealth from the sea for Africans, and to mobilize international
instruments so as to assist in implementing African maritime initiatives toward
good governance. In short, we need to find a way collectively to revolutionize the
African maritime sector and to chart a course toward an African maritime
economy.
Putting complex, multinational plans into action is always challenging, espe-
cially on so large a scale—fifty-four countries are directly involved. Toward that
end this article outlines some ideas, both immediate and long-term, for actualiz-
ing plans and coordinating efforts in pursuit of an African maritime economy.
The central idea presented is that of an “International Charter for the African
Maritime Sector,” an agreement by which a global coalition would empower the
African Union (AU) and its regional economic communities to help Africans
create a secure, well governed, and efficient maritime domain, one capable of at-
tracting investment and enabling global trade. To accomplish these goals the
charter would provide technical assistance, resources, checks and balances, and
oversight for the implementation of strategies and plans across the maritime
spectrum; it would tie resource distribution to compliance with AU maritime
policies; and it would offer significant international assistance in establishing
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and enforcing African maritime laws, thereby allowing Africans initially to con-
centrate their resources on improving their maritime infrastructures.
This article also offers a way to organize African efforts throughout the mari-
time realm and the continent as a whole through a “Special Representative for
the African Maritime Sector” at the African Union. The office would provide
clear leadership in the maritime domain, aiming to tie together currently dispa-
rate efforts in infrastructure, security, safety, governance, trade, and commerce
under one overarching strategy.
There are other simple steps that can be taken now, like expanding combined
patrols and improving information fusion and sharing; this article addresses
these. But first, let us examine the idea of prosperity from the sea and make the
case for a comprehensive approach to achieving it, then assess some of the key,
but disconnected, efforts that Africans and international partners have already
undertaken. Finally, we will delve into the proposals for an international charter
and special representative.
GROWTH AND PROSPERITY FROM THE SEA: THE CASE FOR A
HOLISTIC APPROACH
In 2007 Africa accounted for a mere 2.7 percent of global trade, and less than 1
percent of African exports were in the form of manufactured goods (the lowest
percentage of any region in the world).1 Imports of manufactured goods from
the European Union (EU), China, and the United States alone were nearly dou-
ble the volume of African exported manufactures. Africa imported 14 percent of
the total global agricultural trade (the highest percentage of any region in the
world).2 Raw commodities accounted for nearly 80 percent of all African ex-
ports, with oil representing close to 60 percent of that total.3 If African states
hope to break the cycle of poverty, they will have to spur real economic growth
through more diversified trade and capture a greater share of the global market
for manufactured and finished goods. It is one thing for, say, Exxon-Mobil to ex-
port oil in the present risky and inefficient maritime environment; it is a com-
pletely different matter for lower-margin companies like Gap Inc. to establish
textile factories in that environment. In order to compete in the field of manu-
factured goods, African states will have to demonstrate to investors and compa-
nies that goods produced there can reliably get to market. The maritime sector,
therefore, must feature prominently in any plans for sustained economic growth
through the trade of manufactured goods.
Ninety percent of global trade moves over the oceans, and containerized traf-
fic accounts for an increasingly large share of total maritime shipments.4 This
means that African countries hoping to spur growth through global trade will
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have to attract not only land-based companies but shipping firms as well. This
poses a significant challenge for African countries, because the region’s ports are
currently the least efficient in the world; dwell times are nearly quadruple those
of Asian ports, and no single African port ranks in the seventy most productive
in the world.5 One extra day in port can add $35,000 to the operating costs
of a shipping company.6 The increasing rate of containerized traffic places an
additional burden on small African ports, which often lack the equipment nec-
essary to load and unload containers. In West Africa, movement of twenty-five
containers per hour is the norm, compared to 425 in many Asian ports.7 In addi-
tion, many ports in Africa cannot handle ships of even average size;8 add to this
shortcoming the fact that the world shipping industry has been quickly modern-
izing its fleets, replacing older and smaller vessels with newer “megacarriers,”
and the picture for African maritime transport looks bleak. Africa’s countries
must make large improvements in their port infrastructures through expansion,
maintenance, and improvement in efficiency if they hope to attract leading
shipping companies; if they fail, “several coastal countries in West and Central
Africa could become ‘de facto’ landlocked, having to bear approximately the
same costs as a landlocked country.”9
Port efficiency, of course, is not enough to draw business; a country or region
also needs safe and secure waters, coupled with transparent and convenient
trade regulations, to attract investment and maritime shipping. As it is, high
rates of piracy and armed robbery at sea in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of
Guinea have elevated insurance rates and have even caused some shipping com-
panies to avoid particular routes to or around Africa. Poor dredging and inade-
quate navigational aids add to the risks of operating ships in many parts of
Africa. All of this leads to low traffic, which in turn causes governments to levy
high tariffs to generate sufficient funds for port operations further discouraging
shipping companies from operating in Africa.10 As if that were not enough, Afri-
can governments apply more bureaucratic red tape to maritime trade than does
any other collective region, aggravating inefficiency and increasing opportuni-
ties for corruption.11 It is an ugly cycle and a difficult one to break.
Breaking this cycle will require a coordinated, sustained effort across a broad
front, nothing less than a campaign to revolutionize the African maritime sector
holistically, across its entire spectrum—improving safety and security, gover-
nance, and industrial infrastructure and efficiency. There is no evidence in Af-
rica now of any national, regional, or continental strategy of this kind. As a
result, for example, while some countries, like Nigeria, have made improve-
ments in port efficiency, their advances are offset by poor security—and vice
versa.
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Safety and security create confidence in a market, by reducing physical risks,
cutting insurance costs, and improving operating timelines. Good governance
offers assurance that economic activity (hence investments) will be handled
equitably and transparently, with no hidden costs or lengthy delays. Industrial
infrastructure serves as the backbone of maritime ventures, providing the neces-
sary ways to move goods efficiently to and from markets. These three elements
are necessary components of a coherent and efficient strategy to attract capital
investment so as to develop or enhance national markets. Markets being neces-
sary for jobs, wealth creation, and growth generally, it stands to reason, once
again, that a comprehensive strategy to develop the African maritime sector is
important not only for that sector but for the future prosperity of the continent
as a whole.
A number of governments and international institutions (including the Afri-
can Union) have developed good ideas to improve, say, security or transporta-
tion but too often have not carried them out. A comprehensive strategy should
aid actualization of those plans, sequencing action, prioritizing funding, and of-
fering clear direction to regional economic communities and national minis-
tries as well as a confident vision for the international community.
AFRICAN UNION (AND RELATED) EFFORTS
In January 2010, during the fourteenth African Union Summit, the AU heads of
state endorsed the “African Union Maritime Transport Charter” and the “Mari-
time Transport Plan of Action,” and they affirmed the previous October’s
“Durban Resolution on Maritime Safety, Maritime Security, and Protection of
the Marine Environment.” (The charter and plan of action have gone to the
fifty-three member states for ratification and will become official policy upon
the approval of fifteen.) To those involved behind the scenes, the summit seemed
a momentous occasion, a breakthrough for the maritime domain. After all, these
documents are the culmination of a great deal of work by some individuals at
the African Union, mostly within the Infrastructure and Energy Commission,
who are certainly to be commended. Their titles sound both impressive and
comprehensive. But in fact the papers beg for legitimacy due to a lack of
inclusivity and weak enforcement mechanisms. Shortly after the AU summit
other efforts to draft maritime strategies and plans started to emerge, but they
have had little success, lacking the clear support of the African Union’s leaders.
Nevertheless, despite their lack of leadership support and unifying strategy,
these documents do contain some of the key elements of success.
The Durban Resolution. From 12 to 16 October 2009, African Union maritime
transport ministers held a conference in Durban, South Africa. There they
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endorsed the Maritime Transport Charter and the Maritime Transport Plan of
Action, drafted previously (see below). They also issued what became known as
the “Durban Resolution,” declaring their shared commitment to tackle the is-
sues of maritime safety, security, transport, and environmental protection. Spe-
cifically, they condemned piracy and expressed concern over toxic dumping and
maritime pollution. Through this resolution the ministers called on the AU to
assume leadership of the efforts they had endorsed, encouraged regional organi-
zations and states to start taking action on them, and invited international orga-
nizations and global partners to be active participants.12 The resolution is
significant mostly for the fact it clearly signals the African states’ wish—the lat-
ter confirmed by the heads of state at the annual summit—for AU leadership
and their desire to partner with the international community. The resolution
falls short, however, in terms of consensus, in that it came from a meeting of
transport ministers only, with no coordination across other ministries before
the conference.
The Maritime Transport Charter and Plan of Action. The charter adopted by
maritime transport ministers in Durban in October 2009 was based on an origi-
nal 1994 document updated between 2007 and 2009 by the African Union’s
Commission for Infrastructure and Energy.13 The charter addresses a multitude
of such areas as “promoting the growth and development of African merchant
fleets,” “encouraging” reform and efficiency in port operations, “encouraging”
the expansion of information systems, and “promoting” the establishment of re-
gional or national maritime funds for the development of maritime industry.
The charter also calls for modernization and harmonization of maritime laws
across subregions, expansion of maritime regulations, and improved transpar-
ency and accountability. Finally, it mentions the need to improve security capa-
bilities and to counter piracy and armed robbery at sea.14 Interestingly, it does
not speak to illicit trafficking at sea or illegal, unregulated, and unreported
(IUU) fishing. Also, and unfortunately, the charter fails to address adequately
the dire condition of port infrastructure across the continent, which comes as a
surprise, given that the African Union Commission for Infrastructure and En-
ergy drafted the document.
Nonetheless, in a bold and important step, the Maritime Transport Charter
proposes continental, regional, and national organizations that would carry out
the maritime transport plan. Specifically, the charter urges the AU, the regional
economic communities, and states to create a continental unit for the coordina-
tion of maritime activities at the African Union; regional and continental mari-
time administrations; maritime training institutions; councils to defend the
interests of local shippers; and a fifteen-member continental “follow-up
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committee” charged with holding periodic meetings to promote and monitor
the implementation of the charter. The chief responsibility of these new bodies
would be to carry out the Maritime Transport Plan of Action. Sadly, most of
those bodies do not exist yet, and there is scant evidence that they are forthcom-
ing. If the African Union and the regional economic communities do not imple-
ment and empower these oversight and representative bodies, there will be little
reason to expect any positive effects from the Maritime Transport Charter or
plan of action.
The Maritime Transport Plan of Action lays out seven objectives, with multi-
ple sub-objectives: institutional and legal measures; capacity building; strength-
ening of maritime safety and security; enhancement of port performance;
strengthening of inter-African and international cooperation; facilitation and
financing of maritime transport and ports; and promotion of the development
of maritime transport equipment.15 The plan of action describes a host of neces-
sary measures across a fairly broad spectrum of the maritime domain, and it as-
signs responsibility and timelines for each measure at the state, regional, or
continental level. It does not, however, identify any means or priorities—a
critical failure for anyone hoping to use the plan of action as a mechanism for
maritime-sector development. It contains no sticks and no carrots.
All of these objectives and measures—we have mentioned only a few from a
long list—come across more as lofty aspirations than as directives. The Mari-
time Transport Charter and its plan of action seem to lack authority, and their
language begs the question of how institutions are to implement this broad
agenda. Sure enough, though the African Union heads of state approved the
Durban Resolution, the Maritime Transport Charter, and the Maritime Trans-
port Plan of Action, these documents sit on a shelf, making no progress. Why?
There are three likely reasons. First, as mentioned above, they are products of a
single commission at the African Union—Infrastructure and Energy—and were
approved through the meetings of transport ministers only. Other important
organs of the AU, such as the Peace and Security and the Trade and Industry
commissions, were not involved in their creation. Yet these three documents
clearly creep into the “lanes” of other commissions and ministers, whose
“buy-in” is required if they are to be implemented.
Second, as discussed above, while the documents call on the African Union to
lead the implementation of maritime initiatives, the AU has no human or capital
resources to assume such a role and has sidelined the creation of the “Continen-
tal Maritime Coordination Unit” mentioned above until a suitable donor takes
an interest in funding it.
Finally, these documents on their own cannot convince Africans that revolu-
tionizing the maritime sector is a worthwhile endeavor. They make no attempt
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to show the value of maritime trade, the costs of unsafe and inefficient practices,
or the risks posed by persistent maritime threats. They are not tied to any grand
strategy that achieves commitment at the national and regional levels and coor-
dinates multi-ministerial efforts toward a common goal of prosperity from the
sea. That is understandable, since it is certainly not the role of the Infrastructure
and Energy Commission to develop such a thesis, but it remains disappointing
nonetheless, because the plan of action puts forth a good many necessary and
specific bureaucratic actions. If coupled with an overarching vision for the Afri-
can maritime sector, a robust plan for improving maritime security, and sepa-
rate plans for governance, maritime commerce growth, and financial and
oversight mechanisms, the maritime transport documents could succeed.
The Draft “Maritime Strategy.” Perhaps recognizing the need for a unifying vi-
sion, the African Union contracted with the Brenthurst Foundation (a South Af-
rican think tank) and the Africa Center for Strategic Studies (a U.S. Department
of Defense research institute at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C.) to provide the
union’s deputy chairman a maritime strategy for Africa. The resultant vision pa-
per made a good case for the overarching importance of the maritime domain.16
It also identified a number of areas that should be addressed by the African
Union and its member states to improve safety, security, and the maritime econ-
omy. That strategy, however, remains a white paper, not official AU guidance.
What is more, since no commission within the AU participated in its creation,
once again a noble effort has failed to gain a sense of ownership among various
actors within the African Union itself.
Experts Workshop on Maritime Security. Barely had the ink dried on the draft
maritime strategy before another group embarked on a similar project. Feeling
that the Maritime Transport Plan crossed into its purview and considering the
draft maritime strategy an outsider’s project, the African Union’s Peace and Se-
curity Commission held an “Experts Workshop on Maritime Security” in Addis
Ababa on 6 and 7 April 2010. The conference organizers aimed to generate dis-
cussion leading to specific inputs to a continental strategy for maritime
security.17 To their credit, they invited representatives of other AU commissions,
welcoming a notable speech on maritime immigration by the commissioner of
social affairs. The delegates emphasized the problems of maritime safety,
security, and protection of the environment. They also underlined the need for
legislation, implementation of agreements, and enforcement, all the while
stressing that regional and international cooperation is paramount to success.
The delegates broadly agreed that they needed to get to work on areas already
covered by resolutions and agreements but also to develop an extensive mari-
time strategy that would give structure to Africa’s efforts in the maritime realm.
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B A K E R 4 7
Beyond these conclusions, however, the workshop bore little fruit. The top
leadership of the AU did not attend, and the agenda did not address any aspect of
the earlier draft maritime strategy. Although invited, no business leaders or
economists attended the workshop, and so the workshop did not touch the eco-
nomic aspects of the maritime domain. It remains to be seen whether the Peace
and Security Commission can draft a comprehensive maritime strategy and gar-
ner the active participation of other commissions; there are reasons to doubt its
staying power. Already stretched thin across several pressing peace operations,
the commission has dedicated only one officer to work on maritime security, as a
collateral duty; at the next sign of continental conflict it will likely struggle to
maintain any focus on the maritime strategy and find it difficult to continue to
coordinate a broad array of actors.
The Djibouti Code of Conduct. Another instrument, though not a product of
the African Union, should be mentioned here. The International Maritime Or-
ganization (IMO) sponsored a meeting in Djibouti (the capital of the Republic
of Djibouti) on 26 January 2009 to forge an agreement to cooperate in the inves-
tigation, arrest, and seizure of people reasonably suspected of piracy and to con-
duct shared operations.18 Fifteen countries have signed so far: the Comoros,
Djibouti, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, the Maldives, Mauritius, Mozam-
bique, Saudi Arabia, the Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, and Yemen. The
signatories pledged to review their national maritime laws to ensure they are ad-
equate for criminalizing piracy; however, to date only the Seychelles and Kenya
have actively upheld their agreements to try captured pirates in their courts.
Ironically, the IMO also led a second meeting, this one of African and Middle
Eastern maritime security specialists, just as the 12–16 October 2009 Durban
meeting was going on, but in Victoria, the capital of the Seychelles. Representa-
tives from East Africa, the African Indian Ocean islands, and from father abroad
met to discuss implementation of the Djibouti Code of Conduct. Unfortunately,
the African Union was not represented at those meetings, most likely because its
maritime experts were in Durban. During the meeting, working groups identi-
fied the need for technical assistance in creating national laws and for steering
committees to monitor progress of implementation of the code. The delegations
agreed that adequate training at all levels of maritime administration and law
enforcement was important but also stressed the need to obtain naval and coast
guard assets to conduct law-enforcement operations. Finally, they agreed that
the IMO should establish a Djibouti Code implementation team.19 (The IMO
recently created that team, and its work is under way. Its successes and failures in
the future will offer valuable insight into this type of cooperative approach and
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These documents and efforts are largely technical in nature; they lack a defined
end state, something that ties them together coherently and assures global part-
ners that their resources would not be squandered. With its multiple, disparate
initiatives in progress to develop specific strategies, charters, and plans of action,
the African Union is in effect tackling symptoms, and in uncoordinated ways,
without comprehensively addressing root causes—the lack of an authentically
African maritime economy and of effective maritime governance. Whatever
strategy or strategies emerge, it is clear that the AU and its members need a vi-
sion for the entire spectrum of the African maritime domain—and this would
mean the involvement of every commission in the union, something that has
not happened to date. Africa and its global partners need then some coherent
technical mechanism to ensure consistent implementation of strategies,
charters, and plans, as well as to distribute burdens. By endorsing the Durban
Resolution, heads of state have called upon the African Union to lead efforts to
improve the maritime sector. This leadership must produce guidance, oversight,
and coherence for a wide variety of initiatives already ongoing at the national,
regional, and international levels.
NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES
Many African states and regional organizations, not waiting on leadership from
the African Union, have embarked on a number of programs to address safety
and security in African seas. Several of these efforts are visionary and effective;
all suffer, however, from a lack of coordination among a broad set of stake-
holders and therefore tend, as noted, to address only security symptoms rather
than other core problems of governance and economic development. Neverthe-
less, all of them are commendable and could help to build momentum toward
deeper, long-term solutions for the African maritime. The below are only a few
of the most prominent examples.
The ECCAS Maritime Safety and Security Strategy. In October 2008, ECCAS,
the Economic Community of Central African States, produced a study meant to
help the regional bloc secure its economic interests in the maritime domain.20
The draft offered an approach to protecting offshore oil resources, fisheries, and
sea routes, as well as fighting a host of maritime crimes and achieving a reliable
search-and-rescue capability.
ECCAS has conducted one combined maritime patrol, which is a step toward
meeting its strategic vision for security. It has not yet undertaken a second pa-
trol, however, which may be due to a lack of funds or to a lengthy planning pro-
cess. In any event, ECCAS has focused on the security aspect of the operations,
which is reasonable at this point. The real challenge will come when ECCAS tries
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to tie security operations into law enforcement and judicial procedures ashore.
Here it may benefit from the expertise and financial support of the AU or inter-
national partners.
Southern African Development Community Statement on IUU Fishing. On 4
July 2008, in Windhoek, Namibia, the ministers responsible for marine fisheries
in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) met to take action
on illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. The meeting reaffirmed the
commitment of their countries generally to cooperate in regulating and enforc-
ing fishing laws and to take the following measures: review and harmonize na-
tional fishing laws, strengthen fishing regulations, share information, and
improve the monitoring of fishing, including multinational patrols.21 While it is
not clear that much action has actually occurred in the areas of regulation and
legislation, the statement has spurred some of the countries to conduct joint pa-
trols to enforce maritime laws.22
Southern African Joint Surveillance Patrols. Building on the momentum of the
SADC statement on IUU fishing, in March 2009 the states of Kenya, Mozam-
bique, South Africa, and Tanzania collectively sponsored the patrols in the In-
dian Ocean by the South African offshore patrol vessel Sarah Baartman,
assigned to the environmental-protection service.23 Embarked was an interna-
tional team of eleven inspectors, with Kenya, Mozambique, and Tanzania each
providing two inspectors, and South Africa five. During the one-month opera-
tion the team inspected forty-one vessels, levied ten fines, and seized six ships
for violations of national maritime laws. In the highlight of the operation, the
joint team seized a vessel in the Tanzanian exclusive economic zone carrying
over three hundred tons of illegal tuna. Like the ECCAS patrol this operation fo-
cused on tactical procedures afloat; officials in Tanzania were left scrambling to
determine what to do with the seized fish. In the end, they gave the fish to an or-
phanage, but with comprehensive planning at the outset they might have real-
ized a greater gain by selling the fish on the market and donating some of the
proceeds to the orphanage and applying the rest to continued operations.24 As it
was, funding challenges have caused these countries—including South Africa
—to delay future plans to continue this type of operation. This is a possible can-
didate for international support.
MOWCA Agreements. The Maritime Organization of West and Central Africa
(MOWCA) has drafted a number of policies and initiatives to promote safe mar-
itime transport and maritime security in the eastern Atlantic Ocean. On 31 July
2008 MOWCA members agreed to a memorandum of understanding imple-
menting a regional coast-guard network. Fourteen of the twenty coastal
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member states signed the agreement: Benin, Cameroon, Cape Verde, the Repub-
lic of the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon,
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo. The
memorandum established four operational patrol zones, stretching from An-
gola to Mauritania.25 MOWCA aims to harmonize policy and regulation in West
and Central Africa to comply with the International Ship and Port Facility Secu-
rity Code, the Safety of Life at Sea Convention, the Search and Rescue conven-
tion, and the United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Sea.26 The
organization is also working to establish an “Association of Maritime Adminis-
trations” in the region to promote harmonization and information sharing.27
So far, there is little evidence that MOWCA, without financial support and
binding authority over member states, has achieved anything beyond formaliz-
ing its intentions on paper. But it is a potential regional leader for maritime is-
sues on the Atlantic seaboard, and with funding and oversight it might be the
regional agent for a number of the requirements in the AU’s Maritime Transport
Charter. Along these lines MOWCA specifically desires to create and manage a
“Port Management Association of West and Central Africa,” a “Union of African
Shipper’s Councils,” an “Association of National Shipping Lines,” and three
maritime academies in West Africa (to be affiliated with the IMO’s World Mari-
time University in Sweden).
“Regional Strategy against Piracy and for Maritime Security in Eastern and
Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean.” On 7 October 2010, a collection of min-
isters (mostly ministers of foreign affairs) of East and southern Africa held their
second ministerial meeting of 2010 to address maritime security and piracy.
This conglomeration of ministers met to bolster cooperation on maritime secu-
rity among regional countries and with the European Union, as well as other in-
ternational partners, such as the International Maritime Organization and the
United States. This strategy is complemented by a “Regional Plan of Action.”
These two documents together are perhaps the best example of a comprehensive
regional effort to tie functional areas of maritime security to strategic ends. The
strategy has three main elements: addressing sources of Somali piracy inland in
Somalia, bolstering international efforts, and improving African maritime secu-
rity capacity.
Maritime Centers of Excellence. One can find maritime academies in each re-
gion of Africa—in Kenya, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria, Egypt, and South Af-
rica, to name a few—all aimed at delivering maritime education to port-
authority administrators, merchant mariners, naval and coast guard officers,
and marine police. International cooperation in these schools has been on
the rise. Recently, for example, the Kenyan navy, the Global Maritime and
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Transportation School, U.S. Africa Command, and the U.S. Naval War Col-
lege have teamed to create a new curriculum at Kenya’s Bandari Port Author-
ity College, in Mombasa. These existing institutions could play important
roles in standardizing maritime education across the continent and become
key instruments in disseminating strategic guidance from the African Union
for the improvement and coordination of maritime governance. As things
stand now, however, these schools operate independently of one another, of
the African Union, and of their associated regional economic communities.
Counterpiracy Task Forces. There are at least three multinational counterpiracy
operations currently under way in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean near
the Horn of Africa, as well as numerous other unilateral operations: the Euro-
pean Union’s Operation ATALANTA, a NATO task force, Combined Task Force
151, the Chinese navy’s Task Force 529, an Indian task force, a Malaysian task
force, a Russian task force, and the Yemeni coast guard.28 In all, more than thirty
vessels are currently patrolling these waters to deter, prevent, and defeat acts of
piracy, representing every continent except Antarctica and—despite the adop-
tion of the Djibouti Code of Conduct—Africa. While these task forces bring the
benefit of nonstop maritime patrols, they do not involve Africans in their opera-
tions, and they do not address crimes that are of high importance to Africa,
namely, illegal fishing and illegal dumping. As a result, they do not forge trust
and partnerships; rather, they are viewed with indifference in many parts of Af-
rica, where governments and communities are very reluctant to take action
against African pirates.29
The Africa Partnership Station. In 2007, U.S. Naval Forces Africa initiated a
multinational effort to improve maritime safety and security in Africa through
partnership with African navies and coast guards.30 This initiative is known as
the Africa Partnership Station (or APS);31 it features engagement of a variety of
types, including conferences, mobile training teams, and “banner ship” deploy-
ments, all geared toward building maritime awareness, capacity, capability, and
regional cooperation.32 U.S. Naval Forces Africa has led three Africa Partnership
Station banner-ship deployments in West and Central Africa and one in East Af-
rica; there have also been several deployments of smaller vessels for shorter du-
rations. These deployments strive to train and exercise African maritime forces
in tactics, techniques, and procedures so as to solidify their professionalism and,
more broadly, address the need for maritime-sector development in Africa.
Ships of the Netherlands and Belgium have flown the Africa Partnership Station
banner on training missions in West and Central Africa, extending combined
training and familiarization in these subregions, and helping to make the Africa
Partnership Station a truly international effort. American agencies like the
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National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) have put represen-
tatives on board APS ships, where they work with fisheries agencies, scientists,
and universities to address fisheries management, weather issues, and other
nonmilitary maritime topics.
NOAA’s presence on the APS missions is a good sign, but other agencies—like
the U.S. Agency for International Development and the Commerce Department
—are notably absent. U.S. Naval Forces Africa would like to expand the scope of
APS deployments in order to address maritime-sector development more
broadly, but it lacks two necessary elements for taking that step: guidance and
authority from the U.S. government and guidance from and coordination with
either the African Union, a regional economic community, or an African state.
In short, “ownership” of this initiative has to move above and beyond U.S. Naval
Forces Africa if it is to accomplish its more far-reaching goals. The Department
of State could take the lead on this mission, in partnership with the African
Union.
African Maritime Law Enforcement Partnership. The United States and the gov-
ernment of Cape Verde initiated the African Maritime Law Enforcement Part-
nership (AMLEP) in June 2008.33 This operation pairs African maritime
boarding teams and police with U.S. Coast Guard boarding teams and U.S.
Coast Guard or Navy vessels in combined operations to enforce African mari-
time law, along the lines of the Southern African Joint Surveillance Patrols.
AMLEP has been a successful operation, by which partners have built their own
capacities and improved the management of their maritime environments
through combined maritime law enforcement. It offers an immediate opera-
tional framework for small African maritime forces, extending their reach
throughout their territorial seas and exclusive economic zones. AMLEP opera-
tions focus on illegal fishing, narcotics smuggling, and other illegal trafficking.
To date U.S. Africa Command and U.S. Naval Forces Africa have conducted
five AMLEPs (June 2008 and October–November 2008, with Cape Verde;
July–September 2009, with Cape Verde, Morocco, Senegal, and Sierra Leone;34
December 2009, with Sierra Leone; and June–August 2010 with Cape Verde,
Senegal, Morocco, and Sierra Leone). France has provided cueing support (i.e.,
surveillance and vectoring by maritime patrol aircraft based in Dakar, Senegal),
and U.S. Africa Command has coordinated the operations, through the Mari-
time Analysis Operations Center–Narcotics in Lisbon, Portugal. Two AMLEP
operations resulted in five fisheries interdictions, including the program’s first
seizure (a Taiwanese fishing boat, subsequently auctioned), which sent a strong
message to illegal operators but also generated the payment of significant fines
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to Sierra Leone. The United Kingdom has conducted two AMLEP-like opera-
tions with Cape Verde, and Spain and Malta have expressed interest in joining
the initiative. To date, the partnership has focused predominantly on operations
at sea and hence has mostly practiced military capabilities; attempts have been
made to incorporate other important categories of stakeholders, such as cus-
toms agencies, port authorities, fisheries management, national police, and
transportation ministries, but much still needs to be done on those lines.
While AMLEP is ahead of the counterpiracy task forces in involving Africans,
it lags behind in presence, patrolling only about two months a year. Given cur-
rent financial constraints, global donors will have difficulty mustering the polit-
ical will to extend missions of this type without confidence that investments will
pay off in long-term stability and new markets. Given, however, an international
mechanism that coordinates support efforts, offers transparent oversight of
maritime governance reform, and ties funding to performance, donor countries
may find reasons to sustain and expand joint maritime patrols in African waters.
A VISION FOR THE LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT OF THE
AFRICAN MARITIME ECONOMY
To take on a challenge as daunting, and as necessary, as developing maritime
economies and solidifying maritime governance, infrastructure, safety, and se-
curity, the African Union, its commissions and regional economic communities,
and its member states will need considerable participation from global stake-
holders. Indeed, developing strategies and plans is no small feat, but it is far eas-
ier than converting ideas into realities, especially considering the resource and
structural challenges that the AU and its members face. To complicate matters,
the African maritime is marked by a variety of interdependent but different, un-
linked, and uncoordinated policies, resolutions, codes, and activities. The sched-
uling of simultaneous meetings on major maritime issues in Durban and
Victoria mentioned above was but one sign that the right hand is not working
with the left. The contrast between operational success at sea and procedural
disarray ashore in handling seized fish in the instance cited is another indicator
of poor coordination and planning. Moreover, the very fact that the African
Union initiated a workshop to develop a maritime security strategy during the
same week that two think tanks delivered an independent draft strategy at the
request of the AU itself reveals lack of clear vision and leadership. Add to all of
this the absence of any plan to revitalize African maritime commercial sectors
—or of any mechanism for oversight or enforcement of the continental mari-
time agreements that already exist—and one sees that haphazard attempts to ad-
dress security issues can go nowhere.
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Yet some of the strengths of the African Union, such as its global profile and
power to create mandates, could allow it to organize continental efforts to im-
prove the maritime sector as a whole. Indeed, as we have seen, the African mari-
time transport ministers at the Durban conference called on the AU to exert just
such leadership. To get things moving the AU could use its influence to broker a
formal international agreement to coordinate and facilitate global participation
in African maritime development, with an eye to empowering the AU itself to
lead this revitalization. The International Maritime Organization has signaled
an intention to do something of this nature in support of the Djibouti Code of
Conduct, and the signatories of both that code and the Durban Resolution have
encouraged global partners to take active roles.
One way to combine the efforts of global partners with those of Africans
would be to create an “International Charter for the African Maritime Sector,”
under the combined leadership of the AU, the IMO, and the UN.35 Under the In-
ternational Charter global partners, both public and private, would acknowl-
edge both their interests in the African maritime and their responsibilities
toward it and would pool their resources, fiscal and material. The African Devel-
opment Bank and the World Bank could jointly manage fiscal resources, releas-
ing them only when the AU, IMO, or UN directed. African states or regional
maritime organizations could choose to become members of the International
Charter in order to contribute to the pool or to have access to its resources; the
charter would establish requirements that states and organizations would have
to meet. The African Maritime Transport Charter already identifies most of the
requirements. The International Charter would simply construct a basic set of
rules to enforce implementation; in other words, it would put teeth into the
Maritime Transport Plan of Action and other relevant plans of action. If wisely
constructed, these rules would in turn enable African states and organizations to
develop good, noncorrupt maritime structures in accordance with the transport
charter. The African Union and regional organizations like MOWCA or SADC
would then be able to apply not only political oversight in goading members
slowly into action but fiscal control—to stimulate implementation and, coupled
with routine inspections, ensure honest practice. Global partners could also do
more than just donate money, materiel, and systems: they could cooperate in
maritime law enforcement.
It is one thing to patrol territorial seas occasionally and conduct random inspec-
tions. It is something else—involving a completely different level of governance
—to regulate activity at sea transparently, monitor that activity effectively, and
enforce laws consistently. Some governments would be tempted to invest imme-
diately in maritime-response forces to take quick advantage of potential revenue
from fines and sales of seized contraband. While this benefit is certainly
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important, enlarging coast guards would require extensive capital investment
and developed maintenance capabilities. Rather, under the International Char-
ter global partners might form combined task forces in order to enforce African
or international maritime law. Operating along the lines of the Southern African
Joint Surveillance Patrols and the African Maritime Law Enforcement Partner-
ship, these task forces would include African boarding teams, seamen, officers,
information systems, and, where possible, vessels. Most of the principal ships,
however, would come from global partners, distributing the costs and reducing
immediate financial burdens on African states and organizations. Meanwhile,
African maritime law-enforcement and security forces would increase their
skills through continuous participation in these task forces.
Revenue obtained from fines and seizures generated by task force operations
might go into an “African Maritime Trust” (managed, again, by the African De-
velopment Bank and the World Bank); global partners might match those funds
if African states and organizations demonstrated good governance in the mari-
time. An African member state could request to withdraw funds from the trust
to build elements of maritime governance, infrastructure, and administration,
or, having met the regulations and rules, to upgrade and maintain its own
weapon and law-enforcement equipment.
The idea here is that global partners (like South Africa, the United States, the
United Kingdom, India, France, Brazil, China, Russia, NATO, and the EU, as well
as companies like Maersk, Chevron, and Dubai Ports World) would provide op-
erational platforms in the near term so that Africans could focus their time and
money on other areas necessary to maritime economies and governance. These
partners would also agree to provide maritime security assistance and capacity-
building resources only through the International Charter. The AU, the IMO,
and the UN would lead the charter, and the African Development Bank and
World Bank would manage all finances. Eventually, after establishing elements
of maritime governance and administration, and with the approval of the AU
and the IMO, African states could access monies directly to enable them to in-
crease their roles in the combined task forces, gradually replacing the global
partners. With help of economists from the World Bank and the African Devel-
opment Bank, the International Charter could loosely predict how long a state
should need assistance—meaning that it would not have to represent an
open-ended commitment from global stakeholders.
Agreement of major global partners to join the International Charter and
provide maritime security assistance through its auspices only could have a re-
sounding impact on the African maritime sector as a whole. This system would
create a series of checks and balances, distribute the burden globally, and en-
courage fiscal responsibility and good governance. At the same time, it would
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relieve African states of some of the costs of security and enable them to invest
first in maritime infrastructure, institutions, laws, regulations, and processes.
This charter, in other words, would provide a road map, complete with ways and
means, to establish authentic maritime economies and governance. To realize
this goal the African Union will need to establish, at its headquarters, in its com-
missions, and within its regional economic communities, a strong foundation
for maritime-sector development.
WHAT THE AFRICAN UNION CAN DO NOW
To make the International Charter for the African Maritime Sector a reality and
actualize the African Union’s existing maritime plans, the AU should take some
important steps immediately. At the top of the list lies establishing clear leader-
ship for the development and organization of an African maritime economy.
The chairman of the union could designate one of the commissioners as the
continental “lead” for maritime sector development; alternatively, the chair
could appoint a “Special Representative for the African Maritime Sector”—a ci-
vilian from the private sector of strong character and well-known connections
and background (ideally including maritime business experience)—who does
not come from any of the AU’s commissions but has the experience and author-
ity to ensure authentic involvement from each. First, the special representative
should form the Continental Maritime Coordination Unit and Maritime Trans-
port Review Committee, as established by the Maritime Transport Charter.
Next, the special representative should organize and mobilize the rest of the AU
to play productive roles in the maritime domain; to date only two of the eight
departments have done so—Energy and Infrastructure and Peace and Security.
Maritime issues cut across the AU, and every commission has an important role
to play, as the sidebar shows.36
After organizing the AU to deal more fully and aptly with the African mari-
time, the special representative should immediately begin engaging the private
sector. The special representative will need to induce private enterprises to invest
in African maritime industries and provide their perspectives and expertise in
the development of African maritime plans and strategies. Maritime businesses
will play decisive roles in the success of the maritime sector as a whole; African
maritime businesses would benefit themselves in particular by helping policing
efforts at sea, through the distribution of information and pressuring govern-
ments to implement standard regulations, invest in maritime governance, and
(at least to the degree that it is in their respective interests) enforce maritime laws.
Next, the special representative should set the Maritime Coordination Unit
four immediate tasks. First, the unit should begin assessing maritime laws across
the continent and work to improve their harmonization. This is an important
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step toward attracting investment and improving maritime governance; it
would also support combined maritime law-enforcement operations or other
forms of cooperative security and follows guidelines already established by the
Maritime Transport Charter.
Second, the Maritime Coordination Unit—working with all African Union
commissions, the regional economic communities (subregional treaty organi-
zations recognized by the AU), and the private sector—should develop a clear
strategy for a maritime economy that includes the enabling elements of gover-
nance, infrastructure, trade, safety, and security and plainly tells global partners
where they can best contribute. Each AU commission and each regional eco-
nomic community should then write a plan of action to achieve its particular re-
sponsibilities. Continental and global partners need a clear indication of
priorities and key tasks, and the AU commissions need guidance for their roles.
Third, the Maritime Coordination Unit would naturally encourage the re-
gional economic communities to involve themselves in their respective regional
maritime administrations as established by the Maritime Transport Charter to
promote standardization, integration, and implementation of plans and strate-
gies. The AU can provide strategic leadership, but the regional economic com-
munities will have to lead implementation on the regional level.
Fourth, the AU’s Maritime Coordination Unit should immediately empha-
size the fusing and sharing of maritime information in and among the conti-
nent’s five early-warning centers. Maritime domain awareness is simply critical
for understanding the maritime environment and the development of maritime
governance. A great deal of “maritime domain awareness” capability already ex-
ists in Africa but is underutilized and ineffective. Fusing information in regional
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AFRICAN UNION COMMISSION AND MARITIME ISSUES
Peace and Security: common security and defense policy
Political Affairs: civil society, refugees, human rights, transparency, and
accountability
Infrastructure and Energy: transport (including maritime transport in its
core function); tourism; energy; infrastructure (ports); cooperation on
safety, security, and environmental protection; tariff harmonization; promo-
tion of public/private partnership for transport, communications, tourism,
and energy; interlocutor with IMO for maritime safety
Social Affairs: drug control and related crime, migration, and labor
Human Resources, Science, and Technology: information management
and exchange, hydropower development
Trade and Industry: increased intra-African trade, access to global mar-
kets, and economic diversification
Rural Economy and Agriculture: fish management, protection, and regula-
tion; management of natural resources and environment; water resource
exploitation; protection of rivers and lakes from pollution
Economic Affairs: resource mobilization; vision and assessment for eco-
nomic development; promotion of the private sector; coordination of devel-
opment of African economies; monetary and fiscal policies.
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centers would encourage better use of equipment at the national level, encour-
age sharing of information at the regional level, and make a significant contri-
bution to maritime regulation, maritime safety, and law enforcement.
With the Maritime Coordination Unit working on these measures, the special
representative should focus next on maritime law enforcement. Both the Dji-
bouti Code of Conduct and MOWCA’s Gulf of Guinea Coast Guard network
agreement call for combined maritime patrols to enforce international and Afri-
can maritime laws. A host of global partners are involved in such operations, but
the efforts are not well coordinated and African participation is spotty. The spe-
cial commissioner should coordinate and formalize these partnerships to help
provide an immediate law-enforcement capability, build African human capac-
ity, and realize immediate financial gains from the enforcement of laws. Again
the regional economic communities could play roles here, especially in
brokering patrol agreements in sovereign waters.
Once the African Union establishes clear, strong leadership, it will be well po-
sitioned to lead the International Charter for the African Maritime Sector. The
special representative can then begin the hard task of developing the technical
mechanisms of the International Charter. The good news is that the other im-
mediate actions, taken by now, will have built confidence in global partners.
Certain of these actions—law assessment, strategy development, informa-
tion fusion and sharing, and combined operations—are relatively easy, inexpen-
sive measures that would immediately demonstrate the African Union’s
sincerity and resolve to improve the African maritime sector. They would en-
courage global partners to join the International Charter and go a long way to-
ward addressing maritime issues in and of themselves. Furthermore, the AU
does not need to wait for the development of an overarching maritime strategy
to begin taking some of these steps; there is already a charter to review the mari-
time laws, and the regional economic communities provide frameworks for fus-
ing and sharing maritime information. Admittedly, and as noted below,
coordinating global combined task forces may involve political or legal chal-
lenges, but it is important and should not be pushed aside for that reason. Add-
ing African mariners to combined task forces should be easy (it is already being
done, as mentioned above) and will pay big dividends in building human
capacity.
WHAT GLOBAL PARTNERS CAN DO NOW
Global partners can continue and expand their efforts to provide platforms for
African maritime law enforcement through current protocols, efforts, and rela-
tionships. They can also assist AU efforts to fuse and share information. Both are
in the mutual interest of the international community and African partners.
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Any of the existing counterpiracy task forces could include African boarding
teams, thereby enabling African participation and ownership while improving
African capacity. The most difficult impediments are likely legal factors sur-
rounding the handling of captured pirates; after nearly two years of operations,
however, these should not be insurmountable challenges. Of equal importance,
global partners should work with the International Maritime Organization and
the AU to consolidate these various task forces into one, coordinated organiza-
tion in order to improve efficiency and simplify command and control. Under
the leadership of the AU, the UN, and African states, such a force should expand
its mandate to embrace the enforcement of international and African maritime
laws, including those concerning illegal fishing and illegal dumping.
The Southern African Development Community and the United States could
continue and expand their support in maritime law enforcement in, respec-
tively, South and East Africa and West and Central Africa. Other partners—
whether from Europe, Asia, the Americas, or Africa itself—could join these ef-
forts by sending vessels and boarding teams to operate with Africans, expanding
the breadth and duration of the patrols. Global partners could also formalize
standing combined task forces; one might envision three to four combined task
forces, aligned with the African Union’s African Standby Forces (organized and
managed by the regional economic communities), operating nonstop to help
enforce international and African maritime law. These task forces could even be
considered United Nations missions and the personnel employed allowed spe-
cial UN mission pay and allowances, to encourage participation.
Global partners could provide technical and financial assistance to help the
AU and subregional organizations fuse and share information. That would not
only help African maritime domain awareness but provide valuable intelligence
to maritime law-enforcement operations and improve safety for mariners. Tak-
ing these two steps would also enable the IMO, the AU, and the latter’s members
to begin work on the International Charter for the African Maritime Sector, as
well as to concentrate on building and improving maritime governance, trade,
commerce, and economies in Africa—leaving the more costly tasks of building
coast guards and navies for the middle term.
Finally, there is no reason that stakeholders should delay training programs.
Global partners should act quickly to dedicate money specifically to training
maritime professionals in the military, police, and civilian sectors—especially in
the areas of governance. Investing in human capacity could be as easy as incor-
porating more African ship riders on the existing international task forces or
brokering exchanges of personnel between port authorities, and it is surely one
of the most important aspects of building maritime institutions.
{LINE-SPACE}
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Safe and secure African seas, governed by fair and transparent regulations, are
on the global agenda. African military and maritime leaders recognize the im-
portance of the matter and have taken some steps to address a few issues. The
policy documents, statements, and plans of action they have produced are im-
portant tools for organizing action—and combined patrols are important in
and of themselves—but Africa lacks an overarching vision that could tie the var-
ious efforts together and strike at core problems (development and governance)
rather than merely the symptoms (such as piracy). The world needs a strategy
for an African maritime economy—a regime led by Africans with committed
global partnership, a maritime economy benefiting African national economies
and the global market. The African Union has taken some steps in this direction,
especially through its Maritime Transport Charter. It is time, however, to move
beyond policy papers and on to strategy-based action. Establishing a continental
maritime economy—with improved governance, trade, infrastructure, safety,
and security—is not an easy task, especially since it involves the laws of fifty-four
countries and implies adherence to those laws by the rest of the world.
Establishment of an International Charter for the African Maritime Sector
would be a way to meet these ends. Its goals would be to help African member
states establish a regional maritime economy with capacity and capability in all
maritime sectors; to provide security and law-enforcement support in the short
and middle terms; to create a trust to fund improvements; and to erect checks
and balances to promote good governance and noncorrupt, efficient, modern
maritime structures. While Africa and the rest of the international community
works to establish this charter, the African Union and its global partners should
inculcate maritime leadership at the AU, review maritime laws, improve infor-
mation fusion and sharing, and continue to enforce African maritime laws
through combined operations. With these bold steps the African Union, its sub-
regional organizations, its member states, and its global partners can make great
progress toward an African maritime sector that generates the security, confi-
dence, and efficiency necessary to spark the investment, trade, and jobs vital for
the continent’s prosperity.
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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANGLED-DECK
AIRCRAFT CARRIER
Innovation and Adaptation
Thomas C. Hone, Norman Friedman, and Mark D. Mandeles
In late 2006, Andrew Marshall, the Director of the Office of Net Assessment inthe Office of the Secretary of Defense, asked us to answer several questions: Why
had the Royal Navy (RN) developed the angled flight deck, steam catapult, and
optical landing aid before the U.S. Navy (USN) did? Why had the USN not devel-
oped these innovations, which “transformed carrier
design and made practical the wholesale use of
high-performance jet aircraft,” in parallel with the
RN?1 Once developed by the RN, how had these three
innovations “jumped the gap” to the USN?
The detailed answers to these questions are in a
study (Innovation in Carrier Aviation) that we submit-
ted to Mr. Marshall.2 In the present article we summa-
rize the relevant, complex history contained in that
study and draw some inferences about innovation
from our findings.
THE PROBLEM
In the winter of 1944–45, a committee of senior offi-
cers of the Royal Navy decided that in the future most
carrier aircraft would be jets and that the design of
carriers would have to be modified to “fit” the follow-
ing characteristics of early jet aircraft:
• Jets landed at higher speeds than piston-engine
aircraft. In fact, to have optimal control, the pilot
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would have to land with “power on” instead of killing his engine when the
landing signal officer gave the “cut.”
• Jets accelerated slower than piston-engine planes on takeoff. They would
need to be catapulted off the carrier’s deck.
• Early jet turbine engines consumed more fuel than piston engines, which
meant that it was important to find ways to keep the jets in the air as long
as possible, especially if jet fighters were to serve as the force’s combat air
patrol.3
The committee that had defined the problems of operating jet aircraft from
carriers turned to the Royal Navy’s technical experts at the Royal Aircraft Estab-
lishment (RAE) at Farnborough, England, for detailed methods of solving those
problems.
In 1938, the RAE had created its Catapult Section, a branch of its larger Main
Drawing Office. The Catapult Section was composed of skilled engineers, tech-
nicians, and “draughtsmen” who specialized in designing and testing catapults
and arresting gear for Royal Navy carriers. This “ground crew” was assisted by
experienced test pilots. In April 1945, the Catapult Section was renamed the Na-
val Aircraft Department. Its head was a civilian engineer named Lewis Bodding-
ton. He was already deeply involved in the task of finding a way to create a new
kind of carrier for jet aircraft.4
On 7 June 1945, the Naval Aircraft Department submitted a “Proposed
Programme of Experimental Work” to the head of the RAE. The goal of this ef-
fort was to test the feasibility of using jets without undercarriages on aircraft
carriers. There were four stages to the department’s plan. Stage 1 was a detailed
program of experiments with models. During stage 1, a special concrete pit, two
hundred feet by seventy feet, would be built at Farnborough in order to test a
pneumatic deck. In stage 2, dummy aircraft (Hotspur gliders) would be dropped
on and towed across a temporary “flexible deck.” At the same time, the engineers
at the RAE would be designing a full-scale deck for use at sea.
In stage 3, actual jet aircraft would test the flexible, or pneumatic, deck at
Farnborough. Their tests would determine the proper procedures for landing a
fighter without landing gear on a “flexdeck.” Stage 4 would consist of tests at sea.
By then the RAE hoped to have “a mechanical sighting instrument which will
convey to the pilot by an automatic ‘batsman’ or by a relayed signal . . . the ap-
proach he is making and indicate the correction, if any.”5
By June 1945, then, Boddington and his colleagues had identified two solu-
tions to the problems outlined by senior Royal Navy officers the previous winter
—a new form of landing deck and an improved means of guiding pilots of jets
onto that deck. Boddington followed the 7 June proposal with a paper dated 17
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July arguing that “the large increase in take-off speed which will result from the
developments in the [jet] aircraft . . . , and the resulting necessity to remove the
present free-deck take-off restrictions will demand assisted take-off under all
conditions.”6
There they were: a modified landing deck, a landing aid to assist pilots, and
“assisted take-off under all conditions.” These three ideas would make the mod-
ern aircraft carrier possible. They were “on the table,” so to speak, in the summer
of 1945. It would take ten years to go from this remarkable insight to the first re-
ally modern carrier, USS Forrestal.
ADAPTATION VS. INNOVATION
What about the USN? Were its carrier aviation specialists doing the same kind of
thinking and planning as their counterparts in the RN? The answer is yes and no.
At the end of 1944, for example, Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher, who had com-
manded Task Force 38 at the battles in and around the Philippines in October of
that year, recommended to the staff of the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO)
that an informal board consider developing an aircraft carrier design that would
take account of the lessons learned during the major carrier operations of that
year. His recommendation was seconded by the “type commander” of Navy air
forces in the Pacific.7
The head of the Aviation Military Characteristics branch in the office of the
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air)—known as DCNO(Air)—Captain
William T. Rassieur, accordingly studied the actual and potential impacts of new
and heavier aircraft on the existing Essex class and on the larger Midway-class
carriers then under construction. Rassieur’s analysis considered the carrier air
group and the carrier as a single system. His argument was that the purpose of
this system was to generate sorties. To do that optimally, the carrier needed mul-
tiple catapults that could operate simultaneously. In addition, the carrier’s air-
craft elevators would need to be located at the edges of the flight deck in order to
free up deck space for aircraft waiting their turns at the multiple catapults.8
By the end of June 1945, Captain Rassieur had submitted his analysis to the
board that had been created on the basis of Vice Admiral Mitscher’s recommen-
dation. Early in July, the members of that board endorsed the concept of a car-
rier with “a radically redesigned flight deck and a new mode of operations.”9 In
parallel with the deliberations taking place in the office of DCNO(Air), engi-
neers in the Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics (BuAer) studied the potential of
turboprop-driven aircraft on carriers. Their work led the chief of BuAer, Rear
Admiral Harold B. Sallada, to propose to the CNO in December 1945 that the
Navy develop and procure carrier-based bombers that could carry very heavy
bomb loads.10
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The new DCNO(Air) was Vice Admiral Mitscher. He endorsed Sallada’s rec-
ommendation, as did the CNO, Admiral Chester Nimitz. In February 1946 the
Vice Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral (and aviator) DeWitt Ramsey, directed
the Navy’s Bureau of Ships (BuShips) to initiate a new carrier design study. As
Norman Friedman discovered, BuShips had a new preliminary design (termed
“C-2”) ready in April.11
However, there was also another carrier concept under development in 1946.
C-2 was a modification of the Midway design; its primary purpose was to carry
and launch very large bombers. But the Bureau of Ships was also working on a
new fleet carrier—a general-purpose carrier (CVB-X) to succeed the World War
II Essex type.12 CVB-X, which eventually became the ill-fated United States (can-
celed by the Secretary of Defense in 1949), was also designed to carry large
bombers, for both nuclear and conventional missions.
The interest in nuclear attack inside the Navy was strong. BuAer produced an
“outline specification” for what became the AJ Savage carrier bomber in January
1946.13 Private firms were requested to respond to the specification, and senior
military officers and civilians within BuAer met in March of that year to decide
whether the plane could be developed.14 The Aircraft Laboratory of the Naval
Air Materiel Center (NAMC) was already developing preliminary bomber de-
signs and gathering information on land-based bomber designs being consid-
ered by the Army Air Forces.15
In June 1946, Rear Admiral Jerauld Wright, the Deputy Chief of Naval Opera-
tions (Plans & Policy), had argued to the CNO, Nimitz, that the existence of nu-
clear weapons—even the large and heavy plutonium bomb used against
Nagasaki in August 1945—justified building large, long-range carrier bombers
and carriers to support them.16 In July, the acting Secretary of the Navy, John L.
Sullivan, wrote to President Harry Truman that the “high mobility of the Naval
Carrier Task Force combined with its capacity for making successive and contin-
uous strikes in almost any part of the world make this force a most valuable
means of waging atomic bomb warfare.”17 As retired Vice Admiral Jerry Miller
was to put it in 2001, the nuclear mission became the “only game in town” after
World War II.18
Very quickly, the U.S. Navy went in a different direction from the Royal Navy.
For the RN, the focus in 1945 and 1946 was on rethinking the design and
flight-deck operations of an aircraft carrier to fit the characteristics of jet aircraft
designed for the mission of convoy protection. The RN did not envisage a nu-
clear strike role for its carrier aircraft. The USN, by contrast, focused on heavy
attack and then on nuclear strike—operations emphasizing new and larger air-
craft on new and larger carriers. Unlike the RN, the USN had to prove that it
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could play as an equal with a land-based air force (what would become in 1947
the U.S. Air Force) in the mission of nuclear strike.
But this meant that the U.S. Navy wanted to adapt carriers and carrier air-
craft to a new mission, while the Royal Navy wanted to overcome the problems
(higher landing speeds, the reduced responsiveness of turbojet engines, etc.)
that made it almost impossible safely to operate jet aircraft on existing carriers
at all. The RN’s technical specialists at Farnborough understood that they had
to innovate. The USN also had to innovate, but in a very different way and at a
different level. It had to show that a relatively heavy bomber, weighing over
sixty thousand pounds, could be launched from a carrier.19 Making that hap-
pen was the primary mission of the U.S. Navy’s carrier aircraft community af-
ter mid-1946.
THE RN AND THE USN GO IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS
In 1946, the engineers and technicians at Farnborough were actively developing
and testing their prototype flexdeck, or cushioned carrier landing deck. The
flexdeck was actually “an interim measure which, if used with existing jet de-
signs with their undercarriages removed, would teach us a lot and show the way
to the solution” of the problem of creating a new type of carrier. That, at least,
was the view of Rear Admiral M. S. Slattery, the RN’s Chief of Naval Research, in
April 1945.20
After extensive tests of developmental models of flexible landing surfaces, the
staff at Farnborough began working on a full-scale system in January 1946. As
anticipated, some major problems developed. The “cushion” for the flexible
deck was composed of a series of inflated, sausage-shaped flexible cylinders. On
top of the cylinders was a flat rubber deck—the “carpet”—along which the land-
ing aircraft was to skid. Tests with modified gliders dropped onto such a surface
showed that a method had to be found to keep the weight of the landing aircraft
from pushing one inflated cylinder over its neighbors and thereby reducing dra-
matically the cushion effect.21
The real problem confronting the ground crew at Farnborough, however,
turned out to be the carpet itself. As one of the engineers observed, “nothing of
this magnitude had been attempted before, [and] a great deal of experimental
work with the manufacturers [was] necessary before the design could be final-
ized.”22 Beginning in March 1947, the engineers and technicians at Farnborough
began testing a flexible deck two hundred feet long and sixty wide, complete
with its own arresting gear cable. The first manned landing was made on 29 De-
cember 1947 by the noted RN test pilot Eric Brown, and it nearly cost him his
life.23 He was fortunate not to be seriously injured or killed.
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Tests continued in 1948, and Brown made “forty of these landings in all” at
Farnborough.24 Then the flexible deck was installed aboard carrier HMS War-
rior, and Brown put a Vampire down on it for the first time on 3 November 1948.
After a long string of successful landings, Brown argued in his report of the trials
on Warrior “that the principle of flexible deck landing for undercarriageless
aircraft is fundamentally sound. . . . It may even be that future swept-back and
delta plan form aircraft will be forced to adopt this method of landing on carri-
ers, since all calculations point to serious wheeled landing problems on such
aircraft.”25
Brown was puzzled that other navies did not perceive the utility of the
flexdeck. He knew that the U.S. Navy’s Bureau of Aeronautics had watched the
progress of the RN’s work, and he knew that engineers in BuAer were interested
in it.26 What he may not have known about, however, was the opposition to the
flexdeck by BuAer’s chief, Rear Admiral Alfred M. Pride.27 Once Pride left BuAer
and became the aviation type commander for West Coast aircraft in May 1951,
the engineers in BuAer who thought that the flexdeck might have potential got
the green light to develop a version for the U.S. Navy.28 Though that version was
eventually tested, the USN never adopted the flexdeck, mostly for the same rea-
sons that the RN did not make it standard.29
In fact, for convoy protection the USN developed vertical-takeoff-and-landing
aircraft—aircraft that convoy escorts could carry. BuAer issued a request for pro-
posals to industry for such aircraft in 1948 and tested two unique experimental
models in 1954–55.30 Neither had the performance required.
In effect, the RN’s technical experts worked on how to create an innovative
carrier/jet combination after World War II. The work of their American coun-
terparts was overshadowed by the U.S. Navy’s effort to develop carrier aircraft
that could carry the large nuclear weapon then in existence. The Bureau of Aero-
nautics ordered the AJ-1 Savage—“the smallest plane which can carry the
atomic bomb”—from North American Aviation in June 1946.31 The Savage was
a piston-engine aircraft with a turbojet engine in its tail. At a loaded weight of
over fifty-two thousand pounds, it was significantly heavier, as well as somewhat
larger, than the North American PBJ-1H twin-engine bomber that was launched
from and then recovered aboard USS Shangri-La (CV 38) in November 1944.32
In November 1946, the Chief of Naval Operations “directed the DCNO(Logis-
tics) to modify the three CVBs [Midway-class carriers] to permit the operation
of AJ Savages carrying atomic bombs.”33
This, then, was the pattern of USN development: first, develop the AJ-1 and
design a successor jet-only bomber (the A3D Skywarrior); simultaneously,
modify the three Midways so they could operate the AJ-1; and third, design a
new carrier built expressly for an aircraft with the weight and performance
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characteristics of the A3D. In the meantime, to make it clear to senior officials in
the administration of President Harry Truman that the Navy could operate nuclear-
armed bombers from its carriers, demonstration flights would be launched from
Midway-class carriers using long-range P2V-3C Neptunes, each weighing over
seventy thousand pounds. All this was an audacious effort—nothing less than a
gamble. Over a period of less than five years, the AJ-1 Savage was pushed prema-
turely into operations, the Bureau of Ships spent many man-years on the design of
a “super” carrier, BuAer solicited bids for what became the A3D, and Navy pilots
flew their P2V-3Cs off Midway and its two sisters.34
THE RN AND THE U.S. NAVY COME BACK TOGETHER
This series of events was very different from what was happening at RAE
Farnborough. The flexdeck, though demonstrated successfully at sea, had
proved not to be the solution to the challenge of merging jet aircraft with carri-
ers. The basic problem was that the flexdeck left very little room to line up air-
craft at the forward end of a carrier’s flight deck to await their turns at the
forward catapult. As Captain Dennis Cambell, an experienced naval aviator then
serving as the Deputy Chief RN Representative at the Ministry of Supply, would
recall, the “difficulties [with the flexdeck] were insurmountable.” On 7 August
1951 he chaired a meeting of naval officers and technical experts to determine
whether the RN could design a carrier capable of operating aircraft with or with-
out undercarriages.35 Lewis Boddington was one of the attendees.
The result of this meeting—where Cambell first presented his idea of an an-
gled flight deck—and of some thinking by Boddington afterward was a flight
deck angled enough to port so that any landing aircraft that did not successfully
engage the arresting gear wires could accelerate, take to the air again, and rejoin
the landing “pattern” to make another attempt.36 In the meantime, Rear Admiral
Pride, as chief of BuAer, had already directed the Naval Air Test Center (NATC)
in Patuxent River, Maryland, to study means of making jet landings on carriers
safer.37 As we have already noted, Pride had refused to support the flexdeck con-
cept, but he quickly embraced the concept of the angled flight deck—an idea
that BuAer had considered in the 1930s for a combination cruiser/small-carrier
design.38
Sources differ on just how the angled-deck concept jumped the gap between
the Royal and U.S. navies. Contacts between Royal Navy and U.S. Navy aviation
officers during World War II were very strong, and the RN continued to assign
liaison officers to BuAer after the war.39 British technical specialists also stayed
close to their American contemporaries. For example, the U.S. Navy provided
the RN in November 1948 a full set of deck plans for the eventually canceled car-
rier United States (CVA 58) and detailed drawings of carrier Midway (CV 41),
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along with information regarding the development of arresting gear suited to
the larger carrier aircraft then being developed.40
In his memoir, Captain (later Rear Admiral) Cambell notes that he men-
tioned the angled-deck concept to a delegation of U.S. Navy officers in Septem-
ber 1951. As he recalls, “they said very little, but . . . they exchanged significant
looks. A few weeks later we heard . . . that the USN were already planning to angle
the flight deck of the carrier Midway, for a preliminary trial.”41 In his Wings on
My Sleeve, test pilot Eric Brown noted that he had been directed by his superiors
to take “with me details of a new idea to revolutionize carrier-deck landing”
when he joined the U.S. Navy’s test pilots at the NATC in late summer 1951.42
Harold Buell, who commanded Fighter Squadron 84 on Antietam (CV 36) in
early 1953, later remembered that Brown’s espousal of the angled deck did not
immediately gain support at the NATC, because Brown “was talking of only a
four-degree deck angle, which would drastically limit the number of aircraft on
a carrier deck during flight operations. . . . However, the idea sparked further
thinking, and when the angle was increased to eight degrees . . . , it was decided to
test the concept further.”43
Preliminary tests in the spring of 1952 with an angled deck painted on Mid-
way’s axial flight deck were so promising that the U.S. Navy began converting
Antietam to an angled-deck configuration in late summer that same year. In Jan-
uary 1953, tests at sea on Antietam were successful, and Carrier Air Group 8
spent just over two months learning how to use the new deck configuration dur-
ing exercises off Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. As then–Lieutenant Commander Buell
observed, “To an experienced tailhooker, landing a jet airplane on an angled
deck was sheer bliss.”44
It’s important to note here that the experiments with the angled deck paralleled
the introduction of the steam catapult into the U.S. Navy. After World War II,
BuAer invested in three basic catapult types: improved versions of existing hy-
draulic catapults; an electrically driven design; and a slotted-cylinder, expanding-
gas type that had been pioneered by German engineers during the war. An im-
proved hydraulic catapult designated H-8 was installed on modernized Essex-class
carriers, and it satisfactorily launched the first jets. But the hydraulic approach
seemed to be nearing the limit of its effectiveness.45 BuAer was developing heavier
and heavier aircraft, such as the AJ Savage and what would become the A3D
Skywarrior. In January 1949, therefore, Rear Admiral Pride reached the conclu-
sion that slotted-cylinder, explosive-gas catapults would eventually replace the ex-
isting hydraulic equipment.46
The slotted-cylinder catapult was a long tube with a nearly full-length slot in
its upper surface. A piston could be driven under pressure at high speed down
the length of the tube. Fitted to the piston was a hook extending upward through
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the slot, and the hook was attached to a bridle that could be connected to an air-
plane on the flight deck. Two problems faced the designers of slotted-cylinder
catapults. The first was safely generating the expanding gas that would drive the
piston down the cylinder at the proper rate of acceleration. The second was seal-
ing the slot behind the piston as the piston traveled. The catapult developers
working under the Bureau of Aeronautics could not solve these problems.47
BuAer’s catapult developers knew about the Royal Navy’s work on a steam cata-
pult, but they ranked it third in importance, after their own explosive-driven
and hydraulic models.48 But by 1951 the Royal Navy was successfully launching
aircraft from an experimental steam catapult built on top of the flight deck of
the ex-carrier HMS Perseus. Rear Admiral Apollo Soucek, then the senior U.S.
Navy aviator in the U.S. embassy in London, recommended that the U.S. Navy
pay the cost of having Perseus demonstrate its steam catapult in the United
States.49 The Chief of Naval Operations approved the proposal, and Perseus ar-
rived at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard in January 1952.
The tests of the RN’s steam catapult, performed while Perseus was tied up in the
shipyard, were a signal success, but BuAer’s Captain Sheldon W. Brown, head of
the Ships Installations Division, was concerned that the installation on Perseus
would not withstand the greater steam pressures used by U.S. Navy carriers.50 In
Philadelphia, and later at tests at Norfolk, Virginia, Perseus’s catapult used steam at
a pressure of 350 pounds per square inch (psi). Brown warned that the steam cata-
pult might not perform well with the 600 psi steam provided by the American
propulsion plants. As it turned out, Brown’s fears were not justified.51
By the spring of 1952, senior aviation officers in the U.S. Navy were convinced
that the RN’s steam catapult would work on their ships and would accelerate
their heavy attack aircraft to flight speed. A year later, as we have seen, the angled
deck had proved itself operationally. The next step for the U.S. Navy was to in-
stall both innovations in existing carriers and in carriers under construction,
such as the new carrier Forrestal (CV 59). In the meantime, the RN was develop-
ing the mirror landing system that was to make possible the optical glide slope
for landing on carriers.
In the summer of 1951, Lieutenant Commander Hilary “Nick” Goodhart,
working under Captain Cambell, devised an ingenious method for guiding jet
aircraft at the proper angle onto an angled flight deck. The idea was to use a light
source at the stern of the carrier to project a “ball” of light into a stabilized mir-
ror located next to the angled landing deck and angled at three degrees to the
vertical. If the pilot, coming in to land, kept the ball right in the middle of the
mirror, the plane would descend at the correct angle for a safe landing. Cambell
endorsed the idea, and the technical staff at Farnborough, some of whom had
been working on a radar-guided landing aid for some time, developed a
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prototype device and tested it successfully in March 1952.52 An improved ver-
sion of the prototype went to sea on carrier Illustrious in October.
In 1953, Lieutenant Commander (later Vice Admiral) Donald D. Engen, a
USN exchange officer at the RN’s Empire Test Pilots School at Farnborough,
tested the optical landing aid at Farnborough and then at sea, on Illustrious.
Engen recognized the value of the system and how it would complement the an-
gled deck. He enthusiastically endorsed the RN’s equipment and operations in
reports to the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations and the NATC.53 As a re-
sult, BuAer had an optical landing aid fully operational on Bennington (CV 20)
in the summer of 1955.
Because it had more funds, the USN was able to combine the three innovations
—angled deck, steam catapult, and optical landing aid—in a new carrier
(Forrestal) before the RN could complete its new Ark Royal. Forrestal had been
designed as an axial-deck carrier. Approved in the fall of 1950 for inclusion in
the fiscal year 1952 shipbuilding program, Forrestal “was commissioned on 1
October 1955, despite having been redesigned (with an angled deck and steam
catapults) during the course of construction.”54
LESSONS LEARNED
It is always risky to draw lessons from a single case, because there is no guarantee
that any future case will resemble closely enough the one under study. Neverthe-
less, we believe that some useful lessons can be gleaned from the research that we
did for the Office of Net Assessment. We will cover these lessons as we answer the
questions that were posed to us by Andrew Marshall.
Why did the Royal Navy develop workable catapults, the concept of the an-
gled deck, and an effective optical landing aid before the U.S. Navy did? There is
no one answer to this question. However, what is striking in this instance is the
accuracy with which the RN’s officers and technical specialists initially defined
the problems posed by the adoption of jet aircraft. As we showed in our earlier
study, American & British Aircraft Carrier Development, the RN’s carrier arm
had fallen behind its competitors in the U.S. and Japanese navies before World
War II.55 By the summer of 1945, a majority of aircraft on British carriers operat-
ing in the Pacific were American designs, and RN carriers were using what the
USN called the “deck park” as an integral element of flight-deck operations.56
But the RN had a wartime staff-committee system that could and did recover
from the errors made prewar, and the officers involved realized in the winter of
1944–45 that jet aircraft posed a series of interrelated problems for existing car-
riers. The RAE engineers at Farnborough defined those problems in quantitative
terms and systematically analyzed potential solutions to them. The result was,
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first, the flexdeck concept and then a series of experiments to demonstrate that
the prototype flexdeck would actually work.
A complement to the flexdeck was a slotted-tube catapult designed to launch
the jets without undercarriages. It was tested successfully at Farnborough in No-
vember 1953, but by then it had already been superseded by a steam-powered
slotted-tube design that had been patented by Colin Mitchell in 1938.57
Fortuitously, everything came together for the RN in the summer and fall of
1951. The flexdeck was dropped in favor of the angled deck. The steam catapult
proved itself reliable and effective in launching aircraft with landing gear. Com-
mander Goodhart’s concept of an optical (or mirror) landing aid turned out to
be efficacious.
Where was the U.S. Navy while all this was going on? Its senior aviation offi-
cers were preoccupied with three issues: first, demonstrating that Navy carrier
aircraft could carry nuclear weapons; second, defending naval aviation in the ac-
rimonious dispute with (after the summer of 1947) the U.S. Air Force over ser-
vice roles and missions; and third, developing reliable and powerful turbojet
engines.58 The larger Navy was also going through a series of major internal
changes, including experiments with nuclear power and missiles, plans for de-
ploying two major fleets (one each to the western Pacific and the Mediterra-
nean), and adapting its staff structure in Washington, D.C., to a new pattern of
national-security decision making.59
In effect, the U.S. Navy’s leaders were distracted. They also suffered from the
effects of a change made to the organization of OPNAV, the Office of the Chief of
Naval Operations, during World War II: in 1943, the Secretary of the Navy had
created a deputy Chief of Naval Operations for aviation. This decision central-
ized policy making for naval aviation inside OPNAV, but the senior officers there
were, as we have noted, preoccupied with a range of demanding issues after
1945. What they therefore wanted from the Bureau of Aeronautics was aircraft
that could carry nuclear weapons, facilities on the Midway-class carriers for the
storage and assembly of nuclear weapons, and one or more new carriers to get
the new heavy bombers within striking range of the Soviet Union. In a sense, the
OPNAV officers were revolutionaries. They wanted to give the Navy’s carriers a
new role, a strategic role, but they also aimed only to adapt the existing concept
of the aircraft carrier to a new family of heavy bombers.
For their part, the U.S. Navy’s catapult designers believed that their planned
innovations—especially the replacement of hydraulic catapults with new
gas-powered, slotted-tube designs—would work, but they did not. In addition,
the most pressing problem for the NAMC’s engineers in the two years after
World War II was developing a new barrier that could safely stop jets that had
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missed arresting gear wires as they landed.60 The NAMC’s engineers were strug-
gling to adapt existing equipment and concepts to carrier aviation. Their coun-
terparts at Farnborough, by contrast, began their postwar studies with an
innovative mind-set and kept it. Consequently, it took aviator Rear Admiral
Soucek to convince two successive chiefs of naval operations to bring the steam
catapult to the United States for trials. The success of those trials convinced the
CNO, then Admiral William Fechteler, to force the Bureau of Aeronautics to
adopt it.
It was not sheer stubbornness that kept the U.S. Navy’s catapult engineers
from embracing the steam catapult. They simply did not think it would work
with the high-pressure, high-temperature steam produced by the boilers of the
U.S. Navy’s carriers. Only the success of the trials with HMS Perseus compelled
BuAer’s specialists to change their minds, and even then they believed that their
own designs would eventually prove superior to the RN’s steam catapult.
Their resistance to the steam catapult is a sign that the consensus reached in
the RN in 1945 regarding the new relationship between jet aircraft and carriers
took longer to develop within the U.S. Navy. For example, the Bureau of Ships
was saying in 1953 that “the transition from propeller to jet propulsion . . . has . . .
thrown the design of aircraft carriers into a transition stage. Some of the results of
this transition, canted decks and steam catapults, are, of course, already with us.
Another change less apparent, but still fundamental, is the shift in the aeronautical
factor that exerts the predominant influence on the size of aircraft carriers.”61
What this sort of thinking shows, in our view, is that the USN’s technical special-
ists were slower to grasp the nature of the jet-carrier relationship than their RN
counterparts.
That is one major reason why the U.S. Navy did not develop the angled deck,
steam catapult, and optical landing aid in parallel with the British. American
aviators did recognize the need for deck-edge aircraft elevators, as Captain
Rassieur’s 1945 analysis shows, and the British picked up on this idea. However,
OPNAV, BuAer, and BuShips lacked the shared understanding that placing jets
on carriers meant that the carriers had to change in a fundamental way.
Put another way, there was no one forum where all the implications of oper-
ating jets from carriers could be put on the table. Instead, the USN moved along
administratively through a series of negotiations among the organizations con-
cerned. This was not a failed process—it produced carrier bombers capable of
carrying nuclear weapons. But it was a flawed process, in that it needed the RN’s
innovations to make Forrestal and its successors effective strike platforms.
There is another factor to consider, that of creative and perceptive individu-
als. The RN had the creative engineer Lewis Boddington, the gifted test pilot Eric
Brown, and officers like Dennis Cambell and Nick Goodhart. The U.S. Navy
7 4 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
NWC_Review_Spring2011.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Spring2011\NWC_Review_Spring2011.vp
Monday, February 14, 2011 4:09:09 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
80
Naval War College Review, Vol. 64 [2011], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss2/1
drew on the talents of such aeronautical engineers as Edward Heinemann of
Douglas Aircraft; on its own test pilots, like Donald Engen; and on the bureau-
cratic support provided by such officers as Rear Admiral (later Admiral) Arthur
W. Radford, DCNO(Air) from January 1946 through February 1947. There was
plenty of talent available to both navies, but having the right individuals in the
right place at the right time is often a matter of chance, and chance favored the
RN.
Still, making the best use of their talents does not have to depend on chance,
which is why integrating organizations and processes are important. Commit-
tees are often disparaged as places where officials waste time. But committees
and meetings of the right sort are often essential if innovation is to take place. It
was from one such committee that the angled-deck concept came, and it was
through meetings between U.S. and Royal Navy officers that the concept made
its way from Britain to the United States.
Finally, why did the RN’s innovations “jump the gap” so quickly between na-
vies? The answer is clear from the available evidence. The close contact between
U.S. Navy and RN officers and civilians that had developed during World War II
continued afterward. There were exchange programs for test pilots; information
was passed from American naval and aeronautical engineers to their British
counterparts, and vice versa; and contacts made between senior uniformed offi-
cers facilitated communications. For example, Rear Admiral James Russell,
BuAer chief in 1955, was a good friend of the RN’s Dennis Cambell.
Perhaps the most important “lesson learned” is that uncertainty must be rec-
ognized and then dealt with openly and systematically in order for innovation to
take place. The RN’s officers saw right away that operating jets from aircraft car-
riers was a challenge and that overcoming that challenge would require innova-
tive thinking. Civilians like Lewis Boddington accepted the challenge and
innovated accordingly. When the flexdeck seemed to be not the right answer,
Boddington jumped quickly to the angled deck. He and his colleagues dropped
the flexdeck without asking for a chance to modify it. Their aggressive pursuit of
something that would work marked the team of developers at Farnborough, and
it seems always to be the mark of real innovators.
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HIDING IN PLAIN SIGHT
The U.S. Navy and Dispersed Operations under EMCON,
1956–1972
Robert G. Angevine
The ability to operate freely, unthreatened by adversaries seeking to track andtarget them or interfere with their communications, that the U.S. Navy’s air-
craft carriers have enjoyed for the last two decades is unlikely to continue. China
has been developing an antiaccess/area-denial capability, centered on antiship
ballistic missiles, that may soon be able to locate and attack U.S. carriers at con-
siderable distances.1 The Chinese People’s Liberation Army has also developed
concepts for information warfare that integrate computer network operations,
electronic warfare, and kinetic strikes to degrade an opponent’s ability to collect,
process, and disseminate information.2 If combined effectively, antiship ballistic
missiles and attacks on information networks could endanger the U.S. Navy’s
command of the sea.3
Although the specific problems presented by antiship ballistic missiles and
information warfare are new, the broader operational challenges are not. During
the Cold War, the threat posed by Soviet naval aviation and submarines
prompted the U.S. Navy to stage a number of experiments examining the con-
duct of dispersed operations at sea. Spreading out
across a wide area, it was believed, would make U.S.
naval forces harder to detect, identify, and target. In
order to lessen the chance of detection further, the
U.S. forces in the experiments strictly limited their
communications. Dispersed operations under emis-
sion control (EMCON) represented a significant de-
parture from more active and overt methods of
operation and posed new operational challenges.
Dr. Angevine is the author of The Railroad and the
State: War, Politics, and Technology in 19th-Century
America (2004) and articles on military approaches to
technology, naval experimentation, and American mil-
itary and naval intelligence. He received his PhD in
military history from Duke University in 1999 and cur-
rently works as a defense analyst in the Washington
area. He has taught at Duke, American, and George
Mason Universities and now serves as adjunct assistant
professor of history at George Washington University.
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Navy experiments like the HAYSTACK and UPTIDE series therefore offer collec-
tively an excellent opportunity to study organizational adaptation and change in
response to new technologies and threats and to consider the conduct of distrib-
uted operations in the absence of a network.
THE U.S. NAVY IN THE 1950S
One of the primary challenges facing the U.S. Navy in the early years of the Cold
War was how to employ its command of the sea to influence events ashore. The
Soviet Union was essentially a land power; it did not possess a fleet capable of
challenging American maritime supremacy. Instead, American and Western Eu-
ropean policy makers expected a land attack against Western Europe and the
Middle East to constitute the Soviets’ principal offensive thrust in any future
conflict.4 As early as 1948, the U.S. Navy began envisaging an offensive strike
force that would seek to slow the Soviet ground advance across Western Europe.5
By 1956, the carriers of the Navy’s Mediterranean-based Sixth Fleet were tasked
with not only slowing any Soviet attack headed west and south but also striking
key targets in the southern European part of the Soviet Union.6
In order for their aircraft to reach their targets, however, the Sixth Fleet’s car-
riers had to move into the eastern Mediterranean, close to the Soviet Union, and
survive there long enough to conduct launch operations. In the mid-1950s, the
carriers’ chances of doing so appeared slim. A series of air-defense exercises over
the preceding years had demonstrated the fleet’s inability to defend itself against
even relatively small Soviet air raids.7 In 1956, Admiral John H. Cassady, Com-
mander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, con-
ceded in his annual report, “It is widely recognized that a carrier task force
cannot provide for its air defense under conditions likely to exist in combat in
the Mediterranean.”8
The Haystack Concept
When Vice Admiral Harry Felt assumed command of Sixth Fleet in 1956, the
fleet’s ability to perform its primary mission was therefore questionable. Per-
haps as a consequence, Sixth Fleet had the reputation of being a social rather
than an operational fleet. Felt sought to change that reputation and improve the
effectiveness of his new command by infusing the fleet’s staff with new blood.9
One of the young officers Felt brought in was Lieutenant Jeremiah Denton.10
Denton’s background was in lighter-than-air aviation and electronic warfare.
He had tested large airborne radars in blimps and served as the project officer for
the WV-2, one of the Navy’s first airborne-early-warning radar aircraft. Denton
thus possessed a solid understanding of air defense operations, Soviet aerial at-
tack capabilities, and airborne radar systems.11
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Drawing on his extensive experience looking at radar scopes, Denton had de-
veloped an idea of how to extend the survival time of the Sixth Fleet’s carriers
during a general war.12 He joined forces with Ralph Beatty, the Operations Eval-
uation Group analyst attached to Sixth Fleet, who had been working on mathe-
matical techniques for calculating how a fleet of aircraft could find a carrier in a
background of similar targets. Together, they began developing the new concept.13
Denton and Beatty argued that the Soviet bombers’ greatest challenge was
finding and identifying the Sixth Fleet’s carriers. The fleet should therefore do
everything in its power to “thwart and delay” recognition of the carriers. It
should disperse widely and intermingle with commercial shipping in order to
eliminate the unmistakable appearance on airborne radar scopes of the standard
close, circular (“bull’s-eye”) formation. All nearby supporting units, including
the destroyers serving as plane guards and screening the carriers against subma-
rines, should disperse, and the carriers should operate independently. Strict
control of all electronic emissions and the widespread use of deception would
increase the effectiveness of the concept, which Denton dubbed “Haystack,” be-
cause of its emphasis on making the carriers difficult to find.14
When Felt left Sixth Fleet after just six months to become Vice Chief of Naval
Operations, he made a point of praising Denton, Beatty, and the Haystack con-
cept in front of his successor, Vice Admiral Charles “Cat” Brown, and the entire
Sixth Fleet staff.15 Under Brown’s command, Sixth Fleet began conducting ex-
periments to test the Haystack concept. Small-scale tests began in October 1956.
The HAYSTACK Exercises
The first major exercise testing the Haystack concept, HAYSTACK CHARLIE, was
conducted in January 1957 in the Mediterranean Sea about a hundred miles
west of Sardinia. The primary objective of the two-day exercise was “to test the
effectiveness of tactical deception as a method of striking force air defense.” The
exercise pitted two aircraft carriers, USS Coral Sea (CVA 43) and USS Randolph
(CVA 15), their escorts, and their logistical support ships against a conventional
submarine and land-based snooper and attack aircraft flying out of Naples and
Malta. The carriers, which operated up to 250 miles apart, conducted simulated
nuclear strikes against wartime targets and then retired, while the aggressor
force tried to find and attack them as soon as possible.16
The exercise results suggested that tactical deception was effective. The carri-
ers were able to avoid detection long enough to launch thirty to thirty-five simu-
lated atomic strikes each day before being “attacked” by “aggressor” aircraft.
Small groups of ships were employed effectively as decoys; they attracted attacks
from several aircraft searching for the carriers. In particular, the guided-missile
cruiser USS Boston (CAG 1) and two destroyers acted as an effective “missile
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trap” early in the exercise, shooting down several snooper aircraft trying to in-
vestigate the three closely packed radar blips.17
The results indicated, however, that the Haystack concept was still imperfect.
Destroyers were frequently too close to the carriers. The three destroyers escort-
ing Coral Sea were within ten miles of the carrier when the exercise began, en-
abling a snooper aircraft to detect the carrier in the first five minutes. The
destroyers accompanying Randolph remained more distant, but they were still
close enough to attract attention from snooper aircraft soon after the exercise
started. Aircraft also tended to operate too close to the carriers. Aggressor air-
craft attacked Randolph after intercepting the radar of an antisubmarine patrol
plane circling the carrier. A snooper aircraft also detected the radar signal of an
airborne-early-warning plane operating near a carrier.18
HAYSTACK DELTA, a seventeen-hour exercise, was held on 2 March 1957 in the
Mediterranean Sea southeast of Malta and Sicily. The exercise emphasized pas-
sive air defense using traps and decoy groups. It matched two carriers, USS
Forrestal (CVA 59) and USS Lake Champlain (CVA 39), against two conventional
submarines and land-based attack, snooper, and electronic countermeasure
(ECM) aircraft operating out of Naples and Malta.19
The exercise results again suggested that tactical deception was successful.
The strike aircraft experienced significant problems identifying targets due to
heavy cloud cover and squalls, careful emission control, and deceptive forma-
tions. Learning from past exercises, the destroyers in HAYSTACK DELTA remained
farther away from the carriers and often paired with other ships to simulate car-
riers. The eight aggressor strikes detected thirteen possible military targets, but
only one correctly identified a carrier (Forrestal) and its plane guard. Three
strikes detected Boston and two accompanying destroyers, which were stationed
in the expected direction of attack in order to draw strikes away from the carri-
ers, and closed to investigate or attack. Two other strikes attacked oilers, which
were paired with destroyers and being used as decoys for the first time.20
Emission control also proved effective. Only radar picket destroyers and sec-
tor air-defense ships, not carriers, used navigation aids. The aggressor ECM air-
craft located the task force’s operating area but could not locate or identify
individual units, due to the suppression of electronic signals characteristic of
particular ships.21
In order to experiment with the use of islands to hinder the identification of
surface units by aggressor aircraft, the venue for HAYSTACK ECHO was moved to
the Aegean Sea. The exercise, which was held from 9 to 11 April 1957, pitted
Forrestal, Lake Champlain, and their escorts against two submarines and
land-based snooper, ECM, and attack aircraft operating from Athens. The
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primary objective, again, was to practice tactical control and air defense in a dis-
persed disposition.22
Postexercise analysis was to indicate that it had not realistically tested the
Haystack concept, because of the requirement for nighttime air operations and
the consequent need for the carriers to employ plane guards and tactical air nav-
igation systems (TACANs). An aggressor ECM aircraft had intercepted Lake
Champlain’s TACAN emissions shortly after the exercise began and vectored in
snooper aircraft to track the carrier and strike aircraft to attack it. The initial two
attacks had been successful, as were two later strikes; snooper aircraft had
tracked Lake Champlain almost continuously for the rest of the exercise.
Forrestal had been detected visually at 7:14 AM on 10 April and had been tracked
continuously thereafter, although it had not been attacked successfully until
3:01 PM. ECM aircraft had also detected and successfully attacked the carriers on
several other occasions during the exercise. The analysis concluded, “Air control
without the use of TACAN by carriers is essential.”23
Other attempts at deception in HAYSTACK ECHO were only moderately suc-
cessful. The heavy cruiser Salem (CA 139) and two destroyers decoyed snooper
aircraft into shadowing them for several hours, until daybreak revealed that the
group was not a carrier and its escorts. The many islands in the operating area,
however, did not appear to hinder the aggressor force’s ability to find the carri-
ers. Instead, they complicated the task force’s efforts to defend itself. Land-
locking of radars (the tendency of radar return from landmasses to mask
contacts around them) severely handicapped the ability of the task force to de-
tect aggressor aircraft and control its own aircraft. Moreover, once the carriers
and decoy groups were located, they were unable to relocate quickly. The aggres-
sors could thus ignore the decoys and concentrate their efforts on the carriers.24
The purpose of the Haystack concept was to develop tactics that would ex-
tend the survival time of U.S. carriers in the Mediterranean during the initial pe-
riod of a nuclear exchange. After the conclusion of HAYSTACK ECHO, Brown
declared the exercises a success. In a letter to the Chief of Naval Operations
(CNO) that also went to all the major commands in the Navy, Brown claimed,
“Haystack tactics have been proved effective in increasing the critical survival
time available for launching counter strikes against aggressor bases under to-
day’s war conditions in this area.”25 When the exercise series began, the expected
survival time for carriers in the Mediterranean had been less than two hours.
During HAYSTACK CHARLIE, DELTA, and ECHO, the carriers, with one exception,
survived for at least eight hours; half of the participating carriers survived for
over fifteen hours.26 Extending the survival time of the carriers by even a few
hours gave them enough time to hit Soviet airfields and ports, thereby reducing
NWC_Review_Spring2011.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Spring2011\NWC_Review_Spring2011.vp
Monday, February 14, 2011 4:09:10 PM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
89
Naval War College: Spring 2011 Full Issue
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2011
the threat they faced thereafter. “As each hour without attack passes,” Brown ex-
plained, “the chances of continued survival increases many fold.”27
THE U.S. NAVY IN THE 1960S
The Sixth Fleet focused most of its attention on the threat posed by Soviet
long-range aviation in part because there was no significant Soviet naval pres-
ence outside home waters at the time. In the mid-1950s Soviet surface combat-
ants started to visit foreign ports occasionally, and they began conducting
annual exercises in the North and Norwegian Seas in the late 1950s, but there
were still relatively few Soviet submarines operating in the Mediterranean. The
commander of the Sixth Fleet from 1958 to 1959, Vice Admiral Clarence E.
Ekstrom, felt the submarine threat facing Sixth Fleet was “quite manageable.”28
The developers of the Haystack concept expected that dispersing the destroy-
ers screening the carrier would increase the carrier’s vulnerability to submarine
attack but considered the risk acceptable in areas where the submarine concen-
tration was low or when the air threat exceeded the submarine threat.29 By 1961
they were confident that the combination of dispersion, deception, and emis-
sion control would enable U.S. carriers to survive against enemy submarine at-
tack long enough to conduct their retaliatory nuclear strikes, even in areas of
relatively high concentrations of submarines, so long as those submarines were
conventionally powered. Beatty estimated that a carrier could survive for an av-
erage of five days in a ten-thousand-square-mile area containing two conven-
tional submarines.30
The introduction of the nuclear-powered submarine in the mid-1950s, how-
ever, revolutionized undersea warfare.31 The first Soviet nuclear submarines be-
gan entering service in 1958 and soon threatened to render the Haystack tactics
obsolete. By the early 1960s leading Navy officials were increasingly focused on
how to counter the potential threat of nuclear submarines. A paper, “The Strate-
gic Concept for Antisubmarine Warfare,” circulated by the CNO, Admiral
Arleigh Burke, identified hostile submarine activities as “foremost among the
threats to our use of the seas.”32
Compounding the challenge was the equipping of nuclear submarines with
antiship cruise missiles. As early as 1960, Rear Admiral Jimmy Thach, one of the
Navy’s leading antisubmarine warfare (ASW) experts, predicted that submarine
forces would increasingly rely on missiles as their primary weapons, even against
shipping.33 The Soviet Echo II class, a nuclear-powered submarine equipped
with eight SS-N-3A (Shaddock) missiles, entered service in 1962. The SS-N-3A
missile was, with the exception of certain aircraft, the longest-ranged antiship
weapon in the world; it was capable of striking targets at sea from a distance of
250 nautical miles. Since the typical defensive perimeter of an American carrier
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battle group extended only a hundred nautical miles from the center, an Echo II
could remain outside the perimeter and potentially launch an attack unde-
tected. After an exercise to test performance against Soviet nuclear submarines
firing “standoff ” missiles, one U.S. Navy commander concluded, “It is evident
that the force would have had essentially no capability against such an attack.”34
Although the cruise missile–firing submarine presented dangers, it also had
weaknesses. Its chief problem was detecting and identifying its targets while pre-
serving its own stealth. As Beatty observed, “The ability of a submarine to iden-
tify carriers by sonar alone in large dispersed dispositions is poor. Visual
identification is usually necessary.”35 He recommended testing the effectiveness
of dispersed formations against nuclear submarines and placing an increased
emphasis on the development of acoustic deception tactics and equipment, par-
ticularly expendable acoustic decoys.36
The UPTIDE Concept
By the late 1960s, the Navy increasingly emphasized improving its ability to de-
fend against missile-firing nuclear submarines. In June 1968, the commander in
chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral John J. Hyland, initiated Project UPTIDE
(Unified Pacific Fleet Project for Tactical Improvement and Data Extraction).
One of the primary objectives of UPTIDE was to devise and evaluate tactics Pa-
cific Fleet antisubmarine warfare groups (typically an ASW carrier, its air wing,
and a destroyer squadron) could use to frustrate and defend against missile and
torpedo attacks by enemy submarines within moving or static areas of high tac-
tical interest.37
The driving force behind the UPTIDE series was Vice Admiral E. P. “Pete”
Aurand. An innovator and iconoclast, Aurand suggested shifting the focus of the
ASW effort from killing submarines to reducing their effectiveness by prevent-
ing encounters.38 Echoing Beatty, Aurand argued that although the nuclear sub-
marine was very fast and could remain submerged indefinitely, it was still
essentially blind. An unassisted submarine relied heavily on passive acoustic
sensors to detect, classify, track, and localize carriers and other high-value tar-
gets. Degrading the information the submarine received could significantly re-
duce its effectiveness.
The UPTIDE experiments focused on reducing the probabilities that the sub-
marine would detect, identify, and localize its target. The probability that the
submarine would detect its target could be reduced by strict acoustic and elec-
tromagnetic emission control. Aurand may have drawn inspiration from his
previous observation of Soviet naval operations in the Sea of Japan. Aurand had
noticed that Soviet radar antennas neither rotated nor emitted. He speculated
that the Soviet navy’s policy was to leave its radars turned off unless there was no
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other way to obtain desired information. Although it denied the Soviets early
warning, Aurand believed, “such a policy has merit, especially when compared
to the predominant practice of most U.S. ships to emit constantly.” He con-
cluded, “Finesse in the handling of emitters, electronic, visual, and acoustic
should be developed by our ships, especially in the vicinity of Soviet ships.”39
The probability that the submarine would successfully identify a detected tar-
get could be decreased through acoustic deception. The probability that the sub-
marine would localize it (i.e., close to within range of its weapons) could be
diminished by forcing the submarine to move slowly, by deploying good pas-
sive acoustic systems in all antisubmarine vehicles, especially helicopters and
destroyers.40
The UPTIDE Experiments
Project UPTIDE developed in three phases from January 1969 to November
1972. In each phase, an ASW group examined various dimensions of the chal-
lenge presented by nuclear submarines firing cruise missiles.41 The purpose of
Phase I was to lay the foundation for Phases II and III by exploring the broad
outlines of the problem, refining the experimental design and methodology, and
developing procedures for processing and analyzing data. It examined the situa-
tion from the perspective of the enemy submarine and derived data on the sub-
marine’s capabilities to detect, identify, and fire its missiles at high-value targets.
Phase I also established a baseline for comparison of conventional antisubma-
rine warfare tactics with UPTIDE tactics.42
Phase I consisted of three continuous free-play experiments (each a
Hunter-Killer Antisubmarine Warfare Exercise, or HUKASWEX), which took
place from January to March 1969. In each exercise, USS Kearsarge (CVS 33), its
aircraft, and Destroyer Squadron 23, constituting Antisubmarine Warfare
Group 1, tried to defend Kearsarge against two opposing submarines with simu-
lated cruise-missile capabilities. The submarines participating in Phase I were
USS Pomodon (SS 486) and Medregal (SS 480) for HUKASWEX 1-69 and USS
Snook (SSN 592) and Scamp (SSN 588) for HUKASWEX 2-69 and 3-69. The re-
sults of Phase I underscored the magnitude of the threat posed by the
cruise-missile submarine and established the key metric that would be used in
Phase II—the survival time of the carrier. In 144 exercise hours, the submarines
conducted three torpedo attacks and nineteen launch events simulating the fir-
ing of seventy-eight missiles at the carrier. Eighty-seven percent of the missiles
were judged to have met the bearing parameters for acquisition of their targets.
The average survival time of the carrier was nine hours.43
Phase II was the major data-collection and tactical-evaluation phase of Proj-
ect UPTIDE. It consisted of four major experiments from September 1969 to
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January 1971. The experiments were devoted to examining the effectiveness of
dispersion, acoustic and electromagnetic emission control, simulation of the
high-value target by surface escorts, and active acoustic deception against cruise
missile–firing submarines in a scenario involving a carrier operating within a
fixed area and simulating the launching of strike aircraft.44
The initial Phase II experiment, UPTIDE 2-B, took place in late September
and early October 1969 and pitted Antisubmarine Warfare Group 3—consisting
of USS Hornet (CVS 12), its aircraft, and Destroyer Squadron 31—against USS
Sculpin (SSN 590) and Razorback (SS 394). By employing a dispersed formation,
steaming below propeller cavitation speed (i.e., the speed at which the collapse
of bubbles behind the blades becomes detectably loud), controlling emissions,
and using escorts as “wolf trap” units to lure the submarines away, Hornet was
able to avoid identification for the entire seven-day exercise. The submarines
were deceived, lured, or confused for the majority of the exercise and spent
nearly all the rest of the time in unproductive searches. Toward the end of the ex-
ercise, in frustration, Sculpin used strategic information to fire a spread of eight
missiles at a range of two hundred miles. Significantly, two of them could have
met the bearing parameters to acquire Hornet. Nevertheless, the commander of
Antisubmarine Warfare Group 3 described the exercise as “an unprecedented
success against the undersea adversary by an ASW group using a totally new
concept in communications, formations, tactics, deception, and electronic/
acoustic emission control.”45
UPTIDE 2-C, held in January and February 1970, marked the introduction of
a new tactical element—the acoustic deception device. The minesweeper USS
Leader (MSO 490) was equipped with an active acoustic simulator called “Ter-
giversator,” developed by the Naval Underwater Sound Center in New London,
Connecticut. Tergiversator transmitted into the water carrier and escort propul-
sion noises and active sonar transmissions. Working together, Leader and the
guided-missile cruiser USS Chicago (CG 11) were able to deceive the submarines
USS Plunger (SSN 595) and Snook. After listening to the deception device’s out-
put for three hours, Plunger concluded that it was a heavy warship and fired two
missiles at it. Meanwhile, Hornet was able to survive undetected for eighty-seven
hours. Only when the carrier operated independently at high speed were the
submarines successful in making a coordinated missile attack.46
The number and range of acoustic deception devices expanded significantly
in UPTIDE 2-D, which was held in October 1970. Seven devices were employed,
including an updated version of Tergiversator; two SADSAC (Small Acoustic
Device Simulating a Carrier) buoys, developed by the Naval Underwater Re-
search and Development Center; and four NYVOs (Nymph’s Voices), developed
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by Magnavox. Once again the devices proved effective. They were able to mask
the identity of USS Ticonderoga (CVS 14) for the first ninety-three hours of the
exercise and induce Sculpin and Snook to dedicate two of their four launch
events and nine of their sixteen missiles to them.47
The final exercise of Phase II, UPTIDE 2-E, underscored the dramatic impact
that the experimental tactics could have on carrier survivability. Using UPTIDE
tactics, Ticonderoga was able to avoid detection by Plunger and USS Haddock
(SSN 621) for the entire 140 hours of the regularly scheduled exercise. On the
last day, the carrier reverted to conventional tactics; it was targeted for simulated
missile attacks within four and a half hours.
The principal finding from Phase II was that UPTIDE dispersion and decep-
tion tactics allowed carriers and their escorts to avoid consistently encounters
with submarines. In nearly 650 exercise hours, there were just fourteen launch
events, simulating the firing of fifty-six missiles. Moreover, less than one-third
of the missiles met the bearing parameters for acquisition. On average, the sub-
marines went a hundred hours between valid fire-control solutions on the car-
rier and were unable to conduct any torpedo attacks. In the four week-long
exercise periods of UPTIDE Phase II, the “Blue” (i.e., U.S.) force achieved an av-
erage survival time of almost five and a half days for the high-value target be-
tween submarine-launched missile firings—an improvement by a factor of
eighteen over Phase I results using conventional tactics.48
Phase III of UPTIDE, in two experiments from October 1971 to November
1972, examined transit scenarios and used a new measure of performance
—miles safely traveled. The challenges the ASW group faced were increased to
include integrated surface, subsurface, and air threats, but they were offset by
corresponding increases in the group’s capabilities. Among the new capabili-
ties introduced were land-based patrol aircraft, towed passive sonar arrays,
and helicopter-equipped destroyers. Acoustic deception devices were also
used extensively, and with considerable success. Combining these new capabil-
ities with UPTIDE tactics, the ASW group in UPTIDE 3-A was able to make
good 86 percent of the nine hundred miles it attempted without a successful
attack by a submarine. Only when three of the five acoustic deception devices
being used broke down was the carrier detected and successfully targeted.49
The final exercise of the UPTIDE series, UPTIDE 3-B, occurred in October
and November 1972. It added several new capabilities to the Blue forces, includ-
ing two squadrons of land-based patrol aircraft and a helicopter-equipped de-
stroyer. The Blue forces also successfully made tactical use of towed sonar arrays
and Sound Surveillance System (SOSUS) information, although the slow towing
speed of the towed arrays limited their utility in transit scenarios.50
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DISPERSED OPERATIONS UNDER EMCON
The forces participating in the HAYSTACK exercises and those conducting the
UPTIDE series struggled to command and control widely dispersed forces un-
der EMCON. During the HAYSTACK exercises, Sixth Fleet sought to exploit “ev-
ery available method of delivering message traffic that will permit the
originating ship to maintain the highest practicable degree of electronic si-
lence.”51 The fleet forbade the commanding officers of ships to use electronic
means of communication unless absolutely necessary.52 Instead, they were to
employ visual signals, such as flag hoists or blinkers, to control flight operations
and transmit messages.53
The fleet also urged the use of helicopters and airplanes to carry messages be-
tween ships. There was always the possibility of missing a message drop, but the
helicopter or aircraft would typically carry extra copies of messages. The mes-
sages, enclosed in the equivalent of a buoy, would also float and could therefore
be retrieved. Aircraft could also deliver messages to shore-based radio stations
for relay to their ultimate destinations.54
In cases where electronic communication was necessary, the fleet relied on
airborne relay of ultrahigh-frequency (UHF) transmissions, which are typically
limited to horizon ranges and so are more difficult to detect than high-frequency
transmissions. Although Soviet aircraft, submarines, and surface ships could in-
tercept UHF transmissions, they had to be fairly close to the task force to do so.
UHF was thus seen as a “relatively secure means of communication.”55
Many of the methods UPTIDE forces employed were similar to those used
during the HAYSTACK exercises. Among these were “bean-bag communications”
(delivery of messages by helicopter) and airborne UHF relay. A central element
of UPTIDE was the extensive use of an airborne-early-warning aircraft to relay
UHF communications from the carrier to its escorts and other ships. During
UPTIDE 3-A, antisubmarine aircraft and the carrier’s combat information cen-
ter used UHF so heavily that they nearly saturated the available circuits.56
The restriction to alternative methods and the near saturation of available
circuits produced significant delays in communications. In HAYSTACK CHARLIE,
inexperience with the alternative radio techniques used and the existence of too
many units on the nets in each sector combined to produce long communica-
tions delays.57 In UPTIDE 3-A, the delay times for messages with immediate op-
erational relevance ranged from ten to 318 minutes. Even flash-precedence
messages were delayed for up to sixty minutes.58
Diminished communications capabilities placed a premium on planning.
To implement the Haystack concept, Sixth Fleet relied more heavily on doc-
trine and fixed plans.59 According to the concept, “Movements of the fleet will
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be preplanned and promulgated as much in advance as possible, to allow maxi-
mum practicable electronic silence.”60 Before every port visit, Sixth Fleet would
disseminate the “position and intended movement” (PIM), or route, that task
forces would follow should there be a warning that nuclear war was imminent.
To reduce the number of PIM-change messages, task force commanders were in-
structed to plan ahead and cover several days’ movements with one message if
possible.61
To minimize the volume of electronic emissions, Sixth Fleet also adopted a set
of basic communications procedures. Preassigned alphanumeric groups indi-
cated desired PIM changes or changes in ship stations. Simple aircraft codes
were used to transmit classified information. Recipients of messages did not
“Roger” or acknowledge receipt.62
UPTIDE similarly emphasized planning. Just prior to UPTIDE 3-A, the com-
mander of Antisubmarine Warfare Group 3, Rear Admiral Carl J. Seiberlich,
gave commanding officers of all his units the opportunity to work with his staff
on the development of plans and options. The detailed and inclusive planning
process produced significant benefits. As Seiberlich later explained to Aurand,
he and his staff received valuable inputs, while “the commanding officers all feel
that they have had a piece of the planning action, and understand our philoso-
phy and objectives.”63 One of the focal points of the planning process was mini-
mizing opportunities for detection of the carrier. UPTIDE tactics tried to reduce
acoustic detectability through the use of noncavitating speeds where possible.
Implementing the tactic required, according to the UPTIDE 3-A report, “judi-
cious planning of the time and location when cavitating speeds were required.”64
“THERE MIGHT BE SOME USEFUL IDEAS THERE”
As Ralph Beatty once noted, interest in deceptive formations and dispersed op-
erations under emission control seems to be cyclical. Every few years a version of
the same basic idea emerges. Each iteration of the concept has been a response to
a different specific threat—such as nuclear attack by land-based aviation in the
HAYSTACK series, cruise-missile attack by submarines in the UPTIDE series
—and has therefore approached the problem with little reference to past efforts.
Yet the basic challenge has remained the same: How can naval forces conduct ef-
fective operations while dispersing widely and minimizing communications in
order to avoid detection and attack? Since the U.S. Navy is likely to face similar
challenges in the future, it might do well to heed Beatty’s suggestion: “Pay atten-
tion to what’s happened before. There might be some useful ideas there.”65
One of the useful ideas highlighted by a review of the U.S. Navy’s experiments
with dispersed operations under EMCON during the Cold War is the utility of
alternative methods of communication. During the HAYSTACK and UPTIDE
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exercises, the participating forces chose to limit their communications in order to
minimize the adversary’s ability to detect and identify them. They experimented
with a wide variety of methods—both low-tech (flag hoists) and high-tech (air-
borne UHF relay). The ability to communicate and exchange information using a
range of different methods and to relay communications from platform to platform
proved invaluable.
As the participants in HAYSTACK and UPTIDE discovered, however, alterna-
tive communication methods typically have less capacity than more traditional
ones. Consequently, it is important to develop detailed procedures for operating
with diminished network capacity. Sixth Fleet included comprehensive appen-
dices in its operations orders outlining the specific instructions for operating
with diminished communications. The instructions spelled out which messages
and which users should receive priority under various conditions and which
procedures should be employed.66
It was also important to practice employing alternative means of communi-
cation. The forces participating in HAYSTACK CHARLIE experienced what ana-
lysts described as “excessive” delays, due in part to inexperience with the
communications method employed. Similarly, air control in HAYSTACK DELTA
was unsatisfactory due in part to controller inexperience.67
Even with the development of appropriate procedures and extensive practice,
forces using alternative methods of communication experienced delays. Accord-
ing to the UPTIDE 3-A exercise report, the reduction in communications capa-
bilities and use of alternative methods “extracted a price from the BLUE forces
in terms of inadequate information exchange between the BLUE OTC [officer in
tactical command] and his dispersed forces.” “Information of value to the OTC
from outlying units is often received late or not at all,” the report explained, “and
outlying units often lack the ‘big picture’ information held by the OTC.”68
The delays and diminished flow of information inherent in the use of alterna-
tive communications methods underscored the importance of planning and de-
centralized decision making. The promulgation of plans as far in advance as
possible enabled the commanders of the forces participating in the HAYSTACK
and UPTIDE series to convey their intents before communications were dimin-
ished. The unit commanders, thus fully aware of their mission, were able to take
the initiative, make decisions quickly, and implement them aggressively.
As U.S. naval forces increasingly operate under the threat of antiship ballistic-
missile attack while relying on rapid communication and information exchange,
potential adversaries are likely to seek to detect, track, and target those forces and
disrupt their communication and information networks. In future contests for
control of information, as Beatty warned a decade ago, it will be important to un-
derstand what works and what does not work.69 The principles and practices the
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U.S. Navy developed while experimenting with dispersed operations under
EMCON appear to fall in the former category. As Rear Admiral George P. Steele
told Aurand after receiving a briefing on UPTIDE, “I was able to make use of a
great deal of it [the UPTIDE concept], and I am a believer; it works, and very
well.”70
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In his thirty-two-year career in the Royal Norwegian
Navy before his retirement in 2000, Commodore
Børresen commanded the submarines HNoMS Kobben,
Ula, and Utsira, as well as the frigate Oslo. Ashore,
among numerous other postings, he served as Deputy
Assistant Chief of Staff (DACOS) for Plans in the Opera-
tions Division, Defence Command North Norway
(1985–86); military secretary to Defence Minister Johan
J. Holst (1986–88); DACOS for Organisation on the
Navy Staff of Headquarters, Defence Command Norway
(1988–90); Assistant Chief of Staff (ACOS) for Opera-
tions, Defence Command North Norway (1990–93);
Commander, Trøndelag Naval District (1993–94);
DACOS for Operations/Logistics at Supreme Headquar-
ters, Allied Powers Europe (1994–97) (assigned as Assis-
tant Director of Operations for Bosnia during Operation
JOINT ENDEAVOUR 1995–97); and Chief of the Navy
Staff, Headquarters, Defence Command Norway (1998–
2000). He attended the Norwegian Institute for Interna-
tional Affairs, the NATO Defence College in Rome, and
the National Defence College in Norway. Since his re-
tirement he has been a consultant and a member of
ministerial-level foreign-affairs and defense commit-
tees. He has published numerous articles, studies, re-
ports, and papers; he is a coauthor of volume 5 of
Norway’s official defense history (2004) and a coauthor
of or contributor to four other books.
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ALLIANCE NAVAL STRATEGIES AND NORWAY IN
THE FINAL YEARS OF THE COLD WAR
Commodore Jacob Børresen, Royal Norwegian Navy (Retired)
For those of us who served in the Norwegian armed forces, especially innorthern Norway, the 1980s were exciting times. Norway seemed to be the
focus of American and NATO attention. There was a continuous flow of
high-ranking visitors to Defence Command North Norway (DEFCOMNON),
from the staffs of Allied Command Europe (ACE) and Atlantic (ACLANT).1 Ev-
ery year thousands of allied soldiers, hundreds of aircraft, and dozens of ships
arrived in the area to conduct advanced training and complex exercises. High
points were the deployments of U.S. Navy aircraft carriers, elements of Supreme
Allied Commander, Atlantic’s (SACLANT’s) Striking Fleet Atlantic, into north-
ern Norwegian coastal waters in Vestfjorden, outside Bodø: in 1985, USS Amer-
ica (CV 66) and, in 1987, USS Forrestal (CV 59) in Exercise OCEAN SAFARI; in
1988, USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) and Forrestal in TEAMWORK; and in
1989, America in NORTH STAR.2 We were witnessing, and took part in, what later
turned out to be the culmination of the Cold War—the period of tension that
eventually led to the collapse of the Soviet Union. Norway, neighbor to the So-
viet Union and a coastal state on the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea, found
itself at the geographical center of this final effort.
What is the relevance of these events today? First of all, it is part of our com-
mon recent history, which we do well to preserve and hand down to the genera-
tions that follow us. But the Soviet Union is gone, and with it the Cold War. The
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has been reorganized; with
SACLANT disestablished, it has only one supreme operational commander.
Nevertheless, the underlying assumption of this article, especially the second
part, is that the events in northern Norway in the 1980s provide insights with
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regard to joint and combined planning, exercises, and operations that are still
relevant to the United States and its allies as they prepare for coalition warfare
elsewhere in the world. Their value lies not only in how divergent interests and
differing opinions were handled between NATO supreme commanders. It has as
much or more to do with how to handle diverging interests between sovereign
allies and between sea-based and land-based commanders in situations where
land forces are reinforced or supported from the sea. The notion that in a com-
plex contingency, involving several sovereign nations and both sea-based and
land-based forces, a single American or allied commander can simply assume
operational command and get on with it may be simplistic.
The purpose of this article, then, is first to discuss some of the political chal-
lenges to the Norwegian government in the 1980s as a result of the increased im-
portance to NATO and the United States of the alliance’s northern flank. Sea
control in the Norwegian Sea was seen as crucial for protecting transatlantic sea
lines of communications and to taking out Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic-
missile submarines (SSBNs). Second, I will elaborate on some of the implica-
tions, primarily at the operational and tactical levels, for Norway and the
Norwegian armed forces of NATO’s Concept of Maritime Operations
(CONMAROPS) and the U.S. Maritime Strategy of the 1980s.3
GEOPOLITICAL AND MILITARY STRATEGIC BACKGROUND
Since the early 1960s the United States and NATO had formulated their military
strategies and based their force and contingency planning on the doctrine of
“flexible response.”4 The doctrine rested upon the mutual recognition that the
United States and the Soviet Union both had the capability to destroy each other
and their respective allies with nuclear weapons; it was an expression of the need
to avoid a situation where the only response available to conventional aggression
was nuclear retaliation. The implication was a need to be able to conduct con-
ventional operations with an aim to deter hostilities or bring them to a halt prior
to escalation to nuclear war. An effect was to increase the importance of the
transatlantic lifelines, the ability of the United States to reinforce and resupply
its own forces and those of its allies in Europe by sea, across the Atlantic Ocean.
The world of the 1980s was one of violent peace. Cold War tension appeared
to be growing. At sea, the Soviet navy had grown significantly in strength and
showed increasing tendencies toward belligerence. The U.S. response generally
was to “roll back” the Soviet Union through greatly increased defense spending.
Its primary focus for planning and force building was opposition to the Soviets
in the European theater and support to NATO.5
As the Soviets increasingly based their nuclear deterrence on SSBNs, the ma-
jority of which were based on the Kola Peninsula, they needed to secure a wider
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maritime defensive zone in the Norwegian Sea. In the event of war, the SSBN
fleet would operate in the adjacent Barents Sea. Consequently, they saw, U.S. or
NATO naval forces could not be allowed to take command of the Norwegian Sea.
This Soviet mission of sea denial could require offensive action against Western
naval forces. It might also entail a ground assault on northern Norway itself, in
order to forward-base aircraft and help secure access for Soviet naval forces to
the Norwegian Sea.6
To NATO, this ability to push the maritime defensive zone farther and farther
out, potentially involving a ground invasion of northern Norway, was a danger-
ous new offensive factor in calculations of the balance of power, not only be-
cause NATO had to control these waters itself but because the allied perception
was fundamentally one of defense. Unless the alliance was able to secure Norwe-
gian territory, the Soviets would be in a favorable position to contest control of
the seas. By securing important forward positions in Norway, the Soviet Union
could deploy more effective land-based air cover for its naval forces.7 In short,
the loss of northern Norway could be decisive in the battle for the Atlantic.
Therefore, the support of the land battle in Norway by naval forces was critical.
The war could not perhaps be won at sea, but it could easily be lost there.8
NATO’s response was the Concept of Maritime Operations of 1980.
CONMAROPS highlighted the importance of containing Soviet forces through
forward operations, of conducting defense in depth, and of gaining and main-
taining the initiative at sea.9 CONMAROPS was based first on deterrence.
Should deterrence fail, the strategy was designed to mount a defense far forward
in order to protect the territory of the alliance’s European member nations.10
The concept bracketed NATO’s naval operations into five operational areas or
campaigns: the Mediterranean lifelines, the eastern Mediterranean, the Atlantic
lifelines, the “shallow seas,” and the Norwegian Sea. The three latter campaigns
involved Norway. At this time NATO was also developing elaborate contingency
plans for the rapid reinforcement of Europe in the event of an attack by the Soviet
Union and the Warsaw Pact. Each of these plans had forces allocated to it. An elab-
orate exercise program was developed whereby each plan would be periodically
tested and the forces given opportunities to familiarize themselves with the plan
and the area of operations. But above all, the exercises in each of several series
served as deterrents in themselves, in the form of important political signals of al-
liance solidarity and shared credible will and ability to defend against attack.
The purpose of the Atlantic lifelines campaign was to protect the transporta-
tion of allied reinforcement and resupply across the Atlantic; the associated ex-
ercise series was known as OCEAN SAFARI. The shallow-seas campaign was
designed to prevent the exit of the Soviet Baltic Fleet into the North Sea and to
protect allied convoys in the North Sea and the English Channel; it was exercised
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in the NORTHERN WEDDING series. The Norwegian Sea campaign was meant to
prevent the exit of the Soviet Northern Fleet into the Norwegian Sea and the
North Atlantic and to provide sea-based support to allied air and ground opera-
tions in Norway. Its associated exercise series was TEAMWORK.11
The U.S. forward-oriented maritime strategy of the mid-1980s was drawn
from both NATO and American national military strategies, and it provided that
the U.S. Navy and Marines would wage global coalition warfare in conjunction
with the Army and Air Force and the forces of allied nations.12 As such, it dove-
tailed nicely with CONMAROPS, but in certain areas it went farther—for in-
stance, in the taking out of Soviet SSBNS; operation of carrier battle groups
(CVBGs) in coastal waters far forward, sheltered by the mountains surrounding
the northern Norwegian fjords; and the concept of horizontal escalation.
NATO’s and the Americans’ objectives in the Norwegian Sea were to repel a So-
viet amphibious assault on northern Norway, support northern Norway against
land threats, prevent Soviet use of facilities in Norway, and contain the Northern
Fleet or destroy it at sea.13 As opposed to CONMAROPS, which talked about
campaigns, the U.S. Maritime Strategy dealt with phases.
Phase I was called “transition to war.” In this phase there would be global for-
ward movement of U.S. naval forces. Nuclear-powered attack submarines
(SSNs) would move into positions far forward, including the Arctic, deep inside
the Soviet sea-control and sea-denial areas. Battle groups would begin to form
into multicarrier battle forces. Forward-deployed amphibious task groups
would increase their readiness, and leading portions of a Marine amphibious
brigade would fly to Norway to join their prepositioned equipment. Other Ma-
rine air-ground task forces would begin loading out. Sealift of multiservice rein-
forcements would commence. Britain’s Royal Navy would send SSNs forward,
and a British antisubmarine warfare (ASW) task group, centered on at least one
carrier, would put to sea in the eastern Atlantic. British and Dutch marines
would reinforce Norway. Allied army deployments too were important to the
Maritime Strategy, including the movement of the British Mobile Force and the
Canadian Air-Sea-Transportable (CAST) Brigade Group to Norway.14
In Phase II the purpose was to seize the initiative, as far forward as possible,
preparatory to carrying the fight to the enemy. In the initial antiair warfare cam-
paign, carrier battle forces would engage Soviet air attacks as far forward as pos-
sible in “outer air battles,” to cause maximum attrition. Available land-based
tactical air (TACAIR) would complement these efforts in the Norwegian Sea.
Surveillance, intelligence, and raiding operations against command, control,
and communication sites by U.S. Special Forces and American and allied ma-
rines in Norway would be valuable supplements.15
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Phase III entailed carrying the fight to the enemy. Heavy strikes on the flanks
culminating in attacks on Soviet territory would be conducted as battle forces
massed and moved forward with reduced risk and higher confidence of success.
In this phase the U.S. Navy would be projecting power ashore in support of the
land battle. Amphibious operations would have the purpose of gaining leverage
for war termination, securing strategic choke points, and recovering territory
lost to Soviet attack.16
The desired culmination was war termination on favorable terms. This re-
quired putting such conventional (i.e., nonnuclear) pressure on the Soviets as to
convince them that they would find no benefit in continuing aggression and in
fact should retreat, while giving them no incentive to escalate to nuclear war. For
the U.S. Navy, exerting this pressure meant neutralization or destruction of the
Soviet navy and of ground and air forces on the Eurasian flanks, sea control, and
intervention in the land battle.17
IMPLICATIONS FOR NORWAY AND THE NORWEGIAN ARMED
FORCES
Prior to World War II, Norway’s foreign policy had been based on neutrality, or
nonalignment, a policy that went as far back as 1814. To the Norwegians, fight-
ing Nazi Germany, from 1940 to 1945, as part of an alliance was thus something
new. After the war there were strong political forces that wanted to return to a
policy of neutrality. Accession to NATO in 1949 came about only after a fero-
cious political debate. What finally decided the issue was the realization that in
the event of war between the United States and the Soviet Union, Norway would
be pulled into the conflict whether it wanted to be or not. Nevertheless, and de-
spite the fact that once the debate was concluded public support for NATO
across the political spectrum was consistently strong, Norwegian governments,
whether socialist or nonsocialist, had throughout the Cold War to balance care-
fully between policies of deterrence against and reassurance of the Soviet Union,
and between integration with and screening against NATO.18
The concrete expressions of these considerations were Norway’s base policy,
its nuclear policy, and a series of restrictions on allied exercise activity in Nor-
way. The base policy was first formulated in February 1949 in a note to the So-
viet government stating that Norway would “not enter into treaties with any
other states that contains an obligation to open up bases to the armed forces of
foreign states on Norwegian territory as long as Norway has not been attacked
or been subject to threats of an attack.” At the NATO summit in 1957, the Nor-
wegian prime minister, who was critical of NATO’s nuclear strategy, declared
that Norway would not store nuclear weapons on its soil in peacetime. In 1988
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Defence Minister Johan J. Holst further clarified Norwegian nuclear policy by
announcing:
In accordance with international agreements, Norway will not test, produce, or in
any other way attain, nuclear weapons; nuclear weapons will not be stored in or de-
ployed to Norway; Norwegian armed forces will not be trained in the use of nuclear
weapons; Norway will not enter into any cooperation agreement with an aim to
transfer nuclear weapons or information about nuclear weapons to Norway; special
storage sites for nuclear weapons will not be established in Norway; Norwegian
weapon systems will not be certified for use of nuclear munitions.19
In addition, throughout the Cold War there were limits on how many allied sol-
diers, aircraft, or ships could be present in Norway at any one time, in order not
to undermine the base policy. As a measure of reassurance for the Soviet Union,
allied units were not allowed to operate in the county of Finnmark, next to the
Soviet border, or from Norwegian airfields or harbors or at sea or in the air east
of twenty-four degrees east longitude.20
NORWEGIAN RESTRICTIONS AND THE U.S. MARITIME
STRATEGY
The American “rediscovery” of NATO’s northern flank in the 1970s and the re-
sulting reinforcement plans; prestocking of materiel, fuel, and ammunition; and
increased exercise activity in Norway in the 1970s and 1980s raised a political
debate in the country over the interpretation and practice of Norwegian restric-
tions—the nation’s nuclear and base policies and its constraints on allied train-
ing and exercises. At times the debate generated substantial pressure on the
Norwegian government and put limits on how far Norway could go to accom-
modate allied, primarily U.S. Navy, requirements for support. Of the many is-
sues that were affected by this debate and that caused problems for the
government and strained Norway’s relationship with the United States, I will
briefly mention five, in their relations to the country’s nuclear and base policies:
• Port visits of U.S. nuclear-capable ships and submarines
• Participation of nuclear-capable aircraft in training and exercises
• Prestocking for the U.S. Marine Corps
• Consequences for Norway of the concept of horizontal escalation
• Logistic support to the U.S. Navy by “forward operating locations”
(FOLs).21
Visit by Nuclear-Capable Naval Units. The provision in Norway’s nuclear policy
whereby nuclear weapons would not be stored in or deployed to Norway meant
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that visits by ships armed with nuclear weapons could constitute violations of
that policy. In 1975 the prime minister, Trygve Bratteli, formulated what has
been called the “Bratteli doctrine”: “Our assumption, as foreign ships visit, has
been and is that nuclear weapons are not carried on board. Norwegian authori-
ties anticipate that allied, as well as other nuclear powers, respect this assump-
tion.” The doctrine thus took into account both the fact that warships, under
international law, cannot be inspected by foreign states and that Western nuclear
powers, by policy, neither confirmed nor denied that their ships were carrying
nuclear weapons. The Bratteli doctrine was no more than a codification of es-
tablished practice, but it nevertheless evoked strong reactions by the allied nu-
clear powers and by Norway’s own Chief of Defence, General Zeiner Gundersen.
He feared that the doctrine would lead to a sharp reduction in the visits by allied
ships. The doctrine was thus allowed to slip silently into oblivion. In the early
1980s, reference to it was omitted from statements of diplomatic clearance of
visits to Norway by foreign warships.
When Johan J. Holst was appointed Minister of Defence in 1986, he decided
to reinstate the doctrine, by once more referring to it in diplomatic clearances is-
sued for ship visits. The American reaction was immediate and strong, and Holst
had to back down and accept a compromise whereby reference to the doctrine
was only indirect. In 1992 Holst reversed his policy on this issue completely, stat-
ing that “Norway cannot conduct a policy whereby its allies must prove that they
are not criminals.”22
The Participation in Exercises of Nuclear-Capable Aircraft. In accordance with
the limitations on allied exercises in Norway, the government put restrictions on
the number and types of allied aircraft that could operate at any one time from
Norwegian airfields or in Norwegian airspace. In particular, the government had
problems with regard to nuclear-capable aircraft: the B-52 long-range bomber,
the F-111D fighter-bomber, and the A-6 Intruder light bomber.
In Exercise ANORAK EXPRESS in March 1980, for example, B-52s based in
Britain were to simulate attacks on targets in Norway and then return to base,
without having landed on Norwegian soil. The mission was stricken from the ex-
ercise by the Norwegian government, and a general rule was established for later
exercises whereby B-52s could participate only in other than offensive roles, only
versions of the aircraft not certified or equipped to deliver nuclear weapons
could take part, and B-52s would not land in the country other than in an
emergency.
The F-111D was part of NATO’s intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) and
also of the strategic reserve of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
(SACEUR). In this latter role it could be deployed all over ACE. When SACEUR’s
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plan for cross servicing these aircraft at Norwegian airfields came up for ap-
proval in November 1983, the conservative Kåre Isaachsen Willoch government
demanded that F-111Ds be omitted from the plan as far as Norway was con-
cerned. Like the B-52, the F-111D was so prominently associated with NATO’s
nuclear strategy that regular visits to Norway by these aircraft or their inclusion
in the allied plans for the country’s defense would have been seen as eroding the
Norwegian nuclear policy.
The A-6 Intruder, a nuclear-capable light bomber, also created problems for
the Norwegian government. The aircraft was, for instance, initially not allowed
to exercise in Norway, and storage of heavy equipment associated with the A-6
was excluded from the 1981 U.S. Marine Corps prestocking agreement, on the
premise that storage sites containing an offensive capability like the nuclear-
capable A-6 would be regarded as unacceptable provocations to the Soviet Union,
by both the Soviets and the Norwegian public. But the A-6 was an integral part
of the U.S. Marine Corps’s inventory, and as Marine exercise participation in
Norway increased in frequency and volume, regular involvement by A-6s be-
came unavoidable. The first time A-6s in the air-to-ground role took part in an
exercise in Norway was in TEAMWORK 1984, where they operated out of Bodø in
northern Norway. Previously they had operated only out of Ørland, much fur-
ther south in central Norway in the electronic-warfare role. This proved to be a
breakthrough. From then on and well into the 1990s, the A-6 was a regular par-
ticipant in NATO exercises in Norway, without causing political problems of any
kind to the government.23
Prestocking for a U.S. Marine Corps Expeditionary Brigade. In 1981 American
and Norwegian authorities signed an agreement to store the heavy equipment of
a U.S. air-landed Marine expeditionary brigade (known as the NALMEB) in the
central Norwegian county of Trøndelag. The original plan was to store the
equipment in northern Norway, which was where the brigade would operate if it
were deployed. This was hindered by strong political opposition in Norway, and
a compromise solution had to be found farther south. As compensation, the
heavy equipment for South Norwegian Brigade 6 was stored in the north. Also,
the Marine brigade’s air element was allowed to fly directly to its designated air-
fields in the north. The net result was thus a considerable strengthening of the
defense of northern Norway.
What was the opposition to prestocking for the Marines in northern Norway
all about? First, there were those who opposed any prestocking in Norway for the
U.S. Marine Corps. Second, there were those who supported it in principle but
not in northern Norway. The general opposition to prestocking must, I believe,
be seen as a repercussion of the broad and general political opposition in
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Norway to the war in Vietnam. The war, which had ended in 1975, was still fresh
in memory. Also, the Marine Corps was seen as the epitome of American expedi-
tionary capability; Norwegian politicians feared that prestocking its equipment
would pull the country into American global strategy. There were also those who
felt that storing equipment for foreign troops could undermine the Norwegian
base policy, while others pointed to the fact that because the brigade was nuclear
capable, the presence of its equipment would represent a challenge to the na-
tion’s nuclear policy.
Those who supported prestocking in principle but opposed it in northern
Norway feared that a storage site there would provoke the Soviets and thus be
contrary to the long-standing Norwegian policy of low tension in the north.
This, by the way, was a general problem with the Maritime Strategy, as many
Norwegians saw it. For the Norwegian government, which wanted to tie the
United States to the defense of Norway, on the one hand, and on the other to
minimize internal debate and political division over defense and security policy,
handling the strategy was a difficult balancing act.24
Horizontal Escalation. In 1978 the dean of the Center for Advanced Research (as
the present Center for Naval Warfare Studies was originally known) at the U.S.
Naval War College, at Newport, Rhode Island, Francis J. “Bing” West (who, by
the way, had participated with John Lehman in the development of “Sea Plan
2000,” the precursor to the Maritime Strategy), coined the phrase “horizontal es-
calation.” The phrase signified a concept whereby the U.S. Navy could improve
the American bargaining position against the Soviet Union in the early stages of
a war by forward maritime operations against the Soviet navy, including its stra-
tegic submarines, the SSBNs, thus confronting the Soviets with a choice between
nuclear escalation and termination of hostilities.25 When the Maritime Strategy
started to materialize in the 1980s, the idea of horizontal escalation surfaced in
the Norwegian debate. If the United States were to respond to a conflict with the
Soviets in, let us say, the Persian Gulf by attacking the Northern Fleet base area
on the Kola Peninsula, close to the Norwegian border, would that be in Norway’s
interest and in line with the Norwegian policy of low tension?
In 1986 Johan Holst feared that the U.S. naval strategy could result in Soviet
pressure on the Scandinavian countries and in inadvertent escalation to nuclear
war. He warned against what he called a “mediterraneazation” of the Norwegian
Sea (referring to the permanent presence in the Mediterranean of both the U.S.
Sixth Fleet and units of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet). At the same time, however,
Holst was engaged in securing regular allied naval presence in northern waters,
as that could reduce Soviet dominance and induce restraint on both sides. Again
we see the double dichotomy of deterrence and reassurance of the Soviets and of
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integration with and screening against allies—that runs as a bright line through
Norwegian Cold War defense and security policy.26
Logistic Support to Striking Fleet Atlantic. An important lesson learned from
the participation of the America CVBG in OCEAN SAFARI in 1985 was the need
to establish logistic support in the shape of forward-located depots of fuel and
ammunition. For instance, the SACLANT fuel depot in Namsen, in central
Norway, which had been established in 1983, held enough for only three days’
consumption. In September 1985 the commander of Striking Fleet Atlantic
(COMSTRIKFLTLANT), Admiral Henry C. “Hank” Mustin, USN, brought the
matter up with Norwegian authorities. It was a subject that was going to haunt
them for years, right up until the end of the Cold War, and that would put con-
siderable strain on U.S.-Norwegian relations.
In the summer of 1987, American authorities approached Norway’s Ministry
of Defence with a request to establish FOLs for logistic support to the U.S. Navy
along the Norwegian coast. The Norwegians wanted to postpone the question;
the Americans were indignant at this lack of support. In 1989, after considerable
U.S. pressure, the Norwegian government went along and initiated negotiations
on the subject. The American proposal included four different measures. First
was establishment of forward-located ammunition and fuel depots at Bodø. The
second was provision of airfields and seaports suitable for the reception and on-
ward movement to ships of replenishment stores and spare parts. The Værnes
airport and Trondheim harbor in central Norway were identified as candidates.
Third, there was a need for an FOL farther north. Brønnøysund, where there was
a modern jetty with a deep berth and easy access to the open sea, was seen as the
best alternative. It was located close to an airport, though its runway would have
to be extended somewhat and an aviation fuel depot would have to be built.
Fourth, agreement had to be reached on the earmarking and preparation of war-
time ship-repair facilities. The U.S. Navy had already secured agreement with
five shipyards in Norway for peacetime support; similar agreements had to be
closed for wartime use. Not until 1991 was the Norwegian government ready to
approve a modified logistics agreement. But by this time the Cold War was over,
Striking Fleet had left the Norwegian Sea, and SACLANT was no longer
interested.
And that was precisely why Defence Minister Johan Jørgen Holst and the
Norwegian government had dragged their feet on the subject in the first place.
Holst knew that the deployment pattern of the U.S. Navy was according to
American needs, not Norway’s wishes. He had observed that American strike
carriers had been conspicuously forward deployed in the Norwegian Sea in the
1950s but had disappeared in the early 1960s when submarines took over the
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nuclear-deterrence role. Now the U.S. Navy was back in the Norwegian Sea as a
result of the forward maritime strategy, but he had no guarantee that this new
engagement would last. On the contrary, strategies invariably change as political
situations change and create new requirements and as developments in weapons
technology bring forward new capabilities.
The considerable allied military presence in Norway in the 1980s—on aver-
age around ten thousand personnel in training and over fifteen thousand in-
volved in exercises per year, in addition to a large number of ships and aircraft
—had created an impression that allied soldiers were almost continually present
in Norway and that this constituted an erosion of Norway’s base policy. More-
over, the exercises and training had reached the limit of what Norway was able to
support and still maintain control over the activity. In this situation, to rally suf-
ficient political and popular support for the establishment of forward operating
locations—a euphemism for forward bases—for the U.S. Navy required unusual
political skill, and a positive result would come only at a considerable political
price. It was a price Holst was not willing to pay, since the chances were that no
sooner would the FOLs be in place than the U.S. Navy would leave once
more—which, of course, is exactly what happened.27
STRIKING FLEET ATLANTIC IN NORTH NORWEGIAN WATERS
Let me now turn to some implications for the defense of Norway at the opera-
tional and tactical levels. A concrete expression in Norwegian waters of the U.S.
forward maritime strategy was the deployment of Striking Fleet Atlantic to the
northern Norwegian Sea and into the coastal waters of northern Norway. Strik-
ing Fleet (STRIKEFLT) was organized in four subordinate commands: the car-
rier, ASW, amphibious, and Marine strike forces.28 STRIKEFLT thus contained
naval, air, and ground forces, and it was capable of establishing sea control and
air superiority as a basis for force projection ashore.
Accordingly, its routine deployment to northern Norway represented an
enormous boost to the defense of the region, for three reasons. First, it contrib-
uted convincingly to deterrence, in that it demonstrated American determina-
tion and ability to defend Norway, not through altruism but for reasons of U.S.
security. Moscow would have to regard it as highly probable that an attack on
Norway would mean war with the United States. Second, it constituted a crucial
contribution to the defense of Norway. The operation of STRIKEFLT, with its
two or three mutually supporting CVBGs, in the Vestfjorden and adjacent ocean
areas meant allied sea control and air superiority along the Norwegian coast at
least as far north as Lyngen Fjord, the northernmost of the fjords that penetrate
deep into the key defensive positions of the Norwegian army in inner Troms
County. Depending on the number of CVBGs, Striking Fleet’s presence off the
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Norwegian coast constituted a doubling of the number of air-defense fighters
and a tripling of the number of fighter-bombers available to Commander, De-
fence Command North Norway (COMNON).29 The most dangerous potential
Soviet course of action in the event of war was considered to be an amphibious
assault into the northern fjords to outflank the Norwegian army or attack it in
the rear, in coordination with a simultaneous frontal assault on the defensive
line between Lyngen Fjord and the Finnish border. Deployment of STRIKEFLT
to the area would make such an assault a very risky undertaking.
Third, the planning and execution of complex joint and combined operational-
level exercises that included integration of land-based and carrier-based air and
amphibious landings raised the proficiency of COMNON’s staff and of the Nor-
wegian armed forces in general. Operations at the tactical level in the extremely
target-rich environment of the major NATO exercises in northern Norway con-
tributed to the efficiency and morale of Norwegian units on the ground, at sea,
and in the air.
But there were challenges too. They were a result of deploying STRIKEFLT into
a zone “up threat” (that is, in the direction from which the threat was expected)
that was already the area of responsibility (AOR) of a “principal subordinate
NATO commander,” namely, COMNON, who had substantial naval, air, and
ground forces under his own control. The complications were primarily related to
airspace and water-space management and coordination in order to ensure the
safety and security of “own units” and avoid “blue on blue” engagements while at
the same time allowing the forces to fight effectively. The challenges can be grouped
in four categories:
• Coordination and deconfliction of land-based and carrier-based air defense
• Shape and size of the amphibious objective area
• Employment of Marine air-component aircraft in support of COMNON’s
air campaign
• Coordination and deconfliction of COMNON and COMSTRIKFLTLANT
naval operations in coastal waters.
In addition, there were issues regarding the conduct of complex joint and com-
bined exercises in northern Norway in peacetime in such a way as to avoid acci-
dents involving civilians and damage to civilian property. I shall briefly
comment on each of these issues.
Land-Based and Carrier-Based Air Defense. As carrier battle groups approached
the coast of northern Norway, their “outer defense zones,” which could extend as
far as three hundred nautical miles from the carriers themselves, would start to
overlap COMNON’s airspace.30 As the carriers were under the command of
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SACLANT but COMNON was under SACEUR, there was no higher-up com-
mand with overriding authority to take on overall responsibility for airspace
management. This was nothing new. For many years, operating in the waters be-
tween Greenland, Iceland, and the United Kingdom (then famous as the “GIUK
gap”), U.S. CVBGs had experienced the same problem in relation to the United
Kingdom’s air-defense region. The U.S. Navy of the 1980s strongly preferred to
plan for and exercise coordinated, cooperative, and deconflicted (but separate)
sea-based antiair and strike campaigns rather than integrated TACAIR opera-
tions over both the land and sea under one powerful, central operational theater-
air commander—who would likely be, in many important scenarios, a U.S. Air
Force officer.31
The result had been the so-called CADIMS (Coordinated Air Defense in
Mutual Support) agreement between British and American authorities, with
procedures for the deconfliction of carrier- and land-based air. CADIMS was
now used as a template for a similar agreement between COMNON and
COMSTRIKFLTLANT. The concept was simple; the agreement essentially di-
vided the airspace between the two and set forth special procedures for aircraft
of one command that for some reason had to enter the airspace of the other.
For exercise purposes in peacetime, the dividing line ran parallel to the Norwe-
gian coast; COMSTRIKFLTLANT had control of the airspace to seaward. This
allowed COMNON to carry out his responsibility for the defense of Norwe-
gian airspace prior to war. In a wartime situation the delineation of COMNON
and COMSTRIKFLTLANT airspace would probably have run east to west,
with SACLANT responsible up threat.32
Shape and Size of the AOA. In an amphibious assault, U.S. doctrine gave the
commander of the amphibious strike force complete control at sea, on the
ground, and in the air within the “amphibious objective area,” the AOA. This
control included, as a minimum, coordinating authority over all friendly units
within the AOA. The AOA had to be large enough to allow for effective self-defense.
Moreover, operational control over the Marine strike force, including its air
component, would not pass to COMNON until the amphibious objective had
been obtained. That could, realistically, take at least a week, often more. Conse-
quently, when American planners arrived at COMNON planning conferences
convened to organize amphibious assault exercises in Troms, they presented
AOAs that encompassed all of COMNON’s key defensive area in that county,
plus the northern parts of Nordland County and large chunks of northern
Sweden.
If it had been only a question of the defense of a generic country against a ge-
neric threat, as in NATO exercises today, this would not have been a big problem.
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But NATO’s exercises in northern Norway during the Cold War were designed to
test and refine NATO’s contingency plans for war with the Soviet Union. Con-
cepts and procedures for exercises had therefore to be as close to the real thing as
peacetime safety regulations and political considerations (such as the necessity
to avoid violation of Swedish airspace) would allow. To COMNON it was unac-
ceptable to turn over to an allied commander (who might not even be under
NATO command) control over his own key areas—where his entire anti-invasion
force of four to six mechanized infantry brigades and a considerable number of
naval ships, submarines, and fighter aircraft would be concentrated—in order
that a single light Marine amphibious brigade could deploy. It did not make the
situation easier that, according to plans, elements of the amphibious brigade’s
air component could deploy to northern Norwegian airfields immediately prior
to or during the landing, when the shift of operational control to COMNON had
not yet taken place.
To further complicate the issue, the amphibious commander would be a for-
eigner, with much less knowledge and experience of operations in the highly de-
manding terrain and climate of northern Norway than COMNON and his
subordinate commanders. At the same time, it was unacceptable to the amphibi-
ous commander to land his units on the beach without being certain that he
would be able to defend them effectively in the vulnerable landing phase before
the amphibious brigade had time to regroup and get ready for combat ashore.
Even if the assumption was that the amphibious brigade would land prior to
hostilities breaking out, the very fact that it had done so would make the political
situation so tense that hostilities could break out at any moment.
The issue of the AOA in northern Norway first went onto the agenda in the
NATO command-post exercise WINTEX 1975. A solution that was acceptable to
both parties would have to be based on confidence on the part of the Americans
that COMNON had sufficient control in his area of responsibility that the size of
the AOA could be reduced and its shape tailored to the geography in such a way
that COMNON’s units would not be unduly hindered in their movements while
the amphibious landing was in progress. But a solution on those lines was not
found until TEAMWORK 1984, and luckily we will never know whether the
Americans would have accepted it in a real situation.33
Marine Aircraft in Support of COMNON’s Air Campaign. In accordance with its
operational concept, a U.S. Marine air-ground task force, or MAGTF, is an or-
ganic whole, and its air and ground combat components are integral parts that
cannot be separated.34 COMNON, on the other hand, considered that the U.S.
Marine brigades could be more effectively employed in the defense of northern
Norway if the ground combat component were placed under tactical command
of the Norwegian 6th Division and the air component were under his own air
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component commander, COMAIRNON, and integrated in the COMNON air
campaign.
This was emphatically rejected by the Americans. It would constitute an un-
acceptable violation of their doctrine. Also, according to current plans,
COMNON was allocated only operational control over the U.S. Marine brigade,
and that did not include authority to divide it. COMNON had to give in on this
point and accept that his ability to use his entire defense force in an optimal and
flexible way, especially in the air, would be somewhat reduced. Anyway, given the
considerable fighting capability of the Marine brigade, the net effect on the de-
fense of Norway would be positive, compared to not getting the brigade at all. In
the years of exercising together that followed, as mutual confidence and respect
between Norwegian and American personnel increased, the Americans found it
possible to compromise just a little: “excess sorties,” ready sorties not employed
by the Marine force commander in direct support of his force, were made avail-
able to COMNON for his air campaign.
Coordination and Deconfliction of Naval Operations. As noted, the boundary
between SACLANT’s and SACEUR’s areas of responsibility ran parallel to the
Norwegian coast, only a few nautical miles out.35 As Striking Fleet crossed the
line and approached the Norwegian coast, however, it did not change opera-
tional command or control to SACEUR but operated in accordance with current
NATO procedures for “cross boundary operations.” They required that all
STRIKEFLT units establish radio communications with COMNON in order to
report their positions and intended movement and to receive information about
friendly units in the area, recognition procedures, IFF (identification, friend or
foe) settings, and so on.
This was absolutely crucial in order to avoid blue-on-blue engagements. Es-
pecially along the coasts of northern Nordland and Troms Counties, every inlet
was covered by powerful artillery units, gun and torpedo batteries, and mine-
fields. Numerous fast missile and torpedo boats and coastal submarines would
also be employed as part of Norway’s anti-invasion scheme. In a real instance of
the kind of scenario we are talking about, where STRIKEFLT had deployed in the
defense of Norway against imminent attack from the Soviet Union, all Norwe-
gian naval units would be on high alert and authorized to fire at darkened war-
ships that entered territorial waters without responding to calls on the radio.
Striking Fleet surface combatants and underway replenishment ships that en-
tered Norwegian coastal waters prior to the arrival of the high-value units—for
precursor operations, replenishment of fuel and stores, or other reasons—with-
out listening on the appropriate radio frequencies or responding correctly when
challenged would immediately be shot out of the water.
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Our concern was that what you do not regularly exercise and practice in times
of peace, you will probably not automatically practice in the first phases of crisis
and war, until you have learned your lesson the hard way. Another concern, from
COMNON’s perspective, was that this lack of adherence to agreed procedure re-
duced the value of the exercises to all participants and had a demoralizing effect
on Norwegian naval and coast-artillery personnel, to whom the chance to inter-
act with powerful allied units was something they had looked forward to im-
mensely and prepared themselves for with enthusiasm.
In all the exercises I took part in or was involved with—and that is the major-
ity of all the exercises carried out from 1968 until 1993—allied warships, espe-
cially those of the U.S. Navy, did not take this seriously. They very rarely
responded to radio calls and generally ignored the presence of minefields. In a
real situation, that could have proved catastrophic—but then, they probably
would have learned quickly.
The Planning and Conduct of Major NATO Exercises. Running a complex, mul-
tinational live exercise in an area not closed to the general public is like putting
together an intricate jigsaw puzzle. To prevent unnecessary traffic jams and road
accidents, to keep ships from steaming into fishing nets, and in other ways to
avoid damaging or hindering civilian activities is challenging enough. But the
most daunting task was devising an exercise in the air that was sufficiently chal-
lenging to all participants but neither posed hazards or unnecessary restrictions
on military sorties or civilian air traffic nor created a diplomatic scandal by re-
peated violations of Swedish airspace. It added to the complexity that Soviet air-
craft routinely operated within or adjacent to that part of the exercise area that
stretched into international airspace. The Soviet presence constituted a poten-
tial safety risk. It was necessary to allocate sorties in order to intercept and
shadow the Soviet aircraft, and these sorties had to come out of the exercise air
tasking order.
All air movement had to be meticulously planned in order to avoid low flying
or breaking the sound barrier over inhabited areas or in the vicinity of fur farms.
The whole setup had to be coordinated with the civilian air traffic routes—
something that represented a challenge of its own, as civilian and military air-
craft operated from the same airports and the airspace over Nordland and Troms
is not large. The airspace was further limited in that military aircraft were al-
lowed to approach the Swedish border no closer than twenty nautical miles.
Nevertheless, through the 1970s and ’80s, up until 1988, there were annually one
or two violations of Swedish airspace, each an embarrassment to the Norwegian
government.
The NATO exercises at times stretched the capacity of the civilian air-traffic
control system to the limit. A special problem was keeping track of, and
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deconflicting, carrier-based air under COMSTRIKFLTLANT and land-based air
under COMNON. The combination of limited radar coverage and a shortage of
civilian air controllers led to a situation where the traffic control system was un-
able to cover the large NATO exercises and at the same time deal with civilian
traffic. During Exercise OCEAN SAFARI in September 1987, Scandinavian Air
Lines had to cancel two daily flights between Oslo and northern Norway; the
Ministry of Transport decided to close Norwegian airspace between Bodø and
Alta, in Finnmark, to civilian traffic every morning and evening for the duration
of the exercise.36
{LINE-SPACE}
The U.S. Maritime Strategy and NATO’s Concept of Maritime Operations put
Norway on both Brussels’s and Washington’s military strategic maps in an un-
precedented way. It contributed to increasing the credibility of American and
NATO deterrence of the Soviet Union. It redressed the extremely unfavorable
force balance between the Soviet Union and Norway, on the alliance’s northern
flank, and it brought considerable NATO infrastructure investment to Norway
in the form of fuel and ammunition storage sites, hardened aircraft shelters, im-
proved runways, communications and aircraft early-warning equipment, and
the like. It also brought exercise activity that contributed to a considerable in-
crease in the knowledge and proficiency of Norwegian defense planners and
operators.
Nonetheless, this strategic centrality constituted a challenge to Norway’s pol-
icy of low tension in the northern region and to such key elements of the nation’s
defense and security policy as its base policy, nuclear policy, and restrictions on
allied exercise activity. It thus became the source of fierce internal debates over
Norway’s defense and security policy. These were debates that successive Norwe-
gian governments sought to avoid, as it was believed that for a small country in
an exposed strategic position to indulge in visible political divisions over its de-
fense and security policy would only contribute to further weakening of that
position.
The U.S. Maritime Strategy and CONMAROPS thus presented the Norwe-
gians with a difficult task of balancing between, on the one hand, tying the
United States firmly to the defense of Norway and, on the other hand, trying to
minimize internal debate in a population traditionally skeptical of what it per-
ceived as American interventionism. Alliance strategy in this way brought to the
fore and made visible the recurring theme of a double dichotomy in Norwegian
security and defense policy—that of deterrence and yet reassurance of the Soviet
Union, and that of integration with and screening against allies—that ran as a
thread through Norwegian Cold War defense and security policy from begin-
ning to end.
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N O T E S
The article is based on a presentation by the
author to the Cold War Oral History Confer-
ence at Bodø, Norway, on 21 August 2007.
1. At this time Commander, Defence Com-
mand North Norway, COMNON, a Norwe-
gian three-star general, was “double hatted”
as national commander, subordinate to Chief
of Defence Norway, and as an allied “princi-
pal subordinate commander” in the Supreme
Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) chain
of command. The boundary between Su-
preme Allied Commander, Atlantic’s
(SACLANT’s) area of responsibility
(ACLANT) and that of SACEUR (ACE) ran
parallel with the Norwegian coast just a few
nautical miles out to sea. A major part of
NATO’s air reinforcements, and all of
NATO’s naval and amphibious reinforce-
ments to northern Norway, were, however,
SACLANT forces. As units of SACLANT’s
Striking Fleet crossed into ACE and ap-
proached the Norwegian coast, they did not
immediately or necessarily change opera-
tional command or control to SACEUR but
generally operated in accordance with cur-
rent NATO procedures for “cross boundary
operations.” For the purpose of submarine
operations and naval surveillance, COMNON
acted as a functional commander in the
SACLANT chain of command.
2. The last Cold War deployment of U.S. carri-
ers to Norwegian coastal waters prior to these
had been in the NATO exercise MAINBRACE
in 1952, when USS Midway (CVB 41) and
USS Franklin D. Roosevelt (CVB 42) took
part. Deployment of U.S. carriers into the
Norwegian Sea was, on the other hand, not
uncommon. From February 1954 U.S. carri-
ers were incorporated into American plans
for strategic nuclear warfare. This meant reg-
ular deployment into the Norwegian Sea to
prepare for the offensive nuclear-strike role
in the event of war with the Soviet Union.
These deployments subsided with the intro-
duction of the SSBN to the U.S. Navy from
1964 onward. Between 1964 (Exercise
TEAMWORK) and 1985, U.S. carriers would
regularly participate in NATO exercises in
the North Atlantic and the Norwegian Sea,
carrying out air interdiction missions and air
support to forces on the ground in North
Norway from positions out to sea. Rolf
Tamnes, The United States and the Cold War
in the High North (Oslo: ad Notam forlag AS,
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THE QUIET WARRIOR BACK IN NEWPORT
Admiral Spruance, the Return to the Naval War College,
and the Lessons of the Pacific War, 1946–1947
Hal M. Friedman
War is about wreckage. Consequently, postwar periods tend to be about re-construction, and that phenomenon is what this article is about. It sets
the scene for a larger exploration (the subject of projected sequels to the recent
book from which this article is adapted) of how a military-academic institution
—the Naval War College, in Newport, Rhode Island—attempted to readjust to a
peacetime period that entailed simultaneously the
start of a new type of conflict for the United States
(the Cold War) and with a revolutionary new weapon
(the atomic bomb). While the Cold War and the
Atomic Age were revolutionary in many respects, at
their outset the staff, instructors, guest lecturers, and
students at the Naval War College did not automati-
cally or necessarily think so. To a great degree, Ameri-
can military officers in the immediate postwar period,
while acknowledging that atomic energy weapons and
“war during peace” were earth-shattering in one
sense, fell back on fairly traditional strategic, opera-
tional, and tactical concepts for meeting these new
challenges.1
The College was reconstituted after its reduced
wartime status on a full-time basis under the presi-
dency of Admiral Raymond Spruance and was
charged with the strategic reformulation of American
Hal M. Friedman is associate chair of the Department
of History and professor of modern history at Henry
Ford Community College, Dearborn, Michigan. Profes-
sor Friedman took his master of arts and doctor of phi-
losophy degrees in the history of international relations
at Michigan State University in 1991 and 1995, respec-
tively. Additionally, he teaches part-time as an adjunct
faculty member of the Command and Staff College Dis-
tance Education Program within the U.S. Marine
Corps University’s College of Continuing Education; as
an adjunct lecturer of strategy and policy in the U.S.
Naval War College’s Non-Resident Strategy and Policy
Fleet Seminar Program; and as a section instructor in
Norwich University’s online Master of Arts in Military
History Program. Dr. Friedman’s most recent books are
Arguing over the American Lake: Bureaucracy and
Rivalry in the U.S. Pacific, 1945–1947, 2009; and Di-
gesting History: The U.S. Naval War College, the Les-
sons of World War Two, and Future Naval Warfare,
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naval policy for this atomic and Cold War context. Some of these reforms began
before the war even ended; Vice Admiral William Pye, its wartime President, had
called for an expanded institution capable of teaching a tenfold increase in offi-
cers by means of a three-tiered educational structure consisting of a Command
and Staff course, the War College course, and an Advanced course. Pye remained
until March 1946, presiding over six-month courses that had become the order
of the day during the war and beginning preparations for returning to a full,
two-year program. In addition, by the time the war ended the Naval War College
had started to consider joint service education for officers from the other ser-
vices as well as personnel from the State Department.2
The real change came, however, when Admiral Spruance became President in
March 1946. Spruance not only brought his command experience from the Pa-
cific War and his three previous tours at the College but intimately understood
how radically different the Navy’s responsibilities would be in the postwar pe-
riod. These responsibilities would require a Naval War College that would foster
intra- as well as inter-service and even interdepartmental cooperation. They also
meant a College whose curriculum took logistics into account. Spruance was
convinced that the study of logistics as an aspect of modern naval warfare was
being seriously neglected. In Captain Henry Eccles, who would become the
chairman of the College’s Department of Logistics by 1947, the admiral found
an officer who believed as strongly as he that logistics had to be studied along-
side strategy, operations, and tactics.3
Spruance was also a student of military history, as can be seen in the establish-
ment of the World War II Battle Evaluation Group in 1946. Under Commodore
(later Captain and then Rear Admiral) Richard Bates, the Battle Evaluation
Group was to study the recent war and derive lessons for use by officers seeking
to improve their professional judgment. By 1950, Bates’s team had produced
studies on the battles of Coral Sea, Midway, and Savo Island; it was working on a
multivolume work on the battle of Leyte Gulf when in 1958 it was disestablished
for lack of funds. Related to these changes, Spruance replaced the College’s
“Sound Military Decision” format (so named for a 1937 booklet issued by the
College under Rear Admiral Edward C. Kalbfus) with what he called the “Opera-
tional Planning Model.” This approach produced a much simpler, more
standardized Navy-wide process for estimating operational situations and for-
matting orders.4
As noted above, the radically changing situation in which the U.S. Navy might
have to face off against the Soviet Union in a possible atomic-warfare environ-
ment was the reason that Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, Chief of Naval Opera-
tions, wanted Spruance as the new President of the Naval War College.
Spruance’s charge was to “revitalize” the College as thoroughly as possible. Not
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surprisingly, most of the “lessons learned”
that he would bring came from the Navy’s ex-
perience in the Pacific War, though the Atlan-
tic was hardly ignored. Neither is it surprising
that Spruance’s addresses (the primary
sources of this article), as well as lectures by
instructors and guests and student theses
(the other primary sources of my larger
study) had a number of themes and issues in
common. One of these themes was a contin-
ued focus on amphibious warfare, which was
especially important, given the experiences
of the Pacific War, to Spruance and many of
the immediate postwar staff, instructors, and
students. Another obvious topic was how
atomic weapons would change naval ship de-
sign, strategy, and battle tactics—or not
change them, as the case would sometimes
be. In addition, there was considerable atten-
tion to the continued need for a balanced op-
erational fleet, an adequate afloat train and
shore-base system, and a first-rate merchant
marine as elements of a total, integrated package of American sea power.5
Spruance additionally thought it vital that the Naval War College keep fo-
cused on the future of naval warfare, unlike in the interwar period, when surface
warfare had been the dominant interest to the detriment of studying carrier and
submarine warfare, logistics, and amphibious operations. This again was the
reason for his emphasis on intraservice, as well as interservice, education and
cooperation and for his call for the exercise of academic freedom at the College
rather than searches for the “right” answers. He understood from his own career,
especially the Pacific War, that there were no pat answers to strategic, opera-
tional, or tactical questions. The revitalized College would also be focusing on a
new potential enemy, the Soviet Union. While Spruance was far from a
Red-baiter and thought that the United States and the Soviet Union should be
able to enjoy postwar cooperation, by 1946 the Cold War was becoming ever
more apparent, and Spruance was convinced that the United States could not
beat Russia in a war by invading and occupying its territory. Instead, he thought
Western powers with highly mobile sea and sea-air power could hold Soviet at-
tacks in Eurasia and eventually convince the Soviet people to overthrow their
own government.6 In some ways, this thinking marked continuity with the prewar
1 1 8 N A V A L W A R C O L L E G E R E V I E W
Courtesy Naval War College Naval Historical Collection
NWC_Review_Spring2011-118.ps
\\data1\john.lanzieri.ctr$\msdata\Desktop\NavalWarCollege\NWC_Review_Spring2011\NWC_Review_Spring2011.vp
Thursday, February 17, 2011 9:47:21 AM
Color profile: Disabled
Composite  Default screen
124
Naval War College Review, Vol. 64 [2011], No. 2, Art. 1
https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol64/iss2/1
years, in that Spruance continued to argue that the Navy was the nation’s first
line of defense. But for the Navy itself, the Cold War was a major geographical re-
orientation, since the Pacific Basin was no longer to be the primary theater of
operations, eclipsed now by the Atlantic and Mediterranean.7
Spruance’s concerns and views are encapsulated in a series of speeches and
statements delivered within a few months of 1946 and early 1947, a particularly
significant period between the end of the war and the early formulation of “con-
tainment” as a coherent foreign policy in the fall of 1947. These transitional
years offer a valuable window through which to explore institutions such as the
Naval War College in transition from a hot war to a cold one. These addresses, in
turn, reflect the understandings that Spruance brought to that seminal period
from the war just ended.8
SPRUANCE AND THE POSTWAR FORMULA FOR AMERICAN
NAVAL SECURITY
In mid-June 1946, Admiral Spruance delivered to Brown University alumni an
address entitled “United States as a Sea Power.” He began by telling his audience
that it was American and British naval power in “coordinated operation” that al-
lowed troops and aircraft to be used overseas. Focusing on the Pacific War, he
gave some idea of the problems that arose with exercising that sea power. Noting
that the United States was an insular nation with the size and natural resources
that went with a richly endowed continent, Spruance reminded his audience
that American intercourse with the rest of the world, with the exception of Can-
ada and Mexico, was conducted by sea. Not even the proposed Pan-American
Highway, he thought, would replace seaborne commerce with the rest of the
Americas. The United States was “self-contained,” but with the depletion of its
natural resources, the growth of its population, and increasing industrialization,
overseas trade would become even more important in both peace and war.
Looking at the United States as an island, Spruance felt that the United States
should remain the strongest sea power in the world; in time of war, sea power
would be necessary to extend “sea control” over the various parts of the world’s
oceans and to restrict that of the enemy.9
Spruance went on to assert the need for both ship-based and shore-based air-
craft, for which reason bases were another important part of sea power. He saw
bases as a “vital necessity” in time of war, valuable assets that needed to be built
up in peacetime and then held when war came. “If you are unable to hold them,
your enemy will take them from you and use them against you. If you are able to
hold them, but have no striking forces to operate from them, they play no active
part and tend to become a liability.” The basic ideas by which the United States
won the war in the Pacific had existed prior to its outbreak, but some had to be
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further developed and elaborated. Carriers, for instance, had to be developed,
especially in numbers, from the one or two available in 1942 to the quantity at
sea in 1944. More carriers with better aircraft, as well as high-speed battleships,
cruisers, and destroyers, gave U.S. forces mobility and then a “preponderance”
against Japanese positions that “enabled us to accomplish with small losses what
we could not do previously.”10
Turning to amphibious operations, Spruance recounted how landings on en-
emy shores against opposition had been a focus of study since the First World
War. These operations required new types of ships and landing craft, as well as
equipment to get the troops over the beaches. Gunfire- and air-support tech-
niques also had to be “worked out” so as to prepare for, cover, and support the
landings and ground operations. Repeating what many of the College’s lecturers
and students had recently noted in their own work, Spruance reminded his audi-
ence that prior to the war there had been “intensive study” of amphibious opera-
tions by the Navy and Marine Corps as well as joint Army–Marine Corps
maneuvers to put theory into practice. The landing craft, however, had not pro-
gressed beyond design and testing.11
Another problem was logistical support for naval forces when the fleet was
operating far from fixed bases. Before the war, the Navy only had a small number
of tenders, repair ships, and floating dry docks, and similarly small numbers of
refrigerator, supply, ammunition, and refueling ships, only a few of which could
transfer cargo at sea. When the loss of the Philippines left the United States with-
out a base west of Pearl Harbor, Spruance began to see the Pacific War (as he had
said in wartime) as “largely a matter of the seizure of advanced bases and their
subsequent development for the support of fleet, air and ground forces.”12
In selecting sites for conquest and development, the first requirement was
suitability for airfields, the second the availability of good anchorages. Each base
taken was selected with a view to supporting the next forward movement. “In
order to move ahead as rapidly as possible, we took only such of the heavily de-
fended Japanese positions as we actually had to have. The ones we did not take
were cut off from Japan and left to die on the vine.” Japanese ships could not ven-
ture into waters controlled by the U.S. fleet, and each bypassed Japanese airfield
received, almost daily, such heavy bombing that it became a “sink hole” for Japa-
nese aircraft. He took time to point out to the audience, however, that the tenac-
ity of Japanese resistance was apparent in the fact that no bypassed Japanese
garrison surrendered before the end of the war.13
Spruance next illustrated that in the South and Southwest Pacific, American
operations had the advantage of large landmasses on which extensive shore in-
stallations could be built. Large bases were less vulnerable and allowed cargo to
be turned around more cheaply and easily. However, they were difficult to “roll
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up” during a forward movement. For instance, Spruance recalled that when of-
fensive operations commenced in the Central Pacific in the summer of 1943,
Funafuti in the Ellice Islands was the nearest base to the Gilbert and Marshall Is-
lands that had a good anchorage. Unfortunately, Funafuti was 1,200 miles south-
west of the Marshalls, seven hundred miles southeast of Tarawa Atoll in the
Gilberts, and six hundred miles northwest of American Samoa. It also had very
little land area that could be developed for shore installations and no deepwater
channel for heavy ships. Airfield and anchorage facilities had the same limita-
tion throughout the Ellice Islands, Gilbert Islands, Marshall Islands, and most of
the Caroline Islands. The Navy was forced, therefore, to devote whatever land
was available to airfields and airfield-support services, general maintenance fa-
cilities, radio stations, magazines, storehouses, fuel storage, water distillation,
refrigeration, and electrical power plants. Given the physical space that these de-
mands took up, the Navy knew, there would be no room for fleet facilities: “Eve-
rything we needed in this line would have to be afloat.” Island facilities would be
strictly for aviation support and island defense and would “contribute nothing
of value to the fleet,” with the exception of recreational facilities.14
Given this situation, and because the advance to the Gilberts and Marshalls
was so rapid, it became necessary to organize mobile service squadrons that
could keep the fleet operating thousands of miles west of Pearl Harbor for
months. “As a matter of fact, once we took the Marshalls in February 1944 the
fleet remained continuously in the Central and Western Pacific until the war was
over and out [sic] Army had been landed in Japan.” Individual ships went back to
Pearl Harbor or the continental United States for battle-damage repair or major
overhaul, but the fleet remained in the combat zone. “Command of the
sea—which these days involves command of the air over it—had to be main-
tained at all times. It was the fleet which did this and which enabled us to push
ever closer to the shores of Japan.” Service Squadron 4 was organized in the fall
of 1943. When Eniwetok in the Marshalls was taken in February 1944, the
squadron, as would become the pattern, was moved to the Marshalls, where it
became part of a reorganized Service Squadron 10 at Majuro Atoll. The growth
of Service Squadron 10 was rapid. Oilers, provision ships, repair ships, destroyer
tenders, ammunition ships, and supply ships arrived, supplemented by floating
dry docks, concrete and steel barges, and ammunition lighters. All of these ves-
sels and facilities were self-propelled, as were the harbor tugs, fuel barges, pon-
toon lighters, and numerous other smaller craft for the unloading of cargo and
its transfer from ship to ship.15
The importance of Service Squadron 10 to the fleet could be seen, Spruance
asserted, in the fact that the next operation was the Marianas, a thousand miles
from Eniwetok. The Marianas would give the U.S. interior lines of operation
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against the Japanese, and the primary targets of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam had
sufficient land area for a number of airfields and shore facilities, but again with-
out deepwater, secure anchorages. Saipan provided some protection for an an-
chored fleet from the sea and from northeast trade winds but none from other
directions or from submarine attack. Its weather was undependable (limiting
the kinds of ship repair that could be done), and the harbor itself was too small.
Tinian’s harbor was suitable only for small craft, and Guam had “no anchorage
off shore of any consequence.” The port of Apra, Guam, was small, unprotected
against swells, and undeveloped even after forty years of U.S. occupation (“I may
say that this condition is rapidly being remedied today”). Spruance recalled that
because of the hydrographic conditions in the Marianas, the carriers and battle-
ships had to go back a thousand miles to Eniwetok to replenish ammunition
since handling ordnance weighing up to a ton required, as he put it, “care.”16
At this point, while fuel and aircraft could be transferred at sea, ammunition,
as he mentioned, could not. The ammunition situation had not affected the
Marianas operation, but Spruance had wanted the fleet to be able to do every-
thing at sea except for major repair if it was going to operate closer to Japan. This
meant that work had to be conducted at Pearl Harbor for the transfer of ammu-
nition between ships at sea; the equipment developed there was tested during
the Iwo Jima operation. A new command, Service Squadron 6, was established
for this most recent type of operation; it was to ensure that the fleet could oper-
ate independently indefinitely, except for major repairs. Spruance told his audi-
ence at Brown that the technique proved itself at Iwo Jima and “paid off ” during
the battle of Okinawa. Service Squadron 10 continued to be an advanced base of
sorts, servicing the fleet between operations from Ulithi Atoll, four hundred
miles southwest of Guam, while Service Squadron 6 forward-deployed with the
fleet.17
Logistics, to Spruance, was “the foundation on which large overseas opera-
tions must be built.” He told his audience that in the future U.S. lines of commu-
nication would have to be secure and that the availability of enough shipping to
move “enormous” quantities of supplies had to be certain. Fuel, ammunition,
food, and aircraft would have to be “pipelined” all the way from the sources of
production. Items could be stored at forward bases to promote efficient use of
shipping, but beyond that the uses of forward bases would be quite limited.
Spruance acknowledged that air transportation was “extremely valuable” for
moving key personnel and critical cargo but thought it no substitute for surface
shipping when it came to moving large numbers of personnel and volumes of
freight overseas. “Aircraft operating over long flights require the movement by
ship of fuel weighing several times the amount of pay load they carry.”18
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Spruance went on to the role played by American submarines in the Pacific
War. “Had it not been for the magnificent job done by our submarines, there is
no doubt in my mind that the war with Japan would still be going on.” Pointing
out that these submarines had sunk 60 percent of the merchant tonnage lost by
Japan, he reminded his audience that they had been the only weapon the United
States had in the first two years of the war that could get at Japanese trade routes;
by the last year of the war, Japanese merchant ships had been driven from the
open ocean. “The Japanese empire was built on the use of the sea. When they lost
the shipping needed to bring in the raw materials to Japan and to send out the
men, weapons and supplies needed by their outlying areas, the empire began to
crack.” If Japan had practically no navy or merchant marine left by the end of the
war, however, the Imperial Japanese Army was still intact, and Japan still had
over ten thousand aircraft. “But, between the strangulation by the blockade and
the burning of her cities by the B-29 bombing raids, her economic framework
was stripped bare and she had to capitulate.”19
Spruance then asked rhetorically whether anything had changed since the
end of the war that affected the need for the United States to remain the world’s
strongest sea power. To answer his own question, he suggested that two weapons
—the guided missile and the atomic bomb—were new. Despite speculation that
these new weapons might bring about a new kind of “push button” warfare, in
which American cities would be quickly destroyed by an “unscrupulous and ag-
gressive” enemy, Spruance thought that guided missiles would contain the
atomic bomb threat. In the naval context, he argued that bombs and shells that
missed their targets seldom damaged anything, that battles like Midway demon-
strated that high-altitude bombing rarely achieved hits on ships, and that only
pilots who came in close to their targets achieved hits. Japanese suicide pilots late
in the war had done a tremendous amount of damage—but the kamikazes were,
for Spruance, the ultimate guided missile. Spruance, however, did not think that
long-range guided missiles launched hundreds or thousands of miles from their
targets would come close to their targets unless the targets were quite large. Ob-
viously not entirely envisioning the near-future threat of intercontinental ballis-
tic missiles, Spruance asserted that “the geographic position of the United States
renders us as secure as any country in the world, as long as we keep our potential
enemy on the far sides of the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Sea power can do
this.”20
Still, he admitted, the atomic bomb was the major new and unknown factor
in warfare. More would be known after tests were conducted at Bikini Atoll, but
the analysis of those tests might take several months. If atomic bombs did not
become more plentiful, Spruance doubted “if ships at sea will be found to be a
very profitable target unless a major engagement is impending.” Nevertheless, in
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a theme that would be emphasized in the following year’s curriculum at the Na-
val War College, Spruance asserted that the bomb was so destructive within its
effective radius that it could put a city, harbor, or anchorage seriously in danger.21
The fact that one bomb carried by a single long-range bomber could “do the
work” of several hundred ordinary bombs was, to him, the real threat. Bombers
on one-way missions were especially worrisome, since their radius of action was
doubled, though Spruance thought the usefulness of such a mission would de-
pend on visibility during the day, the amount of enemy territory to be overflown
en route to the target, and the state of the defender’s preparation and alertness.
Coastal cities, he contended, would be “excellent” targets and difficult to defend
if the approach was made over the sea, if the attack was made at night, and if the
plane was equipped with good radar. “The practice of interception by night
fighters will require much improvement before this ceases to be true.” Similarly,
coastal cities would be endangered if submarines could be equipped to fire
atomic-armed rockets from their decks. Spruance thought that given all of this,
until the United Nations had developed “far greater harmony” among the
world’s nations and far greater control of international affairs, “the United
States must not give up the position it won with such effort and sacrifice during
the recent war of being the strongest sea power. Unless we maintain that posi-
tion, our influence abroad will weaken.” In fact, Spruance thought the world
now needed American help and guidance as it never had before.22
SPRUANCE AND THE USE OF HISTORY
On Independence Day 1946, Spruance delivered another address (to an audi-
ence of two people) in Newburgh, New York. He spent a significant amount of it
discussing the American Revolution and the comparative advantages and disad-
vantages of Great Britain and the United States, given the preponderance of
British naval power and the American lack of it. Not surprisingly, he noted the
strategic mobility that naval power gave the British, and he cited George Wash-
ington’s ideas on the advantages that naval superiority would have given the new
nation if it had had a respectable navy.23 Spruance then described, in contrast,
U.S. naval power at the time the Japanese struck Pearl Harbor, by when the
United States had expanded to the Pacific Ocean, acquired overseas territories
and possessions, and had a navy that was “second to none.” He called Pearl Har-
bor a “treacherous blow” that was nonetheless a “blessing,” in that it “brought
out [sic] people into the war without reservations.” He pointed out the key lead-
ership role by President Franklin Roosevelt and the importance of the American
ability to raise a huge military and then mobilize industrially to equip and sup-
ply it. In particular, sea power (exercised by the United States, and the United
Kingdom as well) ensured that the war was not fought in the home territory of
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the United States—a theme that he emphasized in both earlier and later talks.
Admittedly, American territories in Hawaii, Alaska, and the Pacific Islands had
been attacked and in some cases lost, but, he argued, these setbacks all took place
in the first six months of the conflict, when these territories were not properly
defended and could not be adequately supported, and the seas in which they lay
were under Japanese naval control.24
One key to American strategy at this time was holding the Japanese in place
for the rest of 1942 through attrition warfare in the Central and South Pacific
—wearing down Japanese airpower, “shattering” the myth of the Imperial Japa-
nese Army’s invincibility, and beginning to reduce, through a submarine offen-
sive, Japan’s ability to supply its empire with raw materials. Spruance outlined
the two subsequent offensive prongs through the Central and South Pacific, un-
der, respectively, Admiral Nimitz, then Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet
and Pacific Ocean Areas, and General Douglas MacArthur, Commanding Gen-
eral, U.S. Army Forces, Pacific, and Commander in Chief, Southwest Pacific
Area. He emphasized the importance of the growing American material superi-
ority in this phase of the war. Allied coordination of sea, air, and land forces
cleared the way “to seize and develop the necessary bases,” defeating the
empire without landing a single soldier on the Japanese home islands.25
In the Atlantic, by contrast, the Allied need had been to contain the German
submarine threat: “Shipping losses in the Atlantic had a direct effect on the ship-
ping that could be spared for the Pacific, and, so, on the rate at which we could
push the war against Japan.” Spruance argued that though the European Theater
of Operations was primarily a land war against a strong continental power, even
there sea control had been necessary before American military and economic
strength could be brought to bear on Germany. Generally, the European Theater
and Spruance’s view of the American Revolution convinced him that “while
land power is necessary to win a major war, sea power is needed if one is to be
fought overseas and not on own our soil.” If the United States now retained its
position as the world’s greatest sea power, Spruance was convinced, it could re-
main a secure “island” between the Atlantic and the Pacific.26
SPRUANCE AND THE SENATE
A few days later, Spruance testified to the Senate Naval Affairs Committee on
Senate Bill 2044, a bill that had been proposed by Senators Warren Austin of Ver-
mont, Lister Hill of Alabama, and Elbert Thomas of Utah. The bill would have
created a unified military structure that, the Navy felt, was most favorable to the
Army. Spruance made clear that he had had no permanent duty in the Navy De-
partment since 1929 and that his views would “be based primarily on what I saw
of the war as it was fought in the Pacific.” He asserted that the Navy continued to
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be the nation’s first line of defense: “Only as we are able to control the Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans will our potential enemies be kept far distant from our
shores. Our armies and our air forces will then be able to go effectively to our en-
emies overseas and not theirs come to us.” Control of the oceans would not pre-
vent long-range submarines and aircraft from reaching U.S. coasts but, he
believed, would make these operations much more difficult and less effective.
Spruance argued that the bill lacked clear distinctions between the functions of
the Army, the Navy, and the proposed independent Air Force. Nor did it affirm
the right of each service to whatever “tools” it might need to carry out those func-
tions, including the research and development of new weapons and equipment.27
Echoing Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal and Fleet Admiral Nimitz, by
this time the Chief of Naval Operations, on this issue, Spruance further asserted
that the problem was how best to “coordinate” policies and plans at a high level
without preventing what he saw as necessary and healthy decentralization of im-
plementation and execution. The services had to be brought to “pull” in the
same direction but without “stifling” initiative within each: “Overcentralization
tends to retard improvements and to prevent getting rapid action when that is
required.” He saw the bill as creating under the proposed “Secretary of Common
Defense” a bureaucracy that would grow beyond policy making and coordina-
tion and interfere with planning and administration within the services. The
character of future wars and the weapons with which they were to be fought was
unclear and Spruance thought that a centralized bureaucracy would inhibit the
imagination needed to prepare for such conflicts: “Try as we may, none of us is
sufficiently gifted with prophetic vision to foresee what new tools the future will
bring forth or what needs will develop for new tools.”28
It was already clear, however, that World War II had confirmed the impor-
tance of aircraft in all forms of warfare. Spruance’s own experience in the Pacific
had proved that any fleet deprived of supporting aircraft was like a “boxer with
one hand tied behind him.” He classified “supporting aircraft” in two categories:
ship-based (operating from carriers, battleships, and cruisers) and shore-based,
of various types. All of these aircraft were necessary, especially those on carriers,
since they gave mobility: a “multiplicity” of carriers permitted superior concen-
trations of aircraft to be brought against enemy positions, particularly in sur-
prise attacks on enemy carriers and on aircraft on the ground. Land-based
aircraft would help carriers effect surprise, not only with early information but
by hiding the presence of U.S. carriers (by not exposing carrier-based planes on
scouting missions). Carrier planes, meanwhile, could be preserved for strikes.29
Spruance gave the senators three examples of the value of shore-based air
search in support of carrier operations. His first was the battle of Midway, where
surprise had been vital to the U.S. force, since it had fewer carriers than its
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opponent; it was important to strike first and not trade carriers on an even basis.
The American carriers had waited northeast of Midway while the island’s few
PBY Catalinas searched the sectors from which the Japanese were most likely to
approach. Carrier planes were used only to cover the two task forces’ advance
and prevent surprise and were recovered at night. An early report from one of
the Catalinas allowed Task Forces 16 and 17 to get in the first blows and, ulti-
mately, win the battle. “At Midway the cooperation between our search planes
and our carrier task forces was vital.” The scout planes reported enemy position,
composition, course, and speed, but they could not provide constant tracking:
“Our patrol plane pilots were handicapped by having to fly a slow, poorly armed
seaplane, whose performance compared very unfavorably with the B-17s of that
period. They could not remain near an enemy carrier for long without an excel-
lent chance of being shot down by fighters.”30
As his second example, Spruance related how during the Marianas operation
in July 1944 Vice Admiral Marc Mitscher’s Fast Carrier Task Force preceded Vice
Admiral Richmond Turner’s Joint Expeditionary Force in order to clear out Jap-
anese air forces, conduct preliminary bombardments of Saipan and Tinian, and
cover the amphibious forces. Spruance, commanding the Fifth Fleet, had
thought surprise desirable, though not vital. The nearest American base was
Eniwetok in the Marshalls, a thousand miles away. Some of Eniwetok’s sea-
planes, such as the PBM Mariners, could, however, move to Saipan with their
tenders as soon as conditions warranted, and meanwhile its PB4Y Privateers
(patrol bombers adapted from the B-24) flew searches from the Marshalls and
even struck Japanese shipping at Truk, in the Carolines. Spruance told the sena-
tors that knowing the Japanese would search to the east of the Marianas and thus
detect the Fast Carrier Task Force, he had arranged for two Privateers from
Eniwetok to run “interference” and destroy or drive off any Japanese search
planes. The sea-based Mariners could not have accomplished this mission.31
Spruance’s third example also came from the Marianas operation. On the
morning after the initial landing on Saipan, a submarine off the San Bernardino
Strait reported that a large Japanese force had come out the night before. The re-
port confirmed for Spruance that Vice Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa’s First Mobile
Fleet intended to prevent American seizure of the Marianas; all information on
this force would be of “great importance.” Recalling that the amphibious force
had a small seaplane tender that could care for six planes, Spruance ordered six
Mariners at Eniwetok to fly to Saipan. Five of these arrived, and four were sent
out to search. Since they had radar, they could operate at night; in daylight, they
probably would have been shot down by Japanese fighters. On the second night,
one of the Mariners located Ozawa’s force, but radio delays kept the report from
Spruance and Mitscher for eight hours. The two commanders received the
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report only an hour before Ozawa’s planes began their unsuccessful attacks on
the Fast Carrier Task Force.32
From the latter example, Spruance drew for the senators the need for not only
more comprehensive patrol plane coverage but also rapid teamwork, because
naval actions were now so fast paced and the consequences so momentous.
Teamwork, Spruance thought, best came from association, training, and indoc-
trination. All three examples illustrated that there were too many variables in
war for everything to be planned and foreseen: “Our plans can be made out in
great detail up to the time we hit the enemy. After that, they have to be flexible,
ready to counter what the enemy may try to do to us and ready to take advantage
of the breaks that may come to us.” This required the man “on the spot” to know
where he fit into the operation and to take the initiative on the basis of very brief
orders.33
Spruance moved next to antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and the protection of
shipping. He saw the latter as essentially a naval function; the Navy’s responsibil-
ity for the protection of shipping overseas against air, surface, and subsurface
attack began when ships left their ports. For this mission, the Navy needed mine-
sweepers, small vessels, and aircraft. Antisubmarine aircraft were also needed to
prevent submarines from lying in wait off port entrances and to escort convoys
once they were at sea. Again, taking an example from Pacific War amphibious
operations, Spruance recalled that the great masses of naval vessels and shipping
concentrated to capture the Pacific Islands had had to anchor in open waters or
lie offshore for weeks or months if no anchorage was available. This had been the
case at Iwo Jima. Until airfields could be seized ashore and be made operational,
aircraft from carriers were relied on for all forms of local air support, including
ASW patrols; as soon as the airfields were operational, land-based Navy ASW
planes took over. For this reason, at Okinawa, Spruance said, the first move was
to seize a group of nearby islands, the Kerama Retto, with a small, protected an-
chorage that could be used as an advanced base. This anchorage allowed patrol
seaplanes based on tenders to be employed. These Mariners patrolled day and
night until they could be replaced by land-based planes from Okinawa once the
airfields there were activated.34
The seaplane, Spruance argued, had an advantage over land planes in an am-
phibious operation, since it could move forward with its tender very early, as
long as seas were calm enough to operate in. That was important because getting
airfields operational for land-based planes took time, and it was vital to get ex-
tended searches and ASW patrols up at the earliest possible moment. Moreover,
denying land-based planes to the Navy would also limit its ability to conduct
strikes against ships—and to Spruance, attacks on ships in any form, with any
weapon, were naval functions. Carrier aircraft, he said, were “particularly
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effective” at this mission but could not perform the function of a long-range
bomber. For sustained control of sea areas beyond the range of carrier aircraft,
Spruance told the senators, long-range, shore-based planes that could hit ship
targets were very valuable “tools.”35
There was a caveat: “Please note that I desire to stress the ability of such long
range planes to hit the ships they aim at. Dropping bombs in the water from a
safe high altitude soon loses what little moral effect it may have in the begin-
ning.” An enemy is not deterred unless prohibitive losses are inflicted. From that
viewpoint, Spruance told the committee, during the war Navy shore-based
bombers had been much more effective against Japanese shipping than Army
Air Forces (AAF) bombers: “Our planes came down to where they could make a
good percentage of hits, whereas under Army training their bombers usually re-
mained at safe altitudes where little success was possible.” The senators had been
given Japanese figures showing how Japan’s warships and merchant ships were
lost: the AAF had sunk only a small percentage. At Midway, in spite of extrava-
gant claims by the AAF, the Japanese had reported not a single hit from AAF air-
craft. “Fortunately, the presence of our three carriers and the magnificent
performance of their aircraft won the battle in spite of the failure of the B-17s to
contribute.”36
Spruance saw failure also in the AAF’s inability to strike Japanese ships dur-
ing the fall and winter of 1944/45 in connection with the seizure of Iwo Jima, a
failure that produced “disastrous” results. According to Spruance, the best way
to prevent the Japanese garrison on Iwo Jima from being strengthened would
have been to sink Japanese ships bringing men and material to the island, but be-
cause the fleet was needed to support the Palau and Philippine operations, the
Navy could not closely blockade the island. That job was therefore left to the
Army Air Forces. Although the AAF bombed the island almost daily, it did not
stop Japanese support shipping. “As a result, the defenses of Iwo Jima were con-
stantly being strengthened up to 16 February 1945, when the Fifth Fleet started
the bombardment preliminary to the landings. . . . [The] heavy losses incurred
by our Marines in its capture and the great value of the position, subsequently, to
the B-29 effort against Japan are matters of history.” Only then were the Japanese
no longer able to maintain picket vessels to warn the Japanese home islands
about B-29 raids.37
Okinawa provided another example of the need for close cooperation be-
tween search planes and carrier forces. On 7 April 1945, search planes detected
the Japanese superbattleship Yamato and its escorts south of Kyushu. It was
apparent that the force meant to strike American ships at Okinawa from the
northwest, but it was without air cover, so two Mariners were able to remain in
contact until carrier aircraft could strike. Spruance emphasized that to do their
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job the Navy search planes “had to be able to navigate accurately, they had to rec-
ognize what they saw, they had to know the general naval situation, and they had
to be able to communicate their information rapidly. All this required a lot of
naval training.”38
Spruance also lectured the committee on the importance of mines as naval
weapons. Used offensively in enemy-controlled waters, they could be laid only
by aircraft or submarines. Mining, however, was “incidental” to the carrier air-
craft’s main employment of bombing and torpedo attack. In contrast, “the long
range land plane bomber is a very useful tool for minelaying, particularly in en-
emy territorial waters.” He acknowledged that AAF’s B-29s had done a very ef-
fective job of mine laying in Japanese waters, “as they did in bombing the cities,
but [mining] is and should be a Navy responsibility. The Navy should have the
tools with which to do it.”
Finally, Spruance turned to the Navy’s need for the Marine Corps. He was
concerned that Senate Bill 2044 did not safeguard fully the right of the Marine
Corps to exist in the future: “I have too high an opinion of the Marine Corps,
confirmed as a result of our operations together in the Gilberts, Marshalls, and
Marianas and at Iwo Jima and Okinawa, to be willing to have any doubt exist on
this subject.” In general, Spruance concluded, Senate Bill 2044 would require
“major revisions” because it did not guarantee for the services—especially the
naval services—the weapons they would require to carry out their necessary
roles in the next war.39
SPRUANCE IN GREAT BRITAIN
In late October 1946, Admiral Spruance delivered a talk to the Royal United Ser-
vice Institution. While his account was largely a historical rendition of the Pa-
cific War, it contained all the elements he thought were required for future
American naval preparedness. Spruance, for instance, asked the audience to
look at the war in the Pacific from a “naval point of view.” To him, three things
stood out as of particular interest in the development of the “art of naval war-
fare”; no single one of these things could have won the war, but without any one
of them Spruance did not think that the United States would have been as suc-
cessful “under the conditions as they existed in that ocean.” The first was the
“great increase” in the strength of the carrier air force. The large number of car-
riers available by the summer of 1943 gave the United States a “real” strategic air
force, one that had great strength and mobility. This strength was great enough
not only to overwhelm Japanese island outposts but—supported by the guns of
the fast battleships, cruisers, and destroyers—to go “repeatedly” to the coasts of
Japan itself. “Its mobility was such that the Japanese never could tell in what part
of their far-flung empire it would strike them next.”40
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The second point was the improvement in the American ability to make am-
phibious landings against strong opposition. The many new types of landing
ships and craft and improved techniques of naval gunfire and air support al-
lowed the United States to land on and capture the bases needed. The third ma-
jor factor was the capacity to provide logistic support at ever increasing
distances from Pearl Harbor. “In the last analysis, it was our fleet strength which
enabled us to move across the Pacific, to isolate the Japanese island positions we
had selected for capture, to furnish the gunfire and air support for the landings,
and to ensure the security of communications to our rear.” Spruance asserted
that as American forces got closer to Japan, continuous fleet support in ad-
vanced areas became more and more necessary; in fact, he thought, the founda-
tions of U.S. operations were logistics. “Through the agency of our mobile
service squadrons, built up from small beginnings, we were able to give our fleet
the logistic support it needed when and where it was required, whether at sea or
at advanced bases which moved across the Pacific as the fleet itself moved.”41
Spruance wanted to be clear, however, that the war against Japan had not been
won by naval might alone. Without the troops, both Army and Marine, that
stormed ashore and captured islands, the United States would have been faced
with a war of stalemate or of “exchanging raids on outposts[:] . . . It still takes the
infantryman to capture and hold territory.” Moreover, Spruance noted the “im-
portant factor” of the incendiary raids by the B-29s from the Marianas, raids
that effected such “great destruction” on Japanese cities. Further, the “use of the
atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki was probably the deciding factor in
causing the Japanese government to acknowledge their defeat.” Thus, Spruance
thought that modern global war required the coordinated use of all arms and
weapons, backed by the full economic and industrial resources of the nation,
and he thought that future studies of World War II would emphasize the impor-
tance that sea power played in bringing about the defeat of Italy, Germany, and
then Japan.42 Spruance was claiming, in other words, that the formula for future
American national security—if there was to be such a thing—would be continu-
ation of what the United States had done in the Second World War. Any future
war would have the same general outlines as the last one.
SPRUANCE AT THE NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
Spruance was back on the lecture circuit in early January 1947, this time present-
ing at the National War College on the “Future Strategic Role of Naval Forces.”
Spruance quickly went to his main focus—maintenance of the Navy as an “effi-
cient fighting force” that might be the “strong right arm” of national policy. In
terms of the future role of the Navy, this, to Spruance, meant more than ever that
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the lessons of the past had to be studied, but in conjunction with scientific and
technological changes that would impact future naval weapons and tactics.43
Spruance described the primary function of the Navy in time of war as that of
gaining and exercising control of sea areas required for the successful prosecu-
tion of the war and denying to the enemy those areas it needed. Neither goal
could be entirely fulfilled, because submarines and aircraft had made previously
safe and secure anchorages and harbors dangerous. Also, aircraft, mines,
long-range guns, and torpedo boats had all extended the distance to seaward at
which control could be exercised from land. As an example from the Pacific War,
Spruance noted that Japan had been able to use the Strait of Tsushima and the
Sea of Japan for communications right up to the end of the war. Still, Spruance
saw the necessity of sea control as long as the bulk of the world’s commerce had
to be moved by surface vessels. As access to the sea had been “progressively” de-
nied to Japan, its insular empire had “withered” and been brought near the point
of “economic death.”44
In terms of world politics, Spruance contended that the United States was an
insular nation; its access to most other nations was by sea. However, he argued,
World War II left the United States in a new situation, with armies of occupation
in Germany, Austria, Italy, Japan, and southern Korea, as well as rights to bases in
the newly independent Philippines, Micronesia, the Volcanoes, the Ryukyus,
and the Aleutians. There was “no question” that the nation’s frontiers now ex-
tended to Europe and Asia, and as long as this geostrategic situation continued,
Spruance saw a need to keep the sea routes open. At present, there was no major
naval threat to them, but the “surest way” to encourage competitive naval build-
ing was for the United States to allow the Navy to become weak.45
Spruance then contended that it was important to extend the front lines as far
as possible from the continental United States in order to keep its production fa-
cilities intact (especially important given recent developments of long-range
aircraft, guided missiles, and atomic bombs), extend its areas of sea control, and,
by doing so, deny sea control to an enemy nation. Spruance returned to the idea
that in naval warfare, bases had to be pushed forward if distant sea areas were to
be brought under control; no matter how mobile and long-ranged naval forces
were, they were still highly dependent on logistical support. While most logisti-
cal aspects of naval operations could now be done at sea, advanced bases were
still necessary for repairing ships and organizing cargo for distribution to the
fleet.46
Spruance told the students that in selecting amphibious objectives for the ex-
tension of sea control, it was important to combine sites for airfields with “ex-
tensive” and protected anchorages—though in the Pacific some sites had no
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harbors at all, others only “minor” harbors, and others excellent harbors but
only “moderately good” terrain for airfields. There had to be at least one airfield
for local protection. However, both fleet and shore-based air support was im-
portant for “continuing” sea control, once seized. The war in the Pacific had
“proved” that without fleet support “no outlying insular position could be held
for long against assault by properly equipped and trained amphibious forces.”
Spruance thought, then, that the destruction of an enemy’s naval power was still
the first consideration in naval warfare: “This has always been true, and I can see
no possibility of a change in this conception. A study of naval history will show, I
think, that any country whose fleet was not ready and anxious to fight its oppo-
nent’s fleet to destruction generally ended by being defeated at sea.”47
An amphibious assault in a sea area controlled by the enemy combined “prac-
tically” all types of naval operations. All forces involved had to be protected
against attack by enemy submarines and air forces, both en route to and at the
objective. Mined waters had to be swept, gun bombardments and air attacks had
to be delivered at the objective, searches and patrols had to be conducted, and ac-
tions with a major part of the enemy’s fleet had to be fought, unless it had al-
ready been put out of action.48
Along with these actions went denial of sea areas to the enemy. Here,
Spruance was thinking of large-scale raids conducted not for permanent occu-
pation but to inflict damage. His World War II examples included strikes by U.S.
submarines against Japanese shipping; by American aircraft from shore bases
from which they could penetrate enemy-controlled waters; by naval task forces,
principally carrier aircraft but sometimes gunships; by China-based AAF units
along the China coast and Indonesia; and by naval patrol planes—both sea- and
land-based—against shipping in the Yellow Sea, along the coasts of Korea, and
in the Strait of Tsushima. Enemy countermeasures had merely drawn more raids
by U.S. forces.49
Looking to the future, Spruance argued that in any future war the United
States would be separated from its opponent by great stretches of ocean to the
west and east. Since, he contended, no “great war” had ever been won merely by
blows struck from great distances, the United States would have to get close to a
distant enemy to deliver decisive blows. He acknowledged that the nation was
vulnerable from the Arctic but thought that that region was an Army problem
and that seizing it would be, in any case, a waste of energy as it would entail fight-
ing the weather and natural obstacles rather than the enemy. Given these reali-
ties, Spruance argued that any likely future war would therefore require sea
transportation on a major scale, with strategic bases for refueling, repair, and pa-
trolling at key points along the routes in allied or neutral territory as well as in
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areas seized from the enemy. The more of these bases that could be obtained by
State Department negotiation, the better; Spruance also speculated that the
United Nations (UN) might ease the base-availability situation in a future war.
The bottom line, nevertheless, was a need for amphibious operations even after
the United States “came to grips” with the enemy, to push the war toward the en-
emy, protect home territory, and get into position to inflict damage on the en-
emy. Seeing a future war as one of attrition, like the Napoleonic Wars, the
American Civil War, and the world wars, Spruance perceived amphibious war-
fare as a means, along with strategic bombing, to get at the enemy’s production
facilities and national resources.50
Spruance now turned to new technical developments in submarines, radar,
guided missiles, and atomic energy. He was still hesitant to assess their impact on
strategy and tactics. He was reluctant, for instance, to predict changes in subma-
rine and antisubmarine tactics until more was known about increased sub-
merged speed and radius of action of improved boats or countermeasures to
them. With respect to radar, however, Spruance argued that improvements
would not impact naval tactics much, “other than to clear away some of the fog
of war and to permit better handling of forces.”51
As for guided missiles, he classified Japanese suicide planes as “very effective”
weapons. As he had in previous talks, he noted how many rounds of antiaircraft
projectiles it had taken to bring down one Japanese plane, but he also pointed
out that these weapons had not won the war for Japan. Essentially, Spruance
doubted the United States could develop a guided missile with a brain as effec-
tive as that of a human pilot and therefore thought that long-range guided mis-
siles would not be “much” of a hazard to ships at sea. If, however, missiles were
made more effective against large targets ashore, they could impact future naval
warfare. Guided missiles, therefore, were another reason for keeping the enemy
at as great a distance as possible so as to minimize the hits American territory
might take in a future conflict.52
He had no doubt, however, that atomic energy would have a “profound” im-
pact on naval warfare. Sounding like some of the student officers in their 1947
theses on the subject, Spruance thought that atomic energy had tremendous po-
tential as a weapon and a system of propulsion. However, its current scarcity as a
weapon restricted its use to “concentrated and valuable” targets. Ships at sea,
even formations, were not suitable targets, though they might be under critical
conditions, such as just before an important sea battle. The use of atomic weap-
ons against harbors and anchorages, on the other hand, had to be given impor-
tant consideration by the Navy. “The potency of the bomb is so great that a one
way flight by the aircraft carrying it to the limit of its range becomes good war.”53
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This meant to Spruance that either U.S. bases and ships at anchorage had to
be dispersed or defensive measures against air attack, especially night raids,
had to become more effective. “Since we cannot disperse our great cities, I
think the night fighter problem must have a much better solution than existed
on V-J Day.” All of the significant American amphibious operations in the war
had produced great concentrations of shipping, in spite of efforts to disperse
them. An atomic bomb dropped on such a staging area would have “disas-
trous” results on the operation. If such bombs were not outlawed by the UN,
Spruance thought, the Navy would have to figure out how to keep ship losses to
a minimum during an amphibious operation or develop an “airtight” air de-
fense. Here, Spruance was thinking either of increased air transportation of
forces and material when airfields were available or cutting advanced-base re-
quirements to bare minimums.54
As he had mentioned earlier, Spruance was fascinated by the idea of
atomic-propelled ships and how that new technology would increase ships’
speed, offensive and defensive capabilities, and sea-keeping qualities. It would
also affect logistical requirements, since fuel was the most bulky item that had to
be supplied. He did not think that so “radical”a departure as atomic substitution
for petroleum could be realized in the near future, and he did not foresee an en-
tirely nuclear-powered navy, but he perceived great operational advantages once
the technical problems had been worked out.55
Summing up his National War College presentation, Spruance saw plenty of
changes in weapons, methods, and procedures in naval warfare but no change in
the future role of the Navy from gaining and exercising control of the sea and de-
nying it to the enemy: “This will continue as long as geography makes the United
States an insular power and so long as the surface of the sea remains the great
highway connecting the nations of the world.”56
{LINE-SPACE}
In 1946, Admiral Spruance, following Admiral Pye’s lead, began the transition of
the Naval War College from its reduced wartime condition back to its peacetime
status as the service’s premier command and staff college. This transition en-
tailed studying the global political and military situation so as to explore what
would characterize future naval warfare. The basic assumptions were that the
Soviet Union would be the next enemy and that warfare might involve atomic
weaponry. To a great degree, however, neither staff, instructors, students, nor
guest lecturers thought that future naval warfare would be radically different
from previous conflicts. While acknowledging that atomic weapons and Cold
War aspects of “war during peace” were earthshaking in one sense, Spruance and
his officers fell back on fairly traditional strategic, operational, and tactical con-
cepts to meet these new challenges. While many of them argued that it was a
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radically new world, they certainly did not see the Cold War and atomic weapons
as spelling the end of U.S. naval forces, and they even foresaw naval missions that
had a great deal of continuity with the past.57
Charged as President of the Naval War College with the strategic reformula-
tion of American naval policy for this atomic and Cold War context, Admiral
Spruance digested the lessons of the Second World War, especially from the Pa-
cific, with particular focus on amphibious warfare and on how atomic weapons
would change naval ship design, force strategy, and battle tactics. Not only did he
dismiss the idea that navies were obsolete, but he saw an even greater role for the
Navy in Cold War littoral operations. In summary, Spruance called upon the
United States to maintain a balanced operational fleet, an adequate afloat train
and shore-base system, and a first-rate merchant marine—all as components of
a total, integrated package of American sea power.
Spruance had a difficult charge in this period. In an era of rapid demobiliza-
tion, domestic reconversion, acrimonious debates over postwar roles and mis-
sions, and a foreign policy that was changing in a revolutionary way and at
breakneck speed, he needed to translate the lessons of the war into new strategy,
tactics, and procedures for employing the fleet against a landlocked enemy with
a very alien ideology. Moreover, all of this had to be done on a slim budget and in
a way that deterred future war, which was now to be avoided if at all possible, be-
cause of the existence of atomic weapons. Strategies providing for the security of
the Republic had become infinitely more difficult to formulate and implement.
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REVIEW ESSAYS
IS DETERRENCE THE ONLY OPTION?
James J. Wirtz
Payne, Keith B. The Great American Gamble: Deterrence The-
ory and Practice from the Cold War to the Twenty-First Cen-
tury. Fairfax, Va.: National Institute Press, 2008. 471pp. $19
With a few brief exceptions, the concept of deterrence has guided U.S. nuclear
policy since 1946, the year that Bernard Brodie noted that the purpose of mili-
taries had changed from fighting to deterring wars. Nevertheless, a small but
persistent group of deterrence pessimists remain skeptical about many of the
policies prompted by this so-called nuclear revolution, especially the U.S. deci-
sion in the 1960s to abandon any serious effort at damage limitation by forgoing
a missile-defense program. In their view, deterrence is an incredibly risky way to
guarantee national survival, because it ultimately turns over decisions about na-
tional existence to one’s opponents, who are assumed to be both rational and
risk averse. In their view, it would be better to have the capacity to deny one’s op-
ponents the ability to attack in the first place than to rely on the threat of punish-
ment in retaliation for aggressive behavior.
Written by the leading deterrence pessimist of our day, The Great American
Gamble is the quintessential description of the downside of deterrence, espe-
cially efforts at nuclear deterrence undertaken when both parties in a conflict are
vulnerable to retaliation—a situation that came to be
known during the Cold War as “mutual assured de-
struction.” Keith Payne remains an adherent of
Herman Kahn’s conception of deterrence—that a de-
terrent threat, especially one involving extended de-
terrence, is inherently more credible when it is based
on a war-winning strategy and force structure,
Professor James J. Wirtz is Dean of the School of Inter-
national Graduate Studies, Naval Postgraduate School,
California, and Director of the Global Center for Se-
curity Cooperation, Defense Security Cooperation
Agency. He is coeditor of Complex Deterrence: Strat-
egy in the Global Age (2009).
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generally described as an extremely favorable advantage in damage-limitation
capabilities. The most credible form of nuclear deterrence would amount to an
ability to fight and win a nuclear war, in the sense that damage-limitation capa-
bilities would keep the amount of death and destruction suffered in a nuclear ex-
change to acceptable levels. A robust, prompt hard-target-kill capability, backed
up with active (missile) defenses and passive (civil) defenses, thus becomes criti-
cal to effective deterrence.
By contrast, Payne is critical of Thomas Schelling’s notion of stable deter-
rence, based as it is on such notions as “the threat that leaves something to
chance” and the merits of learning to live with mutual vulnerability. Schelling
believed that mutual societal vulnerability (i.e., forgoing damage-limitation
strategies) would increase arms-race and crisis stability, eliminating what he
considered to be likely pathways to nuclear war. Although Payne’s description of
Schelling’s work is disparaging more in tone than substance, his primary com-
plaint about the Nobel laureate’s effort is that it does not address the problem of
deterrence failure. While Kahn holds out the prospect of damage limitation in
the aftermath of a failure of deterrence, Schelling can only hope for the unlikely
prospect that the ensuing nuclear exchange will end before Armageddon.
It is difficult to argue with Payne’s logic: a war-winning arsenal is the best de-
terrent threat, and a robust damage-limitation capability would of course be
good to have if deterrence failed. But advocacy of these sorts of strategies during
the Cold War was an oddly nonstrategic way of looking at the Soviet-American
nuclear standoff. U.S. policy makers decided they had to learn to live with soci-
etal vulnerability, because they believed that a meaningful damage-limitation
capability was beyond their grasp once the Soviet arsenal reached a certain size.
No one actually chose mutual vulnerability; it was a situation that emerged after
U.S. officials abandoned the notion of preventive war to head off the Soviet nu-
clear menace. One thus might be forgiven for thinking that Schelling’s Nobel
Prize in economics was actually in home economics—that is, for devising a rec-
ipe for turning the sourest of all lemons into lemonade.
The Cold War is now over. Mutual assured destruction no longer character-
izes the “nuclear balance” that exists between the United States and other gov-
ernments and nonstate actors. In other words, Kahn’s conception of deterrence
is now more relevant to the strategic setting than it once was. It is therefore not
surprising that Payne was a leading architect of the George W. Bush administra-
tion’s response to this new threat—the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).
The NPR proposed a new “strategic deterrent” that combined conventional
precision-strike capabilities, new “boutique” nuclear weapons (e.g., low-yield
earth-penetrating nuclear warheads), and missile defenses to deter, and if neces-
sary defeat, these new opponents. Payne’s advocacy of the NPR has gone hand in
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hand with his repeated statements about the weaknesses of deterrence as a pre-
ferred strategy when facing today’s rogues’ gallery of terrorists, millenarians,
dictators, and associated miscreants intent on arming themselves with weapons
of mass destruction. Nevertheless, criticism of the NPR was immediate and
overwhelming, if shallow—critics never admitted that its logic was sound and
its policies coherent, or that concerns about arms-race and crisis instability were
overblown when it came to deterring Iran, North Korea, or al-Qa‘ida. Truth be
told, Schelling’s ideas had become accepted wisdom. Critics did not understand
that the changing strategic setting had actually created the possibility for new
strategic options.
The Great American Gamble is thus part manifesto, part history. It is a call to
remember that deterrence is not the only option available to policy makers when
they contemplate nuclear strategy, that a war-winning capability is the best de-
terrent, and that a robust damage-limitation capability will come in handy if de-
terrence fails. It also is a history of an idea that will not die, despite the fact that it
has been twice defeated: first by Soviet capabilities and Schelling’s ideas, and sec-
ond by the total absence of any congressional or public support for the 2001
NPR.
Today, disarmament is the dominant trend in U.S. nuclear policy; nuclear
modernization programs are virtually nonexistent, as operational forces suffer
“glitches” produced by general inattention to detail. Payne’s ideas are thus likely
to strike contemporary readers as anachronistic. One can only hope the future
confirms that judgment.
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THE PROVINCE OF MORAL COURAGE
Donald Chisholm
Shisler, Gail B. For Country and Corps: The Life of General Oli-
ver P. Smith. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2009.
384pp. $39.95
Sixty years ago the 1st Marine Division (Reinforced) completed its epic fighting
withdrawal, supported by naval aviation, from the Chosin reservoir. Although
bloodied, it finished its embarkation on shipping at Hungnam on 14 December
1950 as an intact fighting unit, having brought with it virtually all its dead,
wounded, equipment, and fighting spirit. The 1st Marine Division left behind a
destroyed Chinese 9th Army Group, inflicting 37,500 combat casualties out of
sixty thousand personnel. This justly famous feat of arms is still celebrated
among Marines, knowledgeable soldiers, and military historians.
Oddly, Oliver Prince Smith, the division’s commanding general and the per-
son most responsible for its successful retrograde, remains relatively unknown
even among present-day Marines. However, Smith warrants close attention, and
plenty of it, not only to secure the historical record but to capture the lessons in
leadership that his performance, not only in Korea but throughout his career,
provides contemporary senior officers of all services. Gail Shisler, the general’s
granddaughter, has written a biography that accomplishes both objectives.
In April 1950, Oliver Smith received orders to command the 1st Marine Divi-
sion, effective 31 July. His initial challenges were to reconstitute the division to
war strength from its thin post–World War II manning and staffing (further re-
duced by a provisional brigade quickly sent to reinforce the Pusan perimeter),
assemble its equipment and supplies, load out for Japan, and on arrival, plan for
the Inchon landing. He did all these things in little more than a month. He sub-
sequently led the division in the assault on Inchon, the operation to retake Seoul,
the fumbled Wonsan landing, and the ill-fated drive to the Yalu (these last two
problems not of his making). He then rehabilitated the division and continued
to command it in combat through May 1951.
It may be that Smith has received less attention than his Korean War seniors,
contemporaries, and subordinate commanders—say,
Douglas MacArthur, Matthew Ridgway, and Lewis
“Chesty” Puller—because he never manifested the
color that readily attracts such audiences and was a
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thoroughly modest man, in no way a constructor or manager of his public im-
age, either during or after the fact. He was taciturn, not obviously emotive in the
professional context, and remained enigmatic (not unlike the Navy’s Raymond
Spruance). He viewed MacArthur and other luminaries with a certain wry de-
tachment and his own appearance on the cover of Time with faint amusement.
Some of Smith’s contemporaries took him for a scholarly, bookish sort, useful
in his way to the Marine Corps but not especially well suited for command of a
division in combat. To be sure, Smith was a scholar; he studied at the French
École de Guerre, and at Marine Corps Schools in Quantico he was known as “the
Professor.” Although he had missed the epic battles of World War I, Guadalcanal,
and Tarawa, he was combat experienced, having served during World War II at
New Britain and Peleliu, as assistant division commander to a difficult com-
manding general, and in Okinawa in the unenviable position of 10th Army as-
sistant chief of staff. Absent General Smith’s consummate professionalism and
courage, the outcomes at Inchon, Seoul, and Chosin would have been decidedly
less favorable, and certainly more costly, for the Marines and for the United
Nations.
Smith’s measure as a combat commander is found in his fundamental grasp
of the implications of the factors of space, time, and force—he commanded at
the tactical level of war but thought at the operational level. Three examples
make the point. During October 1950, when MacArthur’s headquarters already
believed the war would be over before Christmas, Smith had come to think the
opposite. Knowing the severity of Korean winters, he ordered warming tents,
stoves, sleeping bags, winter footgear, and parkas in time to equip his division.
The war did not end as MacArthur anticipated, and that winter proved to be one
of the coldest on record.
Smith’s pragmatic assessment of Chosin’s rugged terrain and roads led him to
build defensible redoubts, with airfields, at Koto-ri and Hagaru-ri in order to
bring in supplies and troops and evacuate the dead and wounded. Photos of the
withdrawal from Chosin show Marines walking, when there was space for them
in the vehicles moving with them. Smith intentionally had his Marines walk out,
knowing that if they rode they would be markedly less combat effective in the
event of ambush.
No rear-echelon commander, throughout Smith constantly used the helicop-
ter (the first combat commander to do so) and jeep to maintain both physical
contact with his division and a practical situational awareness. Simultaneously,
his visits to subordinates were not intrusions but rather the consultations of
warriors that make for superb teamwork. Smith’s deep concern for his men was
marked in his daily personal log, wherein he kept detailed accounting of his ca-
sualties: the general always knew the cost of the objective and of command
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errors. Perhaps the most telling photo of General Smith shows him standing
alone among the graves in the Marines’ cemetery at Hungnam in December
1950.
As officers move up through the grades, the relevant province of courage
shifts from the physical to the moral, a matter that did not escape Smith, and he
was well supplied with it. By this reviewer’s count, on at least five occasions in
1950 Smith spoke truth to power, stoutly resisting plans or orders that in his pro-
fessional experience and judgment were likely to cause loss of blood and trea-
sure without achieving the objective. He insisted that not one but two
amphibiously experienced regiments be employed for the Inchon landing, re-
sulting in the withdrawal of the 5th Marines from the Pusan perimeter in time
for the assault. Smith viewed as ill conceived, and so scotched, a scheme by X
Corps to employ a unit of the 1st Marine Division for a rubber-raft crossing of
the Han River to seize the Kimpo airfield. When urged by the X Corps com-
mander (with whom from the beginning he had enjoyed at best a cool profes-
sional relationship) to speed his division’s advance from Inchon to Seoul, he
responded that the fighting was heavy and that he was already moving with the
greatest dispatch possible. When he learned that the corps commander was at-
tempting to issue orders in this regard directly to his regimental commanders, he
quietly confronted him, and those efforts ceased. While Seoul was still hotly con-
tested, Smith received corps orders for a night attack against apparently retreat-
ing North Korean units. His demurral again was correct: the North Koreans were
advancing, not fleeing. During the October–November advance to the Yalu
River, corps orders dispersed his division over a 125-mile stretch; when exhorted
to move northward faster, Smith decided that he would “drag his feet,” in the be-
lief that the Chinese had entered the war with large, organized units and not the
smattering of individual volunteers higher headquarters optimistically asserted.
This review has focused on but six months of General Smith’s life and career,
which of course do not define his four decades of service. They do, however, pro-
vide a lens through which he and the Marine Corps may be understood, and they
represent what all organizations endeavor to achieve. Moreover, as with most
leaders, Smith’s contributions can be measured only with knowledge of the myr-
iad less visible decisions and actions throughout his entire career—of which
Shisler has recounted many in this book.
Another reason that Smith may not be well-known is that after Korea he was
relegated to relatively invisible administrative posts on his return until retire-
ment—possibly because he presented a profound challenge to the ambitions of
others who actively sought the commandantcy. Notably, until his death in 1977
he maintained a mutually warm and deeply respectful relationship with another
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largely obscure but extraordinary Korean War officer, Vice Admiral James H.
Doyle, the amphibious commander.
Shisler is not the first to publish a biography of General Smith. Clifton La
Bree’s The Gentle Warrior (Kent State Univ. Press, 2001) was assessed by this re-
viewer in this journal. I concluded then that while La Bree did not err in his por-
trait of the general, neither did he capture the essence of Smith’s extraordinary
persona that emerges from the extensive, well organized, and surprisingly inti-
mate personal papers at the Marine Corps Historical Center. Shisler wrote to me
after that review’s appearance and allowed me to read an early draft of what be-
came the present book.
She notes in her preface, “He was just my grandfather.” The cynic might sup-
pose that no man could be as good as O. P. Smith, that this book is simply
“hagiolatry” by an adoring granddaughter. But the cynic would be flat wrong.
Appropriately, Shisler’s affection and respect for her grandfather provided the
animus for the sustained labor required to see such a lengthy project to fruition.
With the counsel of Marine Corps historians, Shisler has written a readable,
carefully researched, well documented, and balanced (if sympathetic) biography
of a man whose life is well worth knowing. In so doing she has joined a small
group of “amateur” historians who have in recent years matched or exceeded the
standards set by “professionals.” As the general himself said to his wife about the
fighting withdrawal from Chosin, “There is quite a story to be told and I hope
some day it will be told properly. There is drama enough for anyone in a plain
factual account of what transpired.”
General Oliver P. Smith deserves greater recognition and his biography war-
rants a wide readership. It is a fine book.
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BOOK REVIEWS
“ON THE CUSP OF A STRONG ALLIANCE?”
James Bellacqua, ed. The Future of China-Russian Relations. Asia in the New Millennium. Lexington: Univ.
Press of Kentucky, 2010. 360pp. $50
China’s rise increasingly forms a domi-
nant theme of discussion in newspapers
and academic journals alike, as Beijing’s
rapid growth will likely have a major
impact on the security of the United
States and its prosperity in the twenty-
first century. A vital element to under-
standing the implications of China’s
rise is to examine closely the most im-
portant of Beijing’s foreign-policy
relationships.
This book, edited by James Bellacqua,
fills a vital niche in this regard and be-
longs on the bookshelves of students of
East Asia, Central Asia, and European
security, as well as on those of general
practitioners of international relations.
Numerous crucial insights emerge from
this rich volume, but among the most
important themes is the apparent con-
sensus among the contributors that
Russia and China are not on the cusp of
a strong alliance to oppose Washington.
Rather, as one might expect, this rela-
tionship between these massive neigh-
bors is uneasy, awkward, and rife with
complexity.
Bellacqua deserves ample credit for
bringing together an all-star cast of
writers for this work. Thus Gilbert
Rozman begins with sounding a warn-
ing that the China-Russia relationship
should not be “underestimated,” ob-
serving that “all . . . forces in recent
years have failed to deter Russia’s lead-
ers from turning ever more toward
China.” On one hand, contributors
warn that Russia-China military exer-
cises have grown in scope and sophisti-
cation, while on the other hand, there
are those who note that Russian arms
sales to China seem to be in a rather
precipitous decline. Rozman’s analysis
of the effect of Putin’s leadership on the
relationship is especially interesting.
For example, he notes that Putin did
not hesitate to remove a regional gover-
nor who had been stoking anti-Chinese
sentiment in the Russian Far East.
An evaluation of the volatility in the
evolving Russia-China energy relation-
ship is a particular strength of this
book. Indeed, the detailed chapter by
Erica Downs is worth reading especially
carefully. She makes a strong and logi-
cal argument that the twists and turns
of their energy relationship have largely
been determined by price. Downs
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writes, “During the 1990s, when oil prices
were low, Russia pushed for expanded
energy cooperation, but China . . . was
reluctant. . . . The rise in world oil
prices . . . turned the tables. . . . China
became more eager . . . [and] Russia be-
came increasingly reluctant to commit
to deeper energy integration.” Whether
this “uncertain courtship” in the energy
sector becomes a more serious relation-
ship will depend on “world oil prices,
China’s willingness to pay more for nat-
ural gas, China’s willingness to play by
Russia’s ‘rules of the game’ . . . and Rus-
sia’s concerns about the ‘China threat.’”
Another valuable contribution is the
collection’s examination of the interac-
tion of regional security issues, such as
in Central Asia or on the Korean Penin-
sula, with the Russia-China relation-
ship. While the Taiwan issue is amply
discussed, another regional security is-
sue could well have a similarly potent
influence on the trajectory of the over-
all relationship between the two coun-
tries. If Russia goes forward with a large
planned sale of weaponry to Vietnam,
including Kilo-class submarines, it will
no doubt cause new tensions between
Moscow and Beijing. This example
serves to illustrate the broader impor-
tance of understanding the Russia-
China relationship for world politics
across all regions and therefore under-




Francis, David J., ed. U.S. Strategy in Africa:
AFRICOM, Terrorism, and Security Challenges.
Oxford, U.K.: Routledge, 2010. 216 pp. $114
After a period of involuntary neglect
due to pressing business elsewhere, the
United States appears to appreciate Af-
rica’s elevated strategic importance in
terms of counterterrorism and energy
security, among other things, and to re-
gard regional stability, democratic de-
velopment, economic reform, good
governance, humanitarian assistance,
and the fight against HIV/AIDS as sub-
sidiary objectives that are conducive to
serving those two interests. This devel-
opment makes this work by David
Francis, holder of the Chair of African
Peace and Conflict Studies at the Uni-
versity of Bradford, timely. Fortunately,
it is also thematically well conceived,
with part 1 laying out U.S. security pol-
icy and part 2 discussing African re-
sponses, the two comprising a broadly
complementary set of earnest assess-
ments by perceptive analysts.
In Washington, the conventional wis-
dom on U.S. Africa Command
(AFRICOM) seems to be that although
the Pentagon established it so awk-
wardly in 2007 that African leaders and
populations worried that it was an in-
strument of neocolonialism, subsequent
adjustments in strategic communica-
tion have largely allayed African fears.
Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, former
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Theresa Whelan’s tidy and professional
précis of the American strategic per-
spective incorporates standard Penta-
gon palliatives and spin control. The
next three chapters are more probing
and provocative.
Daniel Volman makes a forceful argu-
ment that “the difference between
AFRICOM and other commands—and
the allegedly ‘unfounded’ nature of its
implications for the militarization of
the continent—are not as real or as
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genuine” as advertised. Nevertheless, he
appears to exaggerate the importance of
AFRICOM as a geopolitical bulwark
against China, as well as the role of the
Combined Joint Task Force–Horn of
Africa (CJTF-HOA), AFRICOM’s sole
major ground asset, as a platform for
kinetic counterterrorism operations.
Furthermore, the evolution of AFRICOM
over the past two years has cast doubt
on Volman’s characterization of the
command as inimical to “an interna-
tional and multilateral partnership with
African nations.” J. Peter Pham, in his
chapter on terrorism and security chal-
lenges, provides a fuller and more accu-
rate picture of CJTF-HOA’s primary
function (essentially defense diplo-
macy) and a nuanced account of how
AFRICOM might help harmonize Afri-
can and American security interests.
M. A. Mohamed Salih is less sanguine
on that score. His doubts, however, rest
not on assumptions of malign Ameri-
can intent but rather on the insuscepti-
bility of Africans’ profound human-
security problems to military solutions.
In turn, Shannon Beebe, a senior Africa
analyst in the U.S. Department of the
Army, considers a human-security
model for Africa that is self-consciously
at odds with the traditional “state-
centric realist paradigm.” This may
seem like pie in the sky to some, but it
does contain some concrete elements
—for example, free-trade zones to
short-circuit corruption and lubricate
economic activity.
The rejoinders on Africans’ behalf
range from wholesale condemnation to
selective criticism of U.S. policy. Ac-
cording to Jeremy Keenan of the Uni-
versity of London, Africans predomi-
nantly see Washington’s profession of
concern for development and security
as transparent cover for hegemonic as-
sertions of “imperialist power.” Wryly
acknowledging the “cottage industry in
policy discourse” that the establishment
of AFRICOM has produced, Thomas
Kwasi Tieku, a Ghanaian, focuses on
the interplay of AFRICOM and the Af-
rican Union (AU). He notes while the
two are ostensibly compatible, partisan
dialogue between Africans who fear that
American preoccupation with oil sup-
plies and counterterrorism will subor-
dinate the AU and those who hope that
AFRICOM will enable the AU the better
to prevent, manage, and resolve con-
flicts has stalled U.S.-African multi-
lateralism. He constructively urges
conceptualizing the relationship in
terms of hard, soft, and smart power in
order to clarify AFRICOM’s optimal
contribution.
David Chuter offers a sweeping big-
picture essay containing several sharp,
if downbeat, insights. In particular, he
suggests that the optimistic Western
“assumption that a strong organisation
can be created on the basis of weak
states” is especially dubious in the Afri-
can context. In his view, Africa needs to
develop a model of security that “does
not take Western ideas and experiences
as a starting point.” After Josephine
Osikena’s balanced survey of activity
between Africa and other international
actors (especially Brazil, India, and
China), Francis himself provides a tren-
chant conclusion on the future of
U.S.-African relations. Cued by signs of
the potential privatization of U.S. mili-
tary and security operations in Africa
and by the disinclination of Western
analysts to see salient links in Africa be-
tween poverty and political violence, he
duly questions the capacity and will of
the United States to do much more
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than attend to its own core security in-
terests on the continent. More optimis-
tically, he recognizes that the United
States must remain open to debate on
AFRICOM’s proper role. Thus he reca-
pitulates the sensible tone of this fine




Koblentz, Gregory D. Living Weapons: Biological
Warfare and International Security. Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell Univ. Press, 2009. 272pp. $35
Gregory D. Koblentz, the deputy direc-
tor of the Biodefense Graduate Program
and assistant professor of government
and politics at George Mason Univer-
sity, has written an outstanding analysis
of one of the most significant national
security challenges of the modern era.
The author devotes five crisp chapters,
written in easily understandable terms,
to the complexities of the potential use
of biologicals in modern warfare.
He describes the national security im-
plications of the potential use of biolog-
ical weapons by state actors as well as
those with no state affiliation. One of
the areas Koblentz addresses, in neces-
sary detail, is the existence of many bar-
riers to preventing proliferation of
biological weapons by states, nonstate
actors, and terrorists.
Koblentz uses case studies to review the
biological warfare programs of Iraq,
Russia, and South Africa, speculating
on the strategic assessment of the risks
and benefits each country may have
considered in determining whether to
proceed with the development of these
offensive weapons. With each example
the reader is able to understand better
the nature of the biological threat and
how truly difficult it is to control such a
weapon once in an aggressor’s hands.
The United States has the most power-
ful military force of modern times but
is having a most challenging time de-
feating an asymmetric adversary in Af-
ghanistan. When one considers the
potential of a lesser state actor or a ter-
rorist group to develop and use biologi-
cal weapons against a militarily superior
force, one is forced to ask when the use
of this weapon will occur, not if. As
Koblentz astutely points out, “Biologi-
cal weapons were the first weapon pro-
hibited by an international treaty, yet
the proliferation of these weapons in-
creased after they were banned.”
This book is a must-read not only for
the professional military officer, diplo-
mat, and politician but for the average
citizen as well. It is for anyone who
wishes to gain a better understanding of
the current biological weapon threat
and is interested in or responsible for
protecting the nation’s vital interests.
ALBERT J. SHIMKUS, JR.
Naval War College
Potholm, Christian P. Winning at War: Seven
Keys to Military Victory throughout History.
Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2010.
304pp. $39.95
Winning at War is the product of over
forty years of academic inquiry into the
nature of war by Christian Potholm, a
professor of government at Bowdoin
College. He proposes that throughout
history there have been seven keys to
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military victory: “superior weapons and
technology entrepreneurship, superior
discipline, sustained but controlled
ruthlessness, receptivity to military and
integrative innovation, the ability and
willingness to protect capital from peo-
ple and rulers, the centrality of superior
will, and the belief that there will always
be another war.” Drawing on an array
of historical examples from the Pelo-
ponnesian wars to the present, Potholm
builds a case that there is a predictive
formula for success. Application of this
formula depends on strict objectivity,
which explains why he applies a tem-
plate of Mars through which to analyze
the decision for war, its execution, and
final results. Viewing human conflict
through the cold, dispassionate lens of
the god of war, for whom winning is all
that matters, advances the process of
distilling war to its essence.
The premise of this book is provocative
for a couple of reasons. First, it may
seem to the student of military history
problematic that a scholar without
prior military experience would pre-
sume to write authoritatively on war.
After all, many classics of military the-
ory and history were written by scholars
who cut their teeth on the battlefield,
such as Carl von Clausewitz, Mao
Zedong, and Sir Basil Liddell Hart, who
are among those with extensive military
experience whose works are eminent to-
day in the classrooms of our nation’s
service academies and war colleges. Sec-
ond, the book provokes the curious to
see whether the author really is on to
something, having produced a work of
unique value for policy makers and mil-
itary strategists.
In fact, the quality of analysis in Win-
ning at War debunks the myth that
military experience is necessary to write
authoritatively on war. Like Sir Julian
Corbett, who never served in the Royal
Navy yet became Britain’s foremost the-
orist on joint strategy, Potholm’s work
deserves our attention because of his
distinguished credentials. That being
the case, what value does this book have
to offer that cannot be derived from
Thucydides, Sun Tzu, Clausewitz, or
contemporary works like Colin Gray’s
Fighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War,
Peace, and Strategy (2007)? Unlike these
classic authors, Potholm draws his con-
clusions from a comprehensive survey
of military history of over 2,500 years,
being candid about his inclusion of
non-Western examples in the analysis.
Thus, the seven keys were derived from
a vetting process that sought to elimi-
nate the constraining factors of time
and space. Yes, there is familiarity in
each of the seven keys, but when con-
sidered collectively they provide a
unique, succinct guide for when to
avoid, initiate, conduct, or end a war.
Potholm addresses the book’s relevance
by applying the template of Mars to the
current war against “radical jihadist
Salafists.” Holistic application of the
template leaves one hopeful about
American potential for defeating this
type of “postmodern” insurgency. Ulti-
mately, however, the author under-
stands that Mars is rarely pleased by the
way humans conduct war and that war
is a contest of wills that are subject as
much to emotion as to rationality. The
objection to this book, if any, will be
put forward by those who do not be-
lieve that war is a fundamental part of
the human condition.
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Murray, Williamson, and Jim Lacey, eds. The
Making of Peace: Rulers, States, and the Aftermath
of War. New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009.
408pp. $93
There are countless books written on
war but fewer on the problems of post-
war or even intrawar peacemaking. This
work thus offers top-quality case stud-
ies on a subject of enormous relevance.
It will be of value to policy makers, aca-
demics, and general readers alike.
The Making of Peace is a collection of
essays written by eminent historians
known mainly for their writings on war.
Sir Michael Howard’s preface sets the
bar high, observing that the usual
war/peace dichotomy is artificial, since
the historical default is perpetual con-
flicts “that need not necessarily be re-
solved by force, and it is the business of
statesmen to ensure that they are not.”
The book’s central argument is that ef-
fective peacemaking requires in-depth
knowledge of the past; a healthy aware-
ness of the political, historical, and cul-
tural context within which a war has
taken place; and a full appreciation of
the characteristics of the “other.” As
Murray writes in the introduction,
“Without guideposts from the past to
suggest paths to the future, then any
road, no matter how irrelevant and in-
appropriate, will do. And such roads
will inevitably lead to future conflicts.”
However, that is not to imply that there
are easy solutions. At the core of this
book are eleven rich case studies of
postwar peacemaking in the Western
world, including chapters by, of course,
Williamson Murray, as well as Paul
Rahe, Derek Croxton and Geoffrey
Parker, Fred Anderson, Richard Hart
Sinnreich, James McPherson, Marcus
Jones, John Gooch, Colin Gray, Jim
Lacey, and Fred Kagan. Sinnreich offers
a thoughtful conclusion, “History and
the Making of Peace,” which ties to-
gether the major themes and offers
three interesting “theories” of peace, all
the while echoing B. H. Liddell Hart’s
dictum that the best way to formulate
effective grand strategy is to look be-
yond a war to the nature of the peace.
Curiously, the editors stress the impor-
tance of knowing your adversary in
peacemaking, but the volume suffers
from scant attention to non-Western
case studies. Although they anticipate
this criticism, their ethnocentrism de-
tracts from an otherwise sterling collec-
tion of cases, especially when the
United States and its Western allies ac-
tively chase peace with non-Western
adversaries. A more minor flaw is the
absence of a bibliography of key sources
on peacemaking, or even just those
used in this book. Nonetheless, this is
an impressive collection for students of
strategy and history, as all serious pol-
icy makers, practitioners, and informed
citizens ought to be.
AUDREY KURTH CRONIN
National War College
Iguchi, Takeo. Demystifying Pearl Harbor: A New
Perspective from Japan. Translated by David No-
ble. Tokyo: I-House, 2010. 343pp. $60
This carefully researched book pains-
takingly corrects the diplomatic history
surrounding Japan’s attack on Pearl
Harbor. The author is a retired Japa-
nese ambassador who was the young
son of the Japanese counselor in Wash-
ington, D.C., on 7 December 1941. Un-
like too many Japanese writers, Iguchi
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is no apologist for the sneak attack.
Rather he objectively analyzes recently
released empirical evidence that reveals
the individuals truly responsible for de-
laying lawful notice to the United States
about the coming attack. The fault did
not rest with the embassy staff, as por-
trayed to the Tokyo war crimes tribu-
nal, but with a conspiracy to cover up
facts, a conspiracy that is now traceable
to high-level officials who deliberately
delayed Foreign Ministry telegrams.
Moreover, the Japanese notes delivered
to then–secretary of state Cordell Hull
shortly after the attack were not
declaration-of-war ultimatums as re-
quired by international law but watered-
down notices about the termination of
bilateral negotiations. The unmistak-
able conclusion from the evidence is
that the officials in power wanted to
catch the Americans off guard.
Iguchi writes from firsthand experience
and with convincing passion about
those in Japan who even now do not
want to accept responsibility for their
country’s perfidious actions. He cites
authoritatively from official, insider rec-
ords, not only placing blame where it
belongs but also clearing up the record
to allow closure, moving to more open
and honest U.S.-Japanese relations.
The book provides a detailed time-line
context for the foreign policy pursued
by Japan throughout 1940–41, when the
focus of the Japanese military was on
China and the Soviet Union. Iguchi re-
jects the thesis that American economic
sanctions and demands for a complete
withdrawal of Japanese forces from
China forced Japan into war. Iguchi
identifies powerful Japanese strategic
thinkers who believed that the only way
resource-poor Japan could win a war
against the United States and Great
Britain was by a quick and devastating
surprise attack. Iguchi also documents
contrary views held by influential Japa-
nese leaders at the time who tried to
halt the momentum for war.
Iguchi does not believe there was an
American conspiracy to provoke war
with Japan. He also rejects such myths
as that Roosevelt knew in advance of
the Pearl Harbor attack or that Chur-
chill was responsible, meaning to draw
the United States into war against
Hitler.
The value of this book is in how can-
didly and accurately Iguchi documents
the historical context for the Pacific
War. He explains Japanese motives
based on his unique personal experi-
ences, reinforced by formerly classified
internal Japanese records. There is no
forgiving Japan’s cowardly attack on
Pearl Harbor, but there is much to ad-
mire about a senior Japanese diplomat
who courageously does his best to set
the record straight.
MYRON H. NORDQUIST
University of Virginia School of Law
Charlottesville, Virginia
Thomas, Evan. The War Lovers: Roosevelt, Lodge,
Hearst, and the Rush to Empire, 1898. New York:
Little, Brown, 2010. 413pp. $29.99
American journalist and historian Evan
Thomas has once again proved why he
is among the foremost modern scholars
of American history, culture, and poli-
tics. The War Lovers is a captivating
chronicle of war fever and calculated
crisis manipulated by key leaders in the
run-up to the twentieth century and
culminating in the Spanish-American
War. Thomas assembles a compelling
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historical record for the case that the
war was a conflict of choice, shaped by
powerful politicians and statesmen and
exploited by a rabidly sensationalist
newspaper editor. Reasons for their
conduct abound, from simple machis-
mo to earnest belief in the national
interest, from greed to pure self-
indulgence and an insatiable appetite
for controversy. Thomas reveals an in-
structive case study for current military
and civilian national security profes-
sionals on the causal factors for war and
the agendas that influence national de-
cision making. He weaves the arche-
typal cautionary tale, making clear that
conflict is sometimes the product of ir-
rational and intensely personal calculus
rather than the pure strategic realpolitik
taught in universities and the war
colleges.
The author recasts the image of Theo-
dore Roosevelt from that of the conven-
tional wisdom—the loyal, altruistic
model nationalist—to that of a sophis-
tic, scheming demagogue willing to
stage-manage U.S. foreign policy to his
own egotistic ends and driven by psy-
chological factors, including an extreme
case of father worship. Roosevelt’s
self-loathing, in this view, was so com-
plete that it transformed his outlook
with absolute sincerity—introspection
was not Roosevelt’s strong suit. Simi-
larly, Thomas paints the statesman and
virtual New England hereditary peer
Henry Cabot Lodge as a puppeteer,
dancing marionettes across a stage to
demonstrate his power and influence.
William Randolph Hearst’s legend as a
muckraking proprietor of “journalism
that acts” needs little exposition, but
Thomas fleshes out his character with
a healthy degree of cynicism and edgy
historical humor. The author develops
a plotline of interaction between these
three principal actors and establishments
—the Washington political establish-
ment, embodied by Speaker Thomas
Reed, the Boston Brahmin social estab-
lishment, and the Harvard set—showing
the tensions and their resolutions in a
way that makes the characters at once
real, competent, ludicrous, vulnerable,
haughty, adventurous, and patriotic.
Thomas himself is of relatively high
birth, the son of a literary editor and
grandson of a Princeton graduate and
presidential candidate. Although edu-
cated at Phillips Andover, Harvard, and
the University of Virginia’s law school,
he shows mercy in describing the con-
ceit and self-importance of fellow Har-
vard men Roosevelt and Lodge.
The takeaway for this reviewer is that
actors are more complex than the over-
simplified caricatures that the modern
press, the academy, and political society
sometimes make them out to be. Roo-
sevelt is often caricatured as a cigar-
chomping outdoorsman and man of
adventure, leading from the front in the
Cuban campaign and earning accolades
and medals for altruistic heroism. In re-
ality, the picture of Roosevelt painted
by Thomas is of a man not nearly so
selflessly patriotic and capable but
rather of one who was willing to subor-
dinate the national interest to his own
ends.
Thomas shows that in similar circum-
stances about a hundred years ago, sim-
ilar actors with analogous agendas acted
in comparable ways, perhaps for similar
purposes. The image of Teddy Roose-
velt, the purest American loyalist,
charging up San Juan Hill to liberate
Cuba from the malicious Spanish re-
gime is insufficient to capture the total
picture of the complex political,
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military, and strategic confluence that
led to the Spanish-American War. The
question for the polity is how to design
a system that marginalizes these per-
sonal agendas and ideologies to ensure
that questions of war are indeed an-
swered with morality, proper state be-
havior, and national self-interest as the
foremost considerations. Books like The
War Lovers are instructive in ensuring
we are not doomed to repeat history, or
at least that we can recognize it when
we are.
LT. COL. ROBERT GRAY BRACKNELL, U.S. MARINE
CORPS
Kabul, Afghanistan
Lieven, Dominic. Russia against Napoleon: The
True Story of the Campaigns of War and Peace.
New York: Viking, 2010. 618pp. $35.95
The Napoleonic Wars are not excep-
tions to the rule that the victor of war
writes the history. Yet there is a strange
omission: the mythic history of Napo-
leon and Russia has been produced
almost wholly by the British and Ger-
mans and focuses on the events of 1813
and 1814. Yes, the disastrous French
campaign in Russia is viewed as the be-
ginning of the end and treated as Napo-
leon’s mistake, but if the Russians are
offhandedly thanked for the war of at-
trition they fought in 1812, their partic-
ipation in Western Europe in 1813 and
1814 has been downplayed. This is de-
spite the startling fact that 650,000 Rus-
sians operated in the West in those
years and in fact trooped into Paris in
March 1814.
Even historians of Russia have not
made much of the role the Russians
played in 1813–14. They could not do
so, of course, given the lack of archival
access. But one must also consider the
impact of the myth of 1812, promul-
gated in War and Peace and later rein-
forced by the “populism” of the Russian
Revolution. Tolstoy’s myth emphasizes
weather, great distances, Napoleon’s
overconfidence, and especially the her-
oism of the long-suffering Russian peo-
ple, who overcame not only the French
but the incompetence of the tsar and
his advisers and generals. All this reso-
nated well with the subsequent need of
nineteenth-century revolutionaries and
Soviets to downplay the successes of the
old regime.
Dominic Lieven’s Russia against Napo-
leon corrects the existing omission by
bringing to light Russia’s preparation
for and the execution of its involvement
in the diplomatic, political, and military
struggle against Napoleon from the
signing of the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807
until 1814. If Lieven is to be congratu-
lated for being the first to use Russian
sources, available only since 1990, he
deserves greater praise for resisting the
urge to make his story part of the even-
tual fall of the tsarist regime. One could
really not ask for more in the way of a
military history. It is exhaustively thor-
ough, cognizant of the relationships of
intelligence, diplomacy, and domestic
politics to war, and properly limited in
scope and conclusions.
Lieven convincingly demonstrates the
real accomplishments in terms of strat-
egy and execution of war of Alexander
I, his foreign-policy advisers, Count
Nesselrode’s Paris intelligence apparat,
and military officers. His greater
achievement, however, is his focus on
logistics and—what might seem to be a
minor matter—the role of the horse.
These are perhaps the largest and most
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interesting aspects of the Russian suc-
cess story. If in 1807 the Russian state
and army were inarguably “Old Re-
gime” compared to the West, by 1814
the Russian ability to project military
power beyond the country’s borders
was formidable. This project depended,
most of all, on the ability to move and
feed men.
To some, the role of “horsepower” in
early modern war will seem a revela-
tion, even though the fact that Napo-
leon could replace men but not the
horses in Russia in 1812 is already
well-known. Lieven tells us that the
horse was the most significant military
asset of its time: “The horse fulfilled the
present-day functions of the tank, the
lorry, the aeroplane and motorized ar-
tillery. It was in other words the
weapon of shock, pursuit, reconnais-
sance, transport, and mobile fire-
power.” Interestingly, nowhere does he
say what immediately leaps to the
reader’s mind—that what the Russians
knew about horsepower mirrored what
the Soviets understood about tanks
during World War II.
KENNETH M. JENSEN
McLean, Virginia
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OF SPECIAL INTEREST
CALL FOR PAPERS: JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS
The editorial board of the Journal of International Security Affairs (ISSN
1532-4060) invites submissions of papers for its Fall 2011 issue. The Journal,
published twice yearly by the nonprofit, nonpartisan Jewish Institute for Na-
tional Security Affairs, covers U.S. military and global security issues affect-
ing the United States and its allies abroad. All articles submitted to the
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REFLECTIONS ON READING
Professor John E. Jackson is the Naval War College’s manager for the
Navy Professional Reading Program.
The Navy Professional Reading Program (NPRP) was established by theChief of Naval Operations (CNO) in October 2006 to encourage sailors at
all levels to participate in a self-paced program of professional development
based on reading books on topics relevant to Navy professionals. Over 1,200
lending libraries of books were established on ships and stations throughout the
Navy, and the sixty carefully selected books were stocked in Navy Exchanges
worldwide. Feedback from the fleet has indicated a widespread awareness of the
program and broad acceptance of the books that constitute the NPRP. Admiral
Michael Mullen, then CNO, approved the initial sixty titles, and the present
CNO, Admiral Gary Roughead, refined the list in October 2008 with the substi-
tution of five new titles that replaced books deemed of lesser importance. The
revised list of sixty books—designated “NPRP 2.0”—now constitutes the offi-
cial NPRP library, which can be found at www.navyreading.navy.mil.
Within the NPRP library there are many excellent books of enduring value,
and efforts are made to avoid wholesale changes that would create excessive
turnover within the various collections. To provide structure to the program
and to assist readers in focusing their interest in specific areas, the books are di-
vided by subject matter into six broad categories (Critical Thinking, Joint and
Combined Warfare, Regional and Cultural Awareness, Leadership, Naval and
Military Heritage, and Management and Strategic Planning). While any sailor
can read any book, the list is also stratified by grade level for readers interested in
a suggested path to follow.
In preparation for the program’s fifth anniversary, the entire library is being
reviewed to identify books that might be “retired” to make room for new titles.
Budgetary and shipboard storage constraints drive the need to maintain a steady
state of sixty books per library set. While the NPRP Advisory Group is conduct-
ing a thorough review of newly published works and is revisiting the decisions
that produced both the 1.0 and 2.0 lists, the NPRP program manager is also
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seeking input from the Navy population at large. Factors to be considered in rec-
ommending books for inclusion in a new list, “NPRP 3.0,” include:
• Is the book of interest and value to a large number of sailors? (Books that
focus narrowly on subject matter that pertains to a small and specialized
portion of the Navy are more appropriate to community-specific venues.)
• Is the book currently in print and available for purchase by the program of-
fice and individual sailors?
• Is the book clearly written and factually accurate?
• Does the book avoid advocacy for radical ideas and concepts that are in-
compatible with the Navy’s core values?
Suggestions for books that should be considered for inclusion in the next re-
vision of the NPRP should be forwarded by e-mail to navyreading@usnwc.edu
or by mail to Navy Professional Reading Program, College of Distance Educa-
tion, Naval War College, 686 Cushing Road, Newport, Rhode Island, 02841.
Please provide the book title, publication date, publisher’s name, and ISBN
number (if known), and a brief (one-or-two-paragraph) synopsis of the book’s
content and of your opinion on its value to sailors and why it should be incorpo-
rated into the NPRP. Please also provide your contact information, in the event
that additional information is needed.
Thanks in advance for helping to improve the Navy Professional Reading
Program. Well-read sailors are effective sailors! Help us prepare our Navy for the
challenging future ahead.
JOHN E. JACKSON
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